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We are witnessing today the beginning of  a return to and renewal of  the theory and 
practice of  political revolution. This return to revolution, however, takes none of  the 
traditional forms: the capture of  the state, the political representation of  the party, the 
centrality of  the proletariat, or the leadership of  the vanguard. Rather, given the failure of  
such tactics over the last century, coupled with the socio-economic changes brought by 
neoliberalism in the 1980s, revolutionary strategy has developed in a more heterogenous and 
non-representational direction. The aim of  this dissertation is to map an outline of  this new 
direction by drawing on the theory and practice of  two of  its main inspirations: French 
political philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari and, what the New York Times has 
called “the first post-modern revolution,” the 1994 Zapatista Uprising in Chiapas, Mexico. 
The aim of  this dissertation is thus threefold. First, I provide a philosophical clarification and 
outline of  a revolutionary strategy that both describes and advances the process of  
constructing real alternatives to state-capitalism. Second, I focus on three influential and 
emblematic figures of  revolutionary history, mutually disclosive of  one another, as well as this 
iv
larger revolutionary return: Deleuze, Guattari, and the Zapatistas. Third, and more specifically, 
I propose four novel theoretical practices that characterize this return to revolution: (1) a 
multi-centered diagnostic of  political power; (2) a prefigurative theory of  political 
transformation; (3) a participatory theory of  the body politic; and (4) a theory of  political 
belonging based on mutual global solidarity.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
We have to try and think a little about the meaning of  revolution. This term is now so 
broken and worn out, and has been dragged through so many places, that its necessary to go 
back to a basic, albeit elementary, definition. A revolution is something of  the nature of  a 
process, a change that makes it impossible to go back to the same point. . . . a repetition that 
changes something, a repetition that brings about the irreversible. A process that produces 
history, taking us away from a repetition of  the same attitudes and the same significances. 
Therefore, by definition, a revolution cannot be programmed, because what is programmed 
is always the deja-la. Revolutions, like history, always bring surprises. By nature they are always 
unpredictable. That doesn’t prevent one from working for revolution, as long as one 
understands “working for revolution” as working for the unpredictable. 
Félix Guattari (2008, 258)
Introduction
 We are witnessing today the beginning of  a return and renewal of  revolution. This 
return, however, takes none of  the traditional forms: the capture of  the state, the political 
representation of  the party, the centrality of  the proletariat, or the leadership of  the 
vanguard. Rather, given the failure of  such tactics over the last century, coupled with the 
socio-economic changes brought by neoliberalism in the 1980s, revolutionary strategy has 
developed in more heterogenous and non-representational directions. The aim of  this 
dissertation is to map an outline of  these new directions by drawing on the theory and 
practice of  two of  its main inspirations: French political philosophers Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari and what many have called “the first post-modern revolution,” the 1994 
Zapatista Uprising in Chiapas, Mexico (Burbach 1994; 1996; Carrigan 1995; Golden 1994; 
2001). 
 There are two important reasons for undertaking a philosophical interrogation of  
this admittedly young revolutionary direction. First, political life does not have the leisure to 
wait until after the revolution for the hindsight of  philosophical inquiry. If  philosophy 
waited until a new political form of  revolution had already come and gone, it would be 
useless in the formation of  the revolutionary process itself. Thus, it is not in spite of, but 
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rather precisely because of  the fact that we are in the middle of  this return to revolution that 
a philosophical interrogation and clarification of  its practical meaning is needed. Second, 
since the turn of  the century we have heard consistently from the Left (the Anti-
globalization movement and the World Social Forum in particular) that “another world is 
possible.” But what we have not heard is, more positively, what this alternative world to 
neoliberal capitalism is. Beyond the political philosophy of  possibility, what is needed is a 
more constructive theory and practice of  this “other world.” I believe we can locate the 
beginnings of  this world in the work of  Deleuze, Guattari, and the Zapatistas. 
 The aim of  this dissertation is thus threefold: First, to provide a philosophical 
clarification and outline of  a revolutionary strategy that both describes and advances the 
process of  constructing real alternatives to state-capitalism. Second, to do so by focusing on 
three influential and emblematic figures of  its history, mutually disclosive of  one another as 
well as this larger revolutionary return: Deleuze, Guattari, and the Zapatistas. Third, and 
more specifically, this dissertation proposes four novel theoretical practices that characterize 
this return to revolution: (1) a multi-centered diagnostic of  political power; (2) a prefigurative 
theory of  political transformation; (3) a participatory theory of  the body politic; and (4) a 
political theory of  belonging based on mutual global solidarity. 
Methodology
Deleuze and Guattari
 Thus, with the aim of  developing these four theoretical practices, I draw from 
Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy by extracting from them the concepts that are 
most relevant and thematically productive to the problematic at hand. Rather than a linear 
exegesis or intellectual history of  Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of  revolution, I adopt 
instead a problem oriented approach that focuses on four central questions of  revolutionary 
2
praxis taken up in each chapter: What is the relationship between history and revolution? 
What is revolutionary transformation? How is it possible to sustain and carry out the 
consequences of  a revolutionary transformation? And how do revolutions connect up each 
other to produce a new form of  world-wide solidarity? Deleuze and Guattari never wrote a 
book, or more than a couple of  focused pages at a time, on the concept of  political 
revolution.1 In fact, the present dissertation is the first and only full length work to centrally 
thematize this concept in their oeuvre. Because their usage of  the concept of  revolution was 
topical and problematic, created to be put to use, so my own methodology will follow suit. 
Additionally, this methodology allows for the most productive and focused use of  their 
work, as it deals with one concept per chapter and aims to connect it directly to the political 
practices of  the Zapatistas. 
 Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy is not only conceptually advantageous to 
this effort, it is historically relevant as well. Deleuze and Guattari, unlike most of  their 
philosophical contemporaries after the revolutionary events of  May 1968, remained openly 
faithful to the concept of  revolution throughout their work. In fact, it is in the aftermath of  
the failure of  many of  the political experiments that happened in the 60s around the world 
that Deleuze and Guattari wrote their largest work of  political philosophy, Capitalisme et 
schizophrénie, volumes one and two (1972, 1980). They were witnessing then the end of  what 
Alain Badiou has called “the last great emancipatory narrative: the revolutionary Party-
State.” (Badiou 2010a, 101; 2010b, 67). Accordingly, in Capitalism and Schizophrenia, revolution 
is consistently valorized and juxtaposed against State-Capitalism as well as State-Socialism 
and the Party/Union Bureaucracy heavily criticized in France and around the world in the 
60s and 70s. During the increasingly conservative and reactionary years of  the 70s and 80s, 
3
1 Although one might argue that their political philosophy in general expresses a theory of  revolution. For 
example, Guattari’s book, Molecular revolution: psychiatry and politics (1984) may be understood to be just this.
Deleuze and Guattari worked tirelessly, in their single largest work, toward a political 
philosophy that would no longer be subordinated to State, Party, or Vanguardism. If  we 
want to look for some of  the earliest philosophical origins of  the contemporary 
revolutionary sequence, it is in these dark but fecund years (70s and 80s) that Deleuze and 
Guattari, perhaps more prolifically, and perhaps more influentially than any other major 
philosophers at the time, created political concepts most consonant with the networked 
horizontalism that characterizes today’s revolutionary return.2 It was also during these same 
years that another influential revolution was being prepared, not in France, but in the 
mountains of  the Mexican Southeast.
 Yes, Deleuze and Guattari never wrote a book on political revolution, but this does 
not mean that they did not write about revolution extensively and consistently throughout 
their political philosophy. If  this dissertation has adopted the method of  creating concepts 
through the assembly of  heterogenous fragments from Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy of 
revolution, it is not only out of  methodological affinity, but out of  a practical necessity of  
doing so as well. And if  this dissertation has chosen to extract these concepts from Deleuze 
and Guattari rather than other political philosophers in this time period, it is because 
Deleuze and Guattari never gave up on their belief  that a world-wide revolution could 
emerge from the smallest of  political experiments without the representation of  the State, 
Party, Vanguard, or proper class consciousness, as indeed it did with the Zapatistas.  
Zapatismo
 But if  Deleuze and Guattari theorized this nascent revolutionary sequence so well, 
why the need to extract anything from the Zapatistas to create these four theoretical 
practices? Although not exactly the same, what I am calling the recent return to revolution 
4
2 Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophical and political influence on Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, in 
particular, is well known. 
can be loosely associated with the popular emergence of  what the media (and not the 
activists themselves) have named The Anti-Globalization Movement (AGM). While the 
AGM and groups like Peoples Global Action (PGA) and the World Social Forum are a 
significant part of  the present revolutionary sequence, the sequence itself  is not reducible to 
the features of  these groups, in part because these meta-groups are composed of  thousands 
of  sub-groups from around the world. In any case, the AGM did not start in Seattle in 1999. 
Most of  the historical scholarship on the AGM dates it from 1994, that is, from the 
beginning of  the Zapatista uprising (Notes from Nowhere 2003; Khasnabish 2008; Curran 
2006; Engler 2007). Zapatismo and the Intercontinental Encuentros were the first and largest 
global anti-neoliberal gatherings of  their kind and gave birth to several important groups like 
the PGA (Khasnabish 2008, 238; Olesen 2005). And although they are obviously not the 
only source of  inspiration, it is well documented that the Zapatistas’ declarations against all 
forms of  domination, their strategic refusal of  capturing state or party power, their creation 
of  directly democratic consensus-based communes, and their vision of  a mutual global 
solidarity network were all highly visible and have had a lasting impact on revolutionary 
theory and practice today (Khasnabish 2008). Thus, understanding Zapatismo is quite 
important to understanding the larger movement currently underway.3 
 But my argument that we are witnessing a new revolutionary sequence is not merely 
an empirical one, although many strong empirical arguments for the emergence of  a new 
revolutionary sequence have been made (and in far more complete ways than I am capable 
of  here).4 I am thus truly indebted to those works, which are like the empirical companion to 
5
3 There are, however, a lot more influences on todays radical left organizing than the Zapatistas.
4 The World Social Forum’s Charter of  Principles also supports several of  the theoretical practices I propose in 
this dissertation (World Social Forum 2001). 
this philosophical dissertation.5 What I am arguing instead is that, in addition to this 
descriptive history of  the past fifteen years of  struggle, we can also define the emergence of  
this new revolutionary sequence by its creation of  a set of  novel and coherent philosophical 
concepts. But since locating these concepts in even the most active organizations of  the last 
fifteen years is well beyond the scope of  the present work, I want to focus on a deeper 
analysis of  two of  the earliest, most influential, and most prolific sites of  this often cited 
“return to revolution”: Deleuze, Guattari, and Zapatismo.       
 Accordingly, I try to give equal qualitative importance to extracting my theoretical 
practices from the political writings and actions of  Deleuze, Guattari, and the Zapatistas 
(although I admittedly spend more quantitative time with Deleuze and Guattari in this 
dissertation). Politics, I hope to demonstrate, has its own thinking and does not need 
philosophy to think for it or represent its thought back to it (Lazarus 1996; Badiou 2005a; 
Foucault 1977). Rather, what the Zapatistas offer that other activists and philosophers do 
not is a particularly prolific and conceptually creative site at the beginning of  this new and 
still unclear revolutionary sequence. Many have gone as far as to call them the first “post-
communist,” “post-modern” (Golden 1994), and “post-representational” revolution 
(Tormey 2006; Proyect 2003). This dissertation thus aims to contribute some novel 
philosophical clarifications, not for the Zapatistas themselves, but for others who wish to 
understand and continue the Zapatista struggle elsewhere. But as these practices appear only 
here and there in various writings and political actions over a fifteen-year period and never in 
a coherently self-described manifesto, the method of  extraction and creative reassembly is 
one of  necessity with the Zapatistas as well.
6
5 In addition to all of  the literature on the Anti-Globalization Movement cited in my dissertation, I am 
indebted to the following articles (Harvey 2010; Graeber 2002; Grubacic and Graeber 2004).
Assembly, Relay, and Contribution
 But if  Deleuze, Guattari, and the Zapatistas share in common their being particularly 
early and influential sources of  concepts for the philosophical development of  what myself  
and others (Graeber 2002; Grubacic and Graeber 2004) are calling the present revolutionary 
sequence, what is their relationship to one another in a philosophy dissertation 
methodologically based on conceptual creation through extraction and reassembly? First, I 
certainly do not want to argue for a direct mutual influence between Deleuze and Guattari 
and the Zapatistas. Despite being more of  a historical/empirical question than a 
philosophical one, it is also highly unlikely (and not worth trying to map their degrees of  
separation). Deleuze and Guattari, to my knowledge, were not aware of  the early stages of  
the Zapatista uprising (before 1994), nor were the Zapatistas likely readers of  Deleuze and 
Guattari’s work leading up to 1994. Second, I do not want to argue that we should use 
Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy to interpret, explain, or understand the 
Zapatistas, any more than I want to argue that we should use the Zapatista uprising to 
legitimate, ground, or justify Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy. This approach not 
only presupposes a privileged foundationalism of  theory over practice, or practice over 
theory, but it also risks perpetuating a long legacy of  Eurocentrism and theoretical 
imperialism (Spivak 2010). Thirdly, the aim of  this dissertation is not to discover in either 
Deleuze and Guattari, or the Zapatistas the philosophical foundations of  all political life or 
“the political,” in part because this task is conceptually totalitarian, but also in part because 
this task is impossible and only reveals to us the un-grounded and anti-foundational 
character of  political being as such (Lacoue-Labarthe, Nancy, and Derrida 1997). So rather 
than argue the point of  political anti-foundationalism that has been argued elsewhere and 
much better,  this dissertation is proposing a different project. 
7
 This dissertation instead proposes to read Deleuze and Guattari and the Zapatistas 
side-by-side using the differences between theory and practice as a productive system of  
relays from which to create concepts for use elsewhere. Where a theoretical action is unclear, 
weak, or too general, a practical action will clarify, strengthen, or specify how to open up 
theory in a new direction, and vice versa. Where one hits a wall, the other might break 
through, not as a substitute for the other but as a relay or assemblage of  two heterogenous 
actions: theory and practice (Foucault 1977, 207). This methodology of  doing political 
philosophy by extracting and reassembling a system of  useful practical-theoretical relays is 
one used by Deleuze, Guattari, and Foucault, and one I follow in this dissertation. 
Accordingly, philosophy, for Deleuze and Guattari, is political in so far as it is directed 
toward creating concepts that are “adequate to what is happing around us. It must adopt as 
its own those revolutions going on elsewhere, in other domains, or those that are being 
prepared” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 100; Deleuze 2004, 138). This dissertation thus 
adopts as its own the current revolution in preparation. 
 But this adoption and adequation is not a matter of  representation or resemblance. 
Intellectuals do not simply stand at the front and off  to the side of  revolutionary struggles 
as its representatives (Foucault 1977, 208). Whether theory is supposed to inform practice or 
practice is supposed to inform theory, in each case their relationship has typically been a 
totalization of  one over the other (1977, 206). In contrast, the goal of  developing a political 
philosophy of  practical-theoretical relays is not to ground one in the other or to describe/
interpret the world more accurately, but rather to transform the world itself  through the 
creation of  a new assemblage. Theory does not cause praxis, nor does praxis cause theory: 
both are heterogeneous components constitutive of the practical-theoretical arrangement 
itself. The political analysis of  revolutionary movements is thus never a question of  
representation, interpretation, or of  “speaking for others;” rather, as Guattari says, “[i]t is a 
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question of  situating their trajectory to see whether they are in a position to serve as 
indicators of  new universes of  references that could acquire sufficient consistency to bring 
about a radical change in the situation” (2008, 328). But, as Guattari continues, because 
“there are no universal scientific models with which to try to understand a situation . . . 
known in advance of  the situation,” one must continually develop new concepts that help 
articulate the situation, not represent it (2008, 343, 397). This is what I have aimed to do with 
the four concepts I propose in this dissertation. 
 So, if  there are no universal foundations or categories for all political life, as Guattari 
argues, then the goal of  political philosophy changes significantly. If  the role of  leadership 
and critique are forever bound by the question of  political foundations, then the alternative 
task of  an engaged political philosopher  is to intervene and contribute immanently to 
political struggles themselves just like anyone else. Or as Subcomandante Marcos says, “We 
had to be honest and tell people that we had not come to lead anything of  what might 
emerge. We came to release a demand, that could unleash others” (Marcos 2001c). Or 
perhaps as Foucault says of  his own philosophical interventions, 
 So, since there has to be an imperative, I would like the one underpinning the 
 theoretical analysis we are attempting to be quite simply a conditional imperative of  
 the kind: If  you want to struggle, here are some key points, here are some lines of  
 force, here are some constrictions and blockages. In other words, I would like these 
 imperatives to be no more than tactical pointers. Of  course, it’s up to me, and those 
 who are working in the same  direction, to know on what fields of  real forces we need 
 to get our bearings in order to make a tactically effective analysis. But this is, after all, 
 the circle of  struggle and truth, that is to say, precisely, of  philosophical practice. 
 (2007, 3)
In sum, the aim of  the present dissertation, in addition to the aforementioned three aims is, 
following Marcos, Marx, and Foucault, not to interpret the world, but to transform it by 
releasing concepts that might unleash something else. Thus the ultimate criteria of  success 
for the four concepts proposed in this dissertation is not whether they have accurately 
described the world, but whether they will have been useful to those engaged in the present 
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revolutionary task of  changing it. 
  
Interventions
 The question of  general methodology being resolved, what are the specific 
philosophical interventions being proposed in this dissertation as regards the work of  
Deleuze and Guattari, and the Zapatistas? That is, within what readings, contexts, and 
assumptions do I propose to draw on these political thinkers? In this next section I propose 
two interventions, one into the scholarly literature on Deleuze and Guattari and one into the 
political commentary written on the Zapatista uprising. In both cases my conclusion is 
similar: to reject reading them as either theories of  political representation or as theories of  
political differentiation. I propose, rather, to read them as theories of  political 
constructivism, that is, as contributions to the creation of  a new collective political body. I 
deal firstly with Deleuze and Guattari.   
Deleuze, Guattari, and Representation 
 Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy, due in part to the increasing amount of  
anti-capitalist activity in the last fifteen years, has recently come to significant scholarly 
attention, and with this attention the concept of  revolution has emerged as a central point of 
interest. Paul Patton has gone as far as to say that revolutionary deterritorialization is the 
normative concept underlying their entire political philosophy (2000, 10).6 And in his book, 
Deleuze and Guattari: an introduction to the politics of  desire, Philip Goodchild locates their 
“concern for the immanent transformation of  society [revolutionary desire] as the sole 
purpose of  their political philosophy” (1996, 5). But within this common interest one can 
see the formulation of  at least two well-argued readings of  this concept. 
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6 “In all cases, [Deleuze] presents a world understood as a complex of  interconnected assemblages (earth, 
territory, forms of  deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation), where the overriding norm is that of  
deterritorialisation.”
 On the one side Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of  revolution is read as a process by 
which marginalized or minor peoples come to be increasingly included and represented by 
the Liberal Democratic State. We can see this type of  reading in the work of  Anglophone 
scholar Paul Patton (translator of  Différence and Répétition, 1968, and author of  Deleuze and the 
Political, 2000), as well as the Francophone scholar Philippe Mengue (author of  Deleuze et la 
question de la démocratie, 2003). Revolution, as a real object of  political aims, according to 
Mengue, should be considered as a process of  becoming-mediated and represented under a 
democratic state. Non-mediated, non-representational politics, according to Mengue, are not 
only highly speculative, but practically impossible and undesirable.  
 What is the big difficulty of  micropolitics? It is that it refuses all mediation and 
 representation. It pretends to  be capable of  doing it, but—letting aside, for a 
 moment, the problem of  the theoretical or speculative validity of  such a 
 thesis—experience has shown that this refusal is absolutely impossible and not even 
 desirable. Indeed, politics is linked to the function of  mediation and 
 representation—the doxic plane of  immanence guarantees it...opinion is at the heart 
 of  politics. (2009, 172) 
Similarly, Paul Patton highlights the figure of  “becoming-democratic” in Deleuze and 
Guattari's later work and argues that, despite their lack of  a normative political position, 
there are certainly democratic principles implicit in their political philosophy. Despite 
Deleuze and Guattari’s frequent criticisms against modern state democracies, Patton argues 
that “the appearance of  'becoming-democratic' in What Is Philosophy? represents a new turn 
in Deleuze and Guattari's political thought” (2008, 178). Specifically, it takes a normative 
turn in favor of  the institutions, rights, and values of  modern liberal democracy. 
 While this position may not be the dominant reading of  Deleuze and Guattari’s 
concept of  revolution, the authors of  this position have certainly contributed to a healthy 
debate over the concept. Despite a host of  agreements I have with these authors in other 
areas, I find a few problems with this position. Firstly, it seems a bit strange to say, as 
Mengue implies, that the historical practice of  direct democracy (non-representational, non-
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mediated democracy) would be simply speculative. Countless volumes on the history of  the 
Paris Commune, the Spanish Civil War, the Landless Peasants Movement in Brazil, and 
others (not to mention those of  many Indigenous peoples like the Zapatistas), attest to the 
the very non-speculative nature of  direct versus representational democracy. There is a 
meaningful distinction between the two that remains unaddressed by both Patton and 
Mengue. Secondly, if  these events have been experienced, as Mengue claims, they could not 
possibly be just speculative. The assertion that these experiments have been tried, and have 
failed, would seem already to indicate that some did find them desirable enough to start 
them and perhaps die for them. Thirdly, the determination of  what is and is not possible and 
desirable is precisely what revolution aims to transform. I find the closure of  this possibility 
politically suspicious. The brute fact that the Liberal State has won a certain historical battle 
and is the presupposition of  many political philosophers has nothing to do with the possible 
emergence of  another more inclusive and desirable form of  political organization. In the 
end, given Deleuze and Guattari’s clear and consistent critique of  State representation and 
mediation, one has to disavow too much of  their political work and explicit condemnations 
of  state democracy in order to make them liberal democrats. Additionally, this move takes 
away one of  Deleuze and Guattari’s most original contributions to the history of  political 
philosophy: a non-foundational theory of  revolution (without State, Party, Vanguard, or 
representation). 
Deleuze, Guattari, and Difference 
 On the other side, Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of  revolution is more often read 
as the pure process of  political becoming, uncaptured by all forms of  political representation 
and mediation (Territory, State, Capital). We can see this type of  reading in the work of  
American and Italian philosophers Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (authors of  Empire, 
2000; Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of  Empire, 2004; and Commonwealth, 2009) as well 
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as in the work of  American scholar Eugene Holland (author of  Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-
Oedipus: Introduction to Schizoanalysis, 1999). Opposed to defining the aim of  revolution by its 
inevitable incorporation into the Liberal State apparatus, as Mengue and Patton do, Hardt 
and Negri draw from Deleuze and Guattari a theory of  revolutionary potentiality or difference-
in-itself that they call the Multitude. Rather than basing revolutionary action on an analogy 
with, an opposition to, a resemblance with, or a representation of  the originally presupposed 
political bodies of  Territory, God, King, Statesman, or Capital, Hardt and Negri propose a 
Deleuzian inspired theory of  political creativity located ontologically anterior to any 
constituted or mediating power, whether State, People, or Capital. Deleuze and Guattari’s 
concept of  revolution, according to Hardt and Negri, should not be read as a theory of  
possibility defined by what is dominantly understood to be “possible” or “feasible” (as 
Mengue argues), but rather as a pure potentiality “to become other than one is,” as Foucault 
says. 
 In Hardt and Negri’s version of  Spinozist-Deleuzian political ontology the concept 
of  the Multitude stands, not as a new form of  representation for global minority movements 
(that would speak for them), or as a negative movement “against representation,” but rather 
as an expressive potential that all such subjugated groups have “to revolt,” “to create 
something new”: a new “absolutely deterritorialized socius” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 39). 
But since this potential is not a political object nor even a specific political event, but rather a 
pure “becoming-revolutionary” that allows for the possibility of  new conditions, elements, 
and agencies in the political field as such, Hardt and Negri are able to avoid the restrictions 
of  only thinking Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of  revolution as taking place within a pre-
given political domain. Thus, “the creative forces of  the multitude that sustain Empire are 
also capable of  autonomously constructing a counter-Empire, an alternative political 
organization of  global flows and exchanges,” as they claim in their book, Empire (11–23). 
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Examples of  this potential for counter-empire, Hardt and Negri argue, are the alter-
globalization movement (2009, 368), and the nomadisms of  refugees and immigrants who 
remain unrepresented in politics today: their transformation in-itself being the real sphere of  
“the political,” perpetually open to all those who potentially participate in its non-exclusive 
community. 
 Similarly, for Eugene Holland, “it is not the entity but the process that has 
revolutionary potential” (2006, 100). Thus “Schizophrenia is the potential for revolution, not 
the revolution itself ” (2006, 100). Opposed to any particular being or entity in the world, the 
revolutionary plane of  immanence, according to Holland, is the “principle of  freedom in 
permanent revolution” (2006, 123).
 Now, while I certainly think this reading is more faithful to the anti-representational 
dimension of  Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of  revolution, I also want to steer clear of  
several dangers in this reading, as posed by recent critical scholarship. These dangers are 
worth recounting here at some length. Since 1997, three full-length books have been devoted 
to this critique: Alain Badiou’s Deleuze: the Clamor of  Being (1997); Slavoj !i"ek’s Organs 
Without Bodies (2003); and Peter Hallward’s Out of  This World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of  
Creation (2006). From these works, and several other critical essays, we can discern three 
distinct criticisms that, while perhaps not entirely fair to Deleuze (and Guattari), do outline 
several dangers posed by their philosophy: political ambivalence, virtual hierarchy, and 
subjective paralysis. 
(1) Political Ambivalence
 “Affirming Difference in the state of  permanent revolution” as Deleuze says in 
Difference and Repetition (53), or affirming “transformation as such” as a new revolutionary 
commitment that escapes the previous problems of  vanguardism and the party-state, as 
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these authors argue, poses the danger that such “a becoming other” is ambivalent.7 It may 
provide a new non-representational space of  liberty, or it may provide a ruptured “open” 
domain for a new discourse of  rights and military occupation by the state, or it may merely 
reproduce a complicity with the processes of  capitalist deterritorialization necessary for new 
capitalist reterritorializations. Slavoj !i"ek, in particular, frequently attributes this capitalist 
ambivalence to Deleuze and Guattari’s politics (2004, 184).8 But to say, with Alain Badiou, 
that affirming the potentiality for transformation as such is to affirm a “purely ideological 
radicality” that “inevitably changes over into its opposite: once the mass festivals of  
democracy and discourse are over, things make place for the modernist restoration of  order 
among workers and bosses,’’ would be to overstate the problem (Badiou and Balmès 1976, 
83). 
 Rather, it would be much more appropriate to say, with Paolo Virno, that “[t]he 
multitude is a form of  being that can give birth to one thing but also to the other: 
ambivalence” (Virno 2003, 131). Accordingly, the affirmation of  this ambivalence as a 
political commitment, and the “politico-ontological optimism and unapologetic vitalism” it 
assumes in Hardt, Negri, and Deleuze’s work, according to Bruno Bosteels, remains radically 
insufficient (2004, 95). While the purely creative power of  the multitude may be the 
condition for global liberation from Empire, it is also the productive condition for Empire as 
well. With no clear political consistency to organize or motivate any particular political 
transformation, such a “vitalist optimism” can remain, at best, Bosteels argues, politically 
ambivalent, speculative, and spontaneous. Showing the non-foundational or ungrounded 
nature of  politics provides no more of  a contribution for organized politics than does the 
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7 “Overturning all orders and representations in order to affirm Difference in the state of  permanent 
revolution which characterizes the eternal return” (Deleuze 1994, 53). “To make the simulacra rise and affirm 
their rights” (1990, 262).
8 “There are, effectively, features that justify calling Deleuze the ideologist of  late capitalism" (!i"ek 2004 184).
creative potentiality of  desire. “A subject’s intervention,” Bosteels suggests, “cannot consist 
merely in showing or recognizing the traumatic impossibility, void, or antagonism around 
which the situation as a whole is structured” (2004, 104), but rather, following Badiou, a 
“political organization is necessary in order for the intervention, as wager, to make a process 
out of  the trajectory that goes from an interruption to a fidelity. In this sense, organization is 
nothing but the consistency of  politics” (Badiou 1985, 12). And in so far as Deleuze and 
Guattari, and those inspired by their work, do not offer developed concepts of  political 
consistency and organization that would bring differential multiplicities into specific political 
interventions and distributions, they remain, at most, ambivalent toward revolutionary 
politics. 
(2) Virtual Hierarchy
 In addition to the first danger, the problem of  ambivalence, Deleuze’s concept of  
revolution, according to Badiou and Hallward, risks a second danger, namely, that of  
creating a political hierarchy of  virtual potential. Badiou argues at length in The Clamor of  
Being that
 contrary to all egalitarian or “communitarian” norms, Deleuze’s conception of  
 thought is profoundly  aristocratic. Thought only exists in a hierarchized space. This 
 is because, for individuals to attain the point where they are seized by their 
 preindividual determination and, thus, by the power of  the One-All—of  which 
 they are, at the start, only meager local configurations—they have to go beyond their 
 limits and endure the transfixion and disintegration of  their actuality by infinite 
 virtuality, which is actuality’s veritable being. And individuals are not equally capable 
 of  this. Admittedly, Being is itself  neutral, equal, outside all evaluation . . . .  
 But ‘things reside unequally in this equal being’ (Deleuze 1994, 37). And, as a result, 
 it is essential to think according to ‘a hierarchy which considers things and beings 
 from the point of  view of  power’ (Deleuze 1994, 37). (Badiou 1999, 12–13)
The political thrust of  this argument is that, if  we understand revolutionary change as the 
virtual or potential for change as such, and not merely change for or against certain pre-
existing powers, then, contrary to any kind of  egalitarianism, there will instead be a hierarchy 
of  actual political beings that more or less participate in this degree of  pure potential 
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transformation. The more actual political beings renounce their specific and local 
determinations and affirm their participation in the larger processes of  difference-in-itself, 
the more powerful they become. Thus, if  the point of  examining any local political 
intervention is in every case to show to what degree it renounces its concrete determinations 
and might “become other than it is” (as a virtuality or potentiality), there seems to be a risk 
of  “asceticism” (Badiou 1999, 13) and hierarchy in such a relationship of  potential.         
 Similarly, Peter Hallward has argued that Deleuze’s political philosophy is “indifferent 
to the politics of  this world” (2006, 162). Hallward claims that “once a social field is defined 
less by its conflicts and contradictions than by the lines of  flight running through it” (2006, 
62n16) any distinctive space for political action can only be subsumed within the more 
general dynamics of  creation, life, and potential transformation. And since these dynamics 
are “themselves anti-dialectical if  not anti-relational, there can be little room in Deleuze’s 
philosophy for relations of  conflict and solidarity” (2006, 162). If  each concrete, localized, 
actual political being is only in so far as its actual being is subtracted from the situation into a 
virtual event, “and every mortal event in a single Event” (Deleuze 1990, 152), the 
processional “telos” of  absolute political deterritorialization is completely indifferent to the 
actual politics of  this world (2006, 97). By valorizing this pure potentiality for transformation 
as such against all actual political determinations, Hallward argues, Deleuze is guilty of  
affirming an impossible utopianism. “By posing the question of  politics in the starkly 
dualistic terms of  war machine or state,” Hallward argues, “—by posing it, in the end, in the 
apocalyptic terms of  a new people and a new earth or else no people and no earth—the 
political aspect of  Deleuze’s philosophy amounts to little more than utopian 
distraction” (2006, 162).
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(3) Subjective Paralysis
 The differential reading of  Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of  revolution may be able 
to avoid the problem of  representational subjectivity: that it can reject or affirm particular 
desires but never change the nature of  the “self  that desires.” But it does so finally, only at 
the risk of  diffusing the self  into an endless multiplicity of  impersonal drives: a self  in 
perpetual transformation. This leads to the third danger, that of  subjective paralysis. Firstly, 
to read Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of  revolutionary subjectivity as the “simple fact of  
one's own existence as possibility or potentiality” (Agamben 1993, 43), or as Paul Patton 
calls it, one’s “critical freedom” (“the freedom to transgress the limits of  what one is 
presently capable of  being or doing, rather than just the freedom to be or do those 
things” (2000, 85)) suggests, as Bosteel’s previous critique implies, an ambivalence. It is both 
the capacity for emancipation as well as the potentiality for enslavement. 
 Secondly, without a pre-given unity of  subjectivity, how do agents qua multiplicities 
deliberate between and distinguish (in themselves) different political decisions? Without the 
representational screen of  reason, or the state-guaranteed grounds of  political discourse, 
what might something like a dispute or agreement look like? If  “becoming other is not a 
capacity liberated individuals possess to constitute themselves as autonomous singularities,” 
but “what defines ‘autonomy’ itself ” (2006, 146), as Simon Tormey argues, then the political 
danger, according to Hallward, is that the subject is simply replaced by the larger impersonal 
process of  transformation as such: “pure autonomy.” The radical affirmation of  the 
ambivalent and unlocalizable processes of  subjective potentiality (qua pure multiplicities) 
seems then to have nothing to contribute to an analysis of  the basic function of  
participatory democracy and collective decision-making, which remains at the core of  many 
of  today’s radical political struggles (See Starr, Martinez-Torres, and Rosset 2011). Insofar as 
a theory of  subjectivity is defined only by its potential for transformation, it is stuck in a 
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kind of  paralysis of  endless potential change no less disempowering than subjective stasis. 
Or, as Hallward frames this criticism, Deleuze “abandons the decisive subject in favor of  our 
more immediate subjection to the imperative of  creative life or thought” (2006, 163).  
Deleuze, Guattari, and Constructivism 
 While this ongoing debate over the implications of  Deleuze and Guattari’s political 
philosophy, and in particular their concept of  revolution, continues to be a productive one, I 
propose a third reading of  Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of  revolution that does not fall 
prey to the dangers of  the two previous ones. I term this a “constructivst” reading, in a 
sense borrowed from Deleuze and Guattari’s own writings. To explain this alternative 
reading, I proceed in three steps: first, I show how the concept of  constructivism emerges in 
Deleuze and Guattari’s work in the first place; secondly, I differentiate this approach from 
the previous two readings; and lastly I demonstrate its significance for the thesis of  this 
dissertation. 
 Deleuze and Guattari’s first major attempt at the creation of  a concept of  revolution 
came after the events of  May, 1968, in France. Their first book together, Capitalisme et 
schizophrénie: l'anti-Oedipe (1972), set out as a critique of  both psychoanalysis and Marxism in 
order to develop a new concept of  revolutionary desire that was indexed neither to primitive, 
state, or capitalist power (in all their familial and oedipal formulations), nor to class analysis 
or the vanguard party apparatus “modeled after the state” in Marxism. Schizophrenia was 
their name for this new concept of  revolution. These efforts were, however, subject to 
significant criticism. Critics immediately charged that Deleuze and Guattari had been too 
optimistic about the potentiality of  art, “minimalized the role of  class struggle,” “militated in 
favor of  an irrationalism of  desire,” and “identified revolutionaries with 
schizophrenics” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 379). After its publication the authors 
expended no small effort clarifying and even modifying the concepts proposed in Anti-
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Oedipus (later, even criticizing them). Revolutionaries are neither “insane” nor self-
marginalized, they insist:
Some have said that we see the schizophrenic as the true revolutionary. We believe, 
rather that schizophrenia is the descent of  a molecular process into a black hole. 
Marginals have always inspired fear in us, and a slight horror. (Deleuze and Parnet 
1987, 139)
Desire is neither irrational nor without determination in a particular political arrangement: 
We say quite the opposite: desire only exists when it is assembled or machined. You 
cannot grasp or conceive of  a desire outside a determinate assemblage, on a plane 
which is not pre-existent but which must itself  be constructed. (Deleuze and Parnet 
1987, 96)
Revolutionary desire does not just blow apart the social into a pure flux:
It is in concrete social fields, at specific moments, that the comparative movements 
of  deterritorialization, the continuums of  intensity, and the combinations of  flux 
that they form must be studied. (Deleuze and Parnet 1987, 135)
Despite these qualifications, the concept of  revolution in Anti-Oedipus remained admittedly 
under-developed. How were these lines of  schizo-flight to provide a stable alternative to the 
history of  representational politics (primitivism, statism, capitalism)? How were these 
“desiring machines” to be assembled into a revolutionary movement? And what are some of 
its concrete characteristics? A crucial shift, though, took place in their political writings 
between Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus (1980). The move from emphasizing the 
unrestrained deterritorializations of  desire to the careful and more sober transformations of  
the concrete political arrangement (constructivism) became decisive (Deleuze and Guattari 
1983, 382). 
 Eugene Holland was perhaps the first to highlight this shift in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
political philosophy. “In as much as deterritorialization designated the motor of  permanent 
revolution, while reterritorialization designated the power relations imposed by the private 
ownership of  capital…deterritorialization looked ‘good’ and reterritorialization looked 
‘bad’…but in A Thousand Plateaus, both de- and re-territorialization appear in a very different 
20
light” (Holland 1991, 58–59). Aside from removing the last traces of  humanism and 
anthropocentrism from the “psycho-social” machines of  Anti-Oedipus, A Thousand Plateaus, 
Holland claims, introduces three kinds of  deterritorialization—relative, absolute negative, 
and absolute positive (1991, 62). A Thousand Plateaus no longer valorizes the uncritical 
excitement for absolute deterritorialization or potential creativity found in Anti-Oedipus (and 
in Deleuze’s previous works) but instead develops what they call the more sober task of  a 
logics or constructivism of  political assemblages. While Holland notes the “less 
revolutionary and less romantic” (1991, 63) character of  A Thousand Plateaus, he also suggests 
that “any lingering suspicion of  an earlier exaggerated or uncritical enthusiasm for 
‘schizophrenia’ should now be dispelled by the very cautious, nuanced treatment of  
deterritorialization and the body-without-organs” (1991, 63). 
 A Thousand Plateaus also marks a shift away from Deleuze’s earlier solo works, self-
defined as the “merger of  philosophy and ontology” (1990, 179).9 While I disagree that 
Deleuze’s previous works can be characterized as entirely “apolitical,” as Badiou has argued, 
Deleuze had in fact developed very few political concepts, usually favoring more ontological 
or aesthetic ones. By contrast, A Thousand Plateaus clearly prioritizes politics over ontology. 
Against accusations of  “ontological vitalism” and “other-worldly politics” made by Peter 
Hallward, A Thousand Plateaus claims (1) to overthrow ontology: to replace the logic of  the 
“is” (est) with the logic of  the “and” (et); and (2) that “politics precedes being” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987, 25, 203). A Thousand Plateaus should therefore be read more primarily as a 
political text than an ontological one, thus distancing it significantly from Deleuze’s earlier 
solo works as well as from much of  Badiou, Hallward, and !i"ek’s critical commentary that 
tends to focus almost exclusively on his pre-A Thousand Plateaus writings. While this by no 
means allows us to ignore the political dangers Badiou and others outline, it is important to 
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9 On the question of  Deleuze’s ontology see (Zourabichvili 1996).
recognize that the constructivist turn that occurs in Deleuze and Guattari’s political 
philosophy has yet to be taken seriously (against the continuity thesis, for example, that is 
argued for explicitly by Hallward and implicitly by many others: that a single central thought 
guides all of  Deleuze’s work, such as  immanence, the virtual, life, and so on). 
 More recent scholarship on Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy, though, has 
begun to shift more notably in the direction of  the political constructivism begun in A 
Thousand Plateaus. Many scholars have noted the existence and importance of  the 
constructivist (also called diagrammatic, pragmatic, or cartographic) turn in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s later work. The terrain, according to Alberto Toscano, “seems to have shifted 
considerably with respect to the earlier [pre A Thousand Plateaus] preoccupation that seemed 
to afford a certain continuity with naturalized or materialist accounts of  ontogenesis” (2006, 
176). Eugene Holland speaks of  the “importance that A Thousand Plateaus ascribes to 
devising planes of  consistency or composition where lines of  flight can intersect and 
become productive instead of  spinning off  into the void” (1998, 69). Bonta and Protevi, too, 
have emphasized the centrality of  having a “working cartography…to experiment with real 
intervention” (2004, 23). Not only do Deleuze and Guattari “give us a theory of  
assemblages” (Patton 2006, 35) that “would map out the complex terrain and conditions in 
which new modes of  existence appear” (Smith 1998, 264), according to Paul Patton and Dan 
Smith, but even Bruno Bosteels has admitted the political importance of  the “basic 
scaffolding” of  “a formal and political theory of  cartography” (1998, 150) developed by 
Guattari. We can even find the admission by Hardt and Negri, in the final chapter of  Empire, 
that “recognizing the potential autonomy of  the mobile multitude, however, only points 
toward the real question. What we need to grasp is how the multitude is organized and 
redefined as a positive, political power” (394, 398). So the real question is not simply that of  
deterritorialization over reterritorialization or creative life versus the dead hand of  capital, 
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but rather the constructive ways revolutionary action takes on a consistency, a commitment, 
and an organization, and what forms of  antagonism and relation it produces in a specific 
struggle. 
 Thus, while there may be politically dangerous tendencies in Deleuze and Guattari-
inspired political philosophy, more or less emphasized in certain works, it is clearly inaccurate 
to say that Deleuze and Guattari and their readers after A Thousand Plateaus are not aware of  
the dangers of  naively “valorizing the potentiality” of  revolutionary deterritorialization.10 
Revolution may, of  course, move too quickly, too much, or end up in a black hole 
(marginality) with no consistency or connection at all. Contrary to the claim of  Anti-Oedipus 
that “We can never go too far in the direction of  deterritorialization” (382), A Thousand 
Plateaus warns us that we can in fact go too far and so must approach revolutionary struggles 
with sobriety, caution, and construction.  
 But scholarly awareness, promising gestures, and scaffolds hardly constitute a fully 
developed constructivist theory of  revolution. Aside from the fact that no full-length work 
until now has been dedicated to developing Deleuze and Guattari’s constructivist theory of  
revolution, there is a  problem with such a project. Éric Alliez, in his essay, “Anti-Oedipus 
Thirty Years On,” has been the most emphatic about the political importance of  Deleuze 
and Guattari’s later constructivist text What is Philosophy? (against the Badiouian charges of  
political spontaneity) (2006).11 Yet, the problem is that What is Philosophy? does not even give 
politics its own proper register, like art (percepts), philosophy (concepts), or science 
(functives)! Accordingly, Alliez’s book, The Signature of  the World, devoted to Deleuze and 
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10 Except Nick Land who continued to affirm deterritorialization as absolute escape without consistency. See 
(Land 1993).
11 See also (Deleuze 1987, 70, 96, 103). “Desire is always assembled and fabricated (machiné) on a plane of  
immanence or composition which must itself  be constructed at the same time as desire assembles and 
fabricates” (103).
Guattari’s constructivism, contains absolutely no discussion of  politics.12  
 Even Manuel DeLanda, who may have gone furthest in developing the details of  
such a social logic or what he calls a “theory of  assemblages” in A New Philosophy of  Society, 
has expressed concern with such a project. “The relatively few pages dedicated to 
assemblage theory in the work of  Deleuze and Guattari hardly amount to a fully-fledged 
theory,” he says. And “even in those cases where conceptual definitions are easy to locate, 
they are usually not given in a style that allows for a straightforward interpretation. This 
would seem to condemn a book on assemblage theory to spend most of  its pages doing 
hermeneutics” (Delanda 2006, 3). But while DeLanda’s solution to this problem is, as 
Alberto Toscano says, to "‘naturalize’ the theory of  multiplicities by recasting it as an 
ontology of  models; much as if  Deleuze were the heir of  Husserl’s meatatheoretical project, 
now applied to the theory of  complex systems” (2006, 86), the current work will not follow 
suit. The central concern of  this dissertation is neither social nor ontological, but political 
and constructivist, interested explicitly in the revolutionary transformation of  existing 
society. But this section has only framed the emergence of  a constructivist turn in Deleuze 
and Guattari’s work. The question now is how to define “constructivism” as a meaningful 
interpretive category against the previous two, and to show how it contributes to a 
philosophical return to the concept of  revolution. 
Toward a Constructivist Theory of  Revolution  
 By “constructivism,” I do not mean what is traditionally understood as “social 
constructivism” in sociology and philosophy, namely, that revolutions are by-products or 
“social constructs” produced by human minds, institutions, historical contexts, cultural 
values, and so on. Such theories presuppose what needs to be explained in the first place: 
mind, society, culture, and history themselves. Deleuze and Guattari rather define their 
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12 The Signature of  the World deals with ethics, not politics. 
philosophical method as constructivist in the sense that it is about the “creative diagnosis 
and assembly of  heterogenous elements into a plane of  consistency” (Deleuze and Guattari 
1987, 96).13 But given such a broad definition and the often scattered appearance of  this 
method in their later work, one is almost forced to make, as Delanda correctly observes, 
some kind of  interpretative or extractive move. I will thus make two: firstly, I limit my own 
methodological work with this concept to a strictly political interpretation, and in particular 
its revolutionary dimension; secondly, I break this constructivist method down into what I 
see as its four distinct yet coherent philosophical activities and try to reassemble them 
around four of  my own concepts.  
 Asked succinctly, the question of  this dissertation is, “how is it possible to return to 
the theory-practice of  revolution?” Answered succinctly, I argue that Deleuze and Guattari 
offer us several helpful concepts that respond to the four problematics of  revolution 
mentioned previously. In response to the question of  how to understand the dominant 
relations of  power such that revolution is desirable, they propose the concept of  “Historical 
Topology.” In response to the question of  how to transform those relations of  power, they 
propose the concept of  “Deterritorialization.” In response to the question of  what we can 
build in their place, they propose the concept of  “Political Consistency,” and in response to 
the question of  who belongs to the struggle, they propose the concept of  “Nomadic 
Solidarity.” Their constructivst theory of  revolution is, thus, neither a utopian program laid 
out in advance, the effect of  “social constructs,” the capture of  state power, an evolutionary 
development, or the potentiality for revolutionary change as such, but rather the committed 
arrangement and distribution of  heterogenous elements or singularities without vanguard, 
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13 Constructivism is the concept Deleuze and Guattari mobilize to against accusations of  political spontaneity. 
“In retrospect every assemblage expresses and creates a desire by constructing the plane which makes it 
possible and, by making it possible, brings it about…It is in itself  an immanent revolutionary process. It is 
constructivist, not at all spontaneist” (Deleuze 1987, 96).
party, state, or capital: it is a politics based on autonomy and the self-management of  
political problems (1983, 380; Deleuze 1994, 158; Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 471).   
 Much closer to what Badiou, Hallward, Toscano, and Bosteels claim to be looking 
for in political concepts like “consistency,” “intervention,” “commitment,” and “solidarity,” 
the constructivist theory of  revolution I am proposing is based on connecting the 
contingent and heterogeneous political practices that have broken free or been uprooted 
(“deterritorialized”) through political crisis to each other to theorize the current revolutionary 
sequence (however nascent it may be) (See !i"ek 2010). The current revolutionary sequence, 
and here I am in agreement with Toscano, has “sketched out new regimes of  organization, 
new forms of  subjectivity at a distance from the accepted forms of  mediated representation 
[like] the Ejercito Zapatista de Liberaciòn Nacional in Mexico . . . [such that] that we might 
begin to think beyond the intra-State logic of  representation” (2004). Thus, the valorization 
of  “lines of  flight,” “rupture,” and “heterogeneity” as they break free from or within power, 
without a positive account of  how such lines compose a new consistency of  their own, are
—and here I am in agreement with Badiou and others—“the concrete definition of  
revolutionary failure,” since revolutionary struggles cannot be sustained beyond the scope of 
isolated outbursts against or within power. Without a cohesive theory of  how to diagnose, 
transform, and create new political bodies connected through mutual global solidarity, I 
argue, we cannot hope to understand the philosophy of  the present revolutionary sequence.  
 Thus, in my reading, the political project of  A Thousand Plateaus is to develop such a 
positive account of  how “revolutionary consistencies” function and are sustained in the 
context of  coexistent dangers. This positive account will address the following four 
questions: In what sense do the processes of  representation pose dangers for revolutionary 
struggles? How do revolutions intervene politically in such situations? How are their 
conditions, elements, and agencies arranged and distributed? How do they connect up to 
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different struggles around the world? Drawing primarily from A Thousand Plateaus and What 
is Philosophy?, I propose a constructivist theory of  revolution that answers these questions 
without submitting revolution to an inevitable political representation or merely affirming a 
political potential to become-otherwise. But the philosophical elaboration of  these concepts 
in Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy is insufficient to develop the four theoretical-practices 
I am proposing. What is still required is their connection to the practical series of  
revolutionary actions offered by Zapatismo.  
Zapatismo and Representation
 Just as there are different ways to read the concept of  revolution in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s philosophy, so there are different ways to interpret the Zapatista uprising. Leaving 
aside all of  those who reject the Zapatista’s struggle for dignity, land, and democracy 
outright, readers of  the Zapatistas fall more or less fall into two camps. On the one hand, 
there are those that see the uprising as an incomplete or failed struggle, insofar as it failed to 
mobilize the Mexican people to overthrow and capture the Mexican state (or even win 
significant representation for the Indigenous of  Mexico). This view can be found in the 
work of  Argentine political theorist Atilio Boron (author of  State, Capitalism, and Democracy in 
Latin America, 1995), and British Pakistani political analyst Tariq Ali in his 2004 essay “Anti-
neoliberalism in Latin America.” Boron argues that the postmodern celebration of  diversity 
and local autonomy around Zapatismo is symptomatic of  the left's general retreat from class 
struggle. For Boron, popular movements, like Zapatismo, cannot afford the luxury of  
ignoring the struggle for state power and representation, especially in Latin America, where 
direct or indirect forms of  U.S. imperialism have so often undermined national sovereignty. 
To the degree that the Zapatistas have made no real gains for class struggle or state 
representation, they have failed (Boron 2003, 143–82).  
 Similarly, Ali argues that the Zapatista’s slogan, “we can change the world without 
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taking power,” is a purely moral slogan with no real revolutionary teeth. As Ali says, 
 I have to be very blunt here — [the Mexican State] [does not] feel threatened 
 because there is an idealistic slogan within the social movements, which goes like 
 this: "We can change the world without taking power." This slogan doesn’t 
 threaten anyone; it’s a moral slogan. The Zapatistas — who I admire — when they 
 marched from Chiapas to Mexico City, what did they think was going to happen? 
 Nothing happened. It was a moral symbol, it was not even a moral victory because 
 nothing happened. (Ali 2004)
 There is certainly some truth to these claims: the Zapatistas (in their 1994 First 
Declaration from the Lacandon Jungle) did declare war on the Mexican state but failed to mobilize 
the Mexican people, and they were technically unable to even win the reformist Peace 
Accords with the Mexican government. Such criticisms are not wrong so much as they 
reduce the criteria of  revolutionary success to the very narrow categories of  state 
representation and class struggle. Firstly, if  we are going to analyze what the Zapatista’s have 
done, we must consider all the different dimensions on which their struggle has taken place 
(media, solidarity, local autonomy, democracy, gender, race, and sexual orientation, as well as 
political economy and the state). The Zapatistas have won some things in some places but 
very little in others. Secondly, these narrow criticisms cover over one of  the most original 
political contributions of  the Zapatistas: not how they have been able to influence  
politicians and the state externally, but how they have created internally a new type of  
political consistency that has coherently organized a society of  over 2,200 communities (over 
200,000 people). These communities are federated into 32 “autonomous municipalities,” 
each grouped into five local self-governments called the Juntas de Buen Gobierno (JBG) or 
Good Government Councils (Ross 2006, 194). Thirdly, although perhaps one can judge the 
immediate effectiveness of  a given slogan, it would be naive to think that slogans or symbols 
as such are not able to mobilize millions of  people around the world, because they have, and 
they do so now more than ever. And as far as slogans go, “change the world without taking 
power” has become a global one whose effects, I argue, have yet to be fully deployed, 
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although they nonetheless characterize an emerging desire for a new politics without States. 
Perhaps the force of  this slogan is best felt, for reasons that I will explain, in the future 
anterior.   
Zapatismo and Difference
 On the other hand, there are readers who argue that the Zapatistas’ most important 
contribution is their strong suspicion of  all forms of  political representation (patriarchy, 
statism, capitalism, etc.) and their affirmation of  a political community and solidarity based 
on difference (across race, gender, class, sexual orientation, geography, and so on). Although 
perhaps the majority of  scholarship on the Zapatistas falls generally under this category 
(even though most disagree about how far the Zapatistas go in achieving this goal), I want to 
look at two of  its more philosophical proponents: Simon Tormey and John Holloway. 
Tormey’s 2006 article, “‘Not in my Name’: Deleuze, Zapatismo and the Critique of  
Representation,” argues that 
 the stance and philosophy of  the Zapatistas is . . . remarkable in itself, but also 
 symptomatic of  a more general shift in the underpinnings of  the political ‘field,’ one 
 that problematizes and points beyond ‘representation.’ This is a shift that first 
 announced itself  in relation to philosophy, ethics and literature some decades ago, in 
 turn spreading to black studies, feminism, queer and lesbian studies, and latterly to 
 postcolonial and subaltern studies. It can now be felt and heard in what is 
 sometimes termed ‘the new activism.’ (138)
But, for Tormey, who draws theoretically on Deleuze’s earlier work, Différence et répétition 
(1968), the Zapatistas, “as a group that insists that it is ‘exercising power’ not on behalf of  the 
people of  the Chiapas . . . but with the people of  the Chiapas,” not only articulate a demand 
against all forms of  political representation, but they, like Deleuze, also “recognize and 
celebrate difference, not as negation . . . but as an affirmation, as something valued in 
itself ” (2006, 142). Marcos, for example, does not represent the Zapatistas, but is himself  a 
multiplicity; he “is gay in San Francisco, a black in South Africa, Asian in Europe, a Chicano 
in San Isidro, an anarchist in Spain, a Palestinian in Israel . . . Marcos is every untolerated, 
29
oppressed, exploited minority that is resisting and saying ‘Enough!’” (Marcos 2001b, 101–6). 
Difference-in-itself, according to Tormey, is also realized in the internal organization of  the 
Zapatistas, whose form of  direct democracy “goes well beyond Marx’s ‘Paris Commune’ 
model of  immediate recall and rotation to embrace the demand that delegates listen to each 
and every ‘campañero’ who turns up” (2006, 148). 
 Similarly, Holloway, in his 2002 book, Change the World Without Taking Power: The 
Meaning of  Revolution Today, argues that one of  the most central contributions of  the 
Zapatistas was to express a “scream” of  negation, dissonance, and frustration with the 
present neoliberal system of  political representation, which Holloway calls 
“Fetishism” (2002, 1). The Zapatistas’ struggle is one not only against the State and Capital 
but against the entire system of  political classification/representation as such. As Holloway 
puts it:
 We do not struggle as working class, we struggle against being working class, against 
 being classified. Our struggle is not the struggle of  labour: it is the struggle against 
 labour. It is the unity of  the process of   classification (the unity of  capital 
 accumulation) that gives unity to our struggle, not our unity as members of  a 
 common class. Thus, for example, it is the significance of  the Zapatista struggle 
 against capitalist classification that gives it importance for class struggle, not the 
 question of  whether the indigenous inhabitants of  the Lacandon Jungle are or 
 are not members of  the working class. (2002, 88) 
But Zapatismo is not just a rejection of  representation; it is an affirmation of  the potential 
to recover a new means of  living, a power-to or capacity for new action. As Holloway says,
 it not enough to scream. Negativity, our refusal of  capital, is the crucial starting 
 point, theoretically and politically. But mere refusal is easily recaptured by capital, 
 simply because it comes up against capital’s control of  the means of  production, 
 means of  doing, means of  living. For the scream to grow in strength, there must be a 
 recuperation of  doing, a development of  power-to. That implies a re-taking of  the 
 means of  doing. (2002, 127)
 While I remain, for the most part, sympathetic to this kind of  reading and to Tormey 
and Holoway’s readings in particular, I think that their points of  emphasis are not so much 
wrong as they are philosophically and politically incomplete or insufficient. It may be true 
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that, with a few exceptions, the Zapatistas are critical of  the dominant structure and 
categories of  political representation (including narrow class analyses based on industrial 
development and factory labor) (Kingsnorth 2004, 29).14 And it is also true that the 
Zapatistas, to some degree, affirm and respect the multiplicity of  differences that make up 
the global opposition to Neoliberalism. However, the rejection of  representation and the 
affirmation of  difference or potential for “power-to” tell us almost nothing about what 
positive philosophical and political alternatives the Zapatistas propose. Both Tormey and 
Hollway spend only a few short pages theorizing the internal political organization of  the 
Zapatistas (direct democracy, consensus, rotation, self-government, subjectivity, global 
solidarity, and so on), and when they do, their conclusion is that these types of  organization 
(internal as well as global networks, etc.) all simply express the Zapatistas’ rejection of  
representation and affirmation of  potential transformation (difference). But a pivotal 
question remains: how is this new type of  post-representational politics constructed? How 
does it work? In what ways does it offer us a real political alternative to capitalist nation-
states? What new types of  political subjectivity does it create and how do they work? If  the 
Zapatistas are not just practical examples of  the philosophical insight that “political 
representation has failed us, and we must become other than we are,” then what do they 
offer us instead, philosophically and practically? 
 Perhaps many of  the same criticisms addressed to “differential readers” of  Deleuze 
and Guattari’s concept of  revolution equally apply here: political ambivalence, virtual 
hierarchy, and subjective paralysis. These are, in part, some of  the Badiouian inspired 
criticisms laid out by Mihalis Mentinis in his book, Zapatistas: The Chiapas Revolt and what it 
means for Radical Politics (2006). After moving through Gramsci, Laclou and Mouffe, Hardt 
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14 "We are not a proletariat, our land is not your means of  production and we don’t want to work in a tractor 
factory. All we want is to be listened to, and for you big-city smart-arses to stop telling us how to live. As for 
your dialectic—you can keep it. You never know when it might come in handy" (Kingsnorth 2004, 29).
and Negri, and Castoriadis, Mentinis argues for a Badiou-inspired theory of  militant 
subjectivity previously lacking in Zapatista scholarship. Despite providing an otherwise 
excellent survey of  radical political theory and Zapatismo, Mentinis fails to reconcile his 
position with Badiou’s ambivalence toward Zapatismo as a truly universal event, and thus as 
having no real politically faithful subjects.15 Perhaps this under-emphasis in scholarship is 
simply historical, since the Zapatistas only started focusing on their internal political 
organization in 2003. In any case, to sum up, difference-in-itself  or the potential to develop 
our “power-to” tell us very little about how to build a revolution, or what concepts the 
Zapatistas offer for the reorganization of  political life. 
Zapatismo and Constructivism 
 Subsequently, I propose, as I did in the case of  Deleuze and Guattari’s work, a 
constructivist reading of  the Zapatistas that recognizes not only their antagonism toward 
representation and their affirmation of  political difference as the pre-condition for a 
radically inclusive global revolutionary movement, but more importantly, what they have 
created in place of  representation and how they have reassembled or built a maximum of  
political difference into their political practice. To be clear, this does not mean that I am 
proposing to use Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophical method of  constructivism to 
understand the Zapatista uprising, despite the strong similarities between the two methods 
of  construction. What I am proposing instead is that the Zapatistas have invented their own 
political constructivism. While philosophy creates concepts, politics creates practices. 
 Between the 8th and 10th of  August, 2003, almost ten years after the 1994 uprising, 
and almost 20 years after Marcos and company’s first descent into the Lacandon Jungle, the 
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15 “The examples of  popular organization we know today are, therefore, either extremely experimental and 
localized (like the Zapatista movement) or theologico-political (like Hezbollah)” (Badiou 2008a, 656). “Through 
a combination of  constructions of  thought, which are always global or universal, and political experiments, 
which are local or singular but can be transmitted universally, we can assure the new existence of  the 
communist hypothesis, both in consciousness and in concrete situations” (Badiou 2008b, 117).  
Zapatistas announced a new direction in their struggle with the birth of  the Juntas de Buen 
Gobierno (JGBs), Committees of  Good Government. Whereas their political energies and 
critiques previously had been focused on (1) battling and negotiating with the Mexican 
government, paramilitary forces, and corporations (rejecting the forces of  political 
representation), and (2) affirming their autonomy and enlarging their global visibility through 
alternative media and global gatherings of  heterogeneous struggles (affirming political 
difference), the birth of  the JBGs marked a significant turn toward the creation of  something 
new. While the Zapatistas certainly did not call this turn “constructivist,” I use this term to 
emphasize their turn toward creating new political practices, like building and sustaining their 
own Autonomous Municipalities of  self-government, cooperative economics, and 
environmental stewardship. It is in this turn, I argue, that we can learn the most from 
Zapatismo.
 Its also during this time that one can see in the Zapatistas communiqués, for the first 
time since the failure of  the 1994 First Declaration to start a war against the Mexican 
government, a critique of  themselves as they tried to build the world they wanted to see, in 
front of  the world. It was announced that the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN), 
the Zapatista Army of  National Liberation, was overstepping its decision-making power in 
the Municipalities and local governments, women were not treated equally in terms of  
participation in the JBG and other areas, the environment was being harmed, drugs were 
being grown, human trafficking through Zapatista territory was occurring, and the five 
Caracloes (Regions of  Zapatistas Territory) were developing unevenly (Marcos 2006). 
Accordingly, the Zapatistas had to expand and multiply their analysis of  power within their 
own territory: in terms of  gender, the environment, local law, cooperative production, and so 
on. 
 In undertaking this massive project of  “learning how to self-govern,” the Zapatistas 
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focused less on political reform with the state and more on creating a prefigurative politics: 
without overthrowing the state, they wanted to achieve a maximum of  autonomy within it 
(and with others outside it). But one of  the most difficult aspects of  this was inventing a 
political body that would allow for the maximum inclusion of  participation and autonomy 
with a minimum of  exclusion and oppression. This was created using a mixture of  
Indigenous tradition, popular assemblies, consensus decision-making, and rotational 
governance (positions changed every 15 days to make sure everyone learned how to govern 
equally). In a word, they created a generalized direct democracy based on a maximum feed-
back loop of  political participation. While certainly a work-in-progress, these were its 
practical horizons (Marcos 2006).       
 But the Zapatistas have never been satisfied with local revolts, no matter how 
successful. While it may have appeared that during these years the Zapatistas became 
focused “inward,” one of  the central purposes of  this constructivist turn (not to be mistaken 
with an inward turn) was to be able to sustain a certain level of  cooperative productive 
development based on common property (not private or public) and to share it with others, 
not just within the Caracoles, but with the world. Since 1994, the Zapatistas were on the 
receiving end of  international aid, but after 2003, one can see in their communiqués a 
sustained and novel effort to provide material and political support to struggles around the 
world against neoliberalism (textiles, dolls, maize, public endorsements, coffee, etc.) (Marcos. 
2006). Where previous concepts of  solidarity had all been, for the most part, one-way in 
direction (Soviet internationalism, third-world solidarity, international human rights, and 
even material aid in the case of  natural disasters, etc.), the Zapatistas invented a whole new 
model of  mutual global solidarity by sharing and encouraging others to mutually share 
support and aid even in cases where they have very little (like the Zapatistas). This kind of  
mutual support has resulted in a host of  interesting solidarities, both political and economic 
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(Walker, 2005).     
 These years leading up to La Otra Campaña (the Other Campaign), from 2003 to 
2006 and beyond, have been misunderstood as “years of  silence” and under-theorized, in 
part due to a dearth of  empirical research (compared to pre-2003 studies), but also perhaps 
in part from a waning of  interest in the “newness” of  Zapatismo. But it is from 2003 
forward, in my view, that the Zapatistas have the most to contribute to a philosophical 
investigation into how a revolutionary alternative to neoliberalism will have been built. I 
argue that the Zapatistas offer us several helpful concepts that respond to the four 
problematics of  revolution mentioned previously. In response to the question of  how to 
understand the dominant relations of  power such that revolution is desirable, they propose 
the practice of  what Marcos calls a “Diagnóstico del Sufrimiento” (Diagnostic of  Suffering) 
documented in La Sexta (Marcos 2010, 11). In response to the question of  how to transform 
those relations of  power, they propose the practice of  building the autonomous “Juntas de 
Buen Gobierno.” In response to the question of  what kinds of  institutions we can put in their 
place, they propose the practice of  “rule by obeying” (Mandar Obedeciendo), and in response 
to the question of  who belongs to the struggle, they propose the practice of  the global 
“Encuentro” (the Encounter). In sum, their constructivst theory of  revolution is quite similar 
to that of  Deleuze and Guattari’s: neither a utopian program laid out in advance, the effect 
of  “social constructs,” the capture of  state power, an evolutionary development, or the 
potentiality for revolutionary change as such, but rather the committed arrangement and 
distribution of  heterogenous elements or singularities without vanguard, party, state, or 
capital. This politics, like that championed by Deleuze and Guattari, is based on autonomy 
and the participatory self-management of  political problems. 
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Overview
 Guided by the methodology of  conceptual assemblage and the intervention of  a 
constructivist reading, this dissertation proposes to draw on the work of  Deleuze, Guattari, 
and the Zapatistas in order to extract a new political philosophy of  revolution helpful for 
understanding and motivating the present, although perhaps young, revolutionary sequence. 
In particular, it proposes four specific theoretical practices or “tactical pointers for the 
conditional imperative of  political struggle”: (1) a multi-centered diagnostics, (2) 
prefigurative transformation, (3) a participatory process, and (4) mutual global solidarity. 
Accordingly, the chapters of  this dissertation will propose and defend each of  these 
conceptual tactics in turn. Additionally, each chapter is composed of  three major 
subsections. The first section critically distinguishes the proposed concept from two others: 
one based on political representation and the other based on political differentiation without 
construction. The second section then draws on at least one major idea from Deleuze and 
Guattari’s philosophy to help assemble the theoretical practice proposed in the chapter. And 
the third section draws on at least one major political practice from Zapatismo to help 
assemble the proposed theoretical practice. 
 Chapter II argues that the return to revolution located in Deleuze, Guattari, and the 
Zapatistas can be characterized by a diagnostic theory of  history motivated by the relative 
rejection of  all previous forms of  historical representation (patriarchy, racism, statism, 
capitalism, vanguardism, etc.) and a concern for their immanent diagnosis. Although this 
claim clearly rejects the representational readings of  Deleuze, Guattari, and Zapatismo, it is 
obviously quite similar to the philosophy of  difference described earlier in this chapter. As 
such, it may seem relatively uncontroversial. But, my argument includes three crucial and 
under-emphasized dimensions of  this rejection. Firstly, that it is a relative rejection, meaning 
that political representation always plays a more or less active role in political life even if  only 
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in the mode of  “being warded off ” by more participatory practices. That is, even in its 
relative absence, it still exerts force as an immanent historical potential of  any political 
practice. Secondly, I argue that political representation is not an homogenous philosophical 
category, since there are several distinctly different types of  representation. These differences 
are found not only in terms of  content, such as race, class, gender, economics, and so on, 
but also in formal structure, such as coding, overcoding, and axiomatization. Thirdly, I argue 
that these types of  relative representation always intersect and coexist with each other to 
different degrees in every political situation. Against the necessary historical emergence of  
these different types of  political representation, but also against their merely contingent and 
coexistent emergence, I argue instead, drawing on Deleuze and Guattari’s Historical Topology 
and what the Zapatistas call their Diagnostic of  Suffering, that their return to revolution is 
characterized by their use of  these types of  representation as a way to understand the 
political dangers and opportunities presented in the situation to be transformed. But how 
then can one escape this matrix of  political power and representation? 
 In chapter III I argue that this return to revolution found in the work of  Deleuze, 
Guattari, and the Zapatistas is also characterized by a prefigurative theory of  political 
transformation aimed at constructing a new present within and alongside the old. Opposed 
to achieving revolutionary transformation by an evolutionary process of  transition, progress, 
and reform in representation, or achieving it simply through a spontaneous rupture with the 
present, prefigurative political transformations emerge as what will have been underway 
along side the dominant political reality. Drawing on Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of  
Deterritorialization and the Zapatista’s theory of  the Juntas de Buen Gobierno, I argue that 
prefigurative revolutions are thus those types of  transformation that are able to sustain the 
maximal creation of  a new present as the expression of  the past and future of  their situation 
and connect it up to other struggles happening elsewhere. This type of  political revolution is 
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thus neither tied entirely to the determinations of  its past (with its pre-given possibilities) 
nor to the potentialities of  its future always yet-to-come. Rather, it is constructive of  a new 
present that transforms both the past and the future. But how then can these revolutionary 
transformations be sustained beyond their relative autonomy and prefiguration?
 In chapter IV, I thus argue that we can locate in Deleuze, Guattari, and the Zapatistas 
a participatory theory of  a revolutionary body politic that is able to sustain these 
prefigurative transformations. A participatory body politic doe not simply establish new 
conditions for political life based on a “more just” sphere of  political action whose 
foundational principles are still held independently from the constituted sphere where such 
principles are deployed. Nor does a participatory body politic merely aim to establish anti-
institutions, whose sole purpose is to undermine all forms of  representation and await the 
possibility that something new, and hopefully better, may emerge. Rather, a participatory and 
revolutionary body politic is built and sustained through an expressive process whose 
founding conditions are constantly undergoing a high degree of  direct and immanent 
transformation by the various practices and people who are effected, to varying degrees, by 
its deployment. In particular, I argue in this chapter that this participatory “feedback loop” 
can be located in Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of  Consistency, found in A Thousand 
Plateaus and What is Philosophy?, and in the Zapatista’s political practice of  Rule by Obeying 
(Mandar Obedeciendo). I argue that, in order to understand the structure and function of  this 
consistency and of  ruling by obeying in this new body politic, we need to understand how 
their conditions, elements, and agencies work differently than in representational and anti-
representational institutions. I argue this by drawing on three concepts in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s philosophy that correspond to the conditions, elements, and agencies of  
consistent revolutionary institutions: the abstract machine, the concrete assemblage, and the 
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persona.16 Just as these three concepts immanently transform one another in a relationship 
of  “order without hierarchy,” according to Deleuze and Guattari, so does ruling by obeying 
provide the egalitarian frame-work for the revolutionary institutions of  the Zapatistas 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 90). But the participatory nature of  a revolutionary body politic 
still leaves the the question, “how will these new political bodies be able to connect up with 
each other across their radical differences?” 
 Thus, chapter V draws on all the previous chapters in order to argue that we can 
locate in Deleuze, Guattari, and the Zapatistas a theory of  revolutionary political affinity 
based on the mutual global solidarity of  such participatory political bodies. Revolutionary 
political affinity, I argue, is not simply a matter of  integrating marginalized demands back 
into the dominant territorial-nation-state apparatus based on modifying specific criteria for 
citizenship or aiding those who need help. Nor is it a matter of  recognizing the universal 
singularity of  all beings to become other than they are. Rather, revolutionary political affinity 
is a matter of  solidarity: when revolutionary political bodies, namely, those who remain un-
represented or excluded from dominant forms of  political affinity, find in each other, one by 
one, the trans-universality (transversality) and mutual aid of  each other’s singular struggles. 
Singular-universal solidarity is thus not a matter of  recognition, charity, or even radical 
difference, but rather a mutually federated difference or “contingent holism” of  
heterogenous singular-universal events in world-wide struggle. The task of  this chapter is 
thus to avoid the dangers of  exclusion and universal singularity and propose a theory of  
political solidarity instead, drawn from Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of  Nomadism and 
the Zapatistas’ global practice of  Encuentros Intercontinentales. In particular, I argue first against 
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16 There are many types of  abstract machines according to Deleuze and Guattari. In chapter II I elaborate three 
kinds of  abstract machines (territorial, statist, capitalist) but in the present chapter the the concept of  the 
abstract machine, concrete assemblage, and machinic persona should be understood as referring only to the 
“consistent” type of  machines. 
the concepts of  “citizenship” and “difference” as desirable models of  political belonging 
insofar as the former is structurally exclusionary and the later is unable to theorize any 
concrete relations between multiple coexistent conditions. Secondly, I argue that, opposed to 
these two dangers, revolutionary solidarity should be defined instead by the federated 
connection between multiple singular-universal conditions without totality. 
 Finally, chapter VI concludes with a reconstruction and reflection upon the relative 
accomplishments of  each chapter and the argument of  the dissertation as a whole. In 
particular, chapter VI addresses the problem left remaining at the end of  the dissertation: 
how can mutual global solidarity take on a decision-making power such that the world’s 
organized struggles against neoliberalism can form an acting counter-power without private 
property, necessary political exclusion, economic exploitation, or a centralization of  this 
counter-power itself ? While Deleuze, Guattari, and the Zapatistas provide excellent 
resources for constructing a new political philosophy of  revolution, they are only able to lay 
the ground work to deal with this problem that has also yet to be resolved in the present 
revolutionary sequence at the level of  the World Social Forum. This is a significant barrier to 
a real transition away from global capitalism and requires a further philosophical 
investigation into the currently emerging forms of  political and philosophical 
experimentation that contribute to this problem’s resolution.       
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CHAPTER II
POLITICAL HISTORY AND THE DIAGNOSTIC OF REVOLUTIONARY PRAXIS
. . . neither Marx nor Engels ever came close to developing a theory of  history, in the sense 
of  an unpredictable historical event, unique and aleatory, nor indeed to developing a theory 
of  political practice. I refer here to the politico-ideologico-social practice of  political 
activism, of  mass movements and of  their eventual organizations, for which we possess no 
concepts and even less a coherent theory, in order for it to be apprehended in thought. 
Lenin, Gramsci, and Mao were only ably to partially think such a practice. The only theorist 
to think the political history of  political practice in the present, was Machiavelli. There is 
here another huge deficit to overcome, the importance of  which is decisive, and which, once 
again, sends us back to philosophy. 
(Althusser 1994)
Introduction
 In light of  its apparent exhaustion, how is it possible to return to revolution? This is 
the central problematic of  this dissertation. Given the scope of  such a question, I proposed 
in the previous chapter to focus my philosophical interrogation of  this question on two 
figures in the history of  the present revolutionary sequence who have been particularly 
influential to its development: Deleuze and Guattari, and the Zapatistas. Thus, in order to 
shed some light on the larger revolutionary sequence that began to take place at the end of  
the 20th century, I also proposed four distinct theoretical practices that help us clarify and 
develop this new political philosophy of  revolution: (1) a multi-centered diagnostic of  
political power; (2) a prefigurative theory of  political transformation; (3) a participatory 
theory of  the body politic; and (4) a political theory of  belonging based on mutual global 
solidarity. These four theories respond to four important questions concerning revolution 
and correspond with each chapter of  this dissertation: What is the relationship between 
history and revolution? What is revolutionary transformation? How is it possible to sustain 
and carry out the consequences of  a revolutionary transformation? And how do revolutions 
connect up each other to produce a new form of  world-wide solidarity?
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 The previous chapter not only laid out the larger task of  the dissertation as a whole 
but proposed a method for creating the four proposed concepts and an interpretive 
intervention for locating them in Deleuze, Guattari, and the Zapatistas. Insofar as the 
concept of  revolution plays a central role in the work of  Deleuze, Guattari, and the 
Zapatistas but is not thematized as such, this dissertation is bound by necessity to extract 
and reassemble a philosophy of  revolution from the fragments found across their work. My 
aim in doing this is not to represent the entirety of  their thought on revolution, but to build 
a specific set of  theoretical practices that others may find useful in taking up a common 
struggle. Along with this method I also proposed to make a contributing intervention into 
the literature on Deleuze, Guattari, and the Zapatistas by reading them not as political 
theories and practices aimed at merely reforming the process of  political representation or 
aimed at simply affirming the ontologically differential conditions of  their potential for 
transformation, but reading them instead as political constructivists engaged in the creation 
of  positive alternatives to state, party, and vanguard politics.1 
  Given the above philosophical framework I have put forward, this chapter responds 
to the first of  the four questions above: “what is the relationship between history and 
revolution today?” In reply, this chapter argues that the return to revolution influenced by 
Deleuze, Guattari, and the Zapatistas can be characterized by a “diagnostic” theory of  
political history motivated by the relative rejection of  all previous forms of  historical 
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1 While Deleuze and Guattari’s critics do well to pin-point certain shortcomings, risks, or tendencies, 
particularly in Deleuze and Guattari’s pre-A Thousand Plateaus writings, (political ambivalence, virtual hierarchy, 
and subjective paralysis) I also argued in chapter I, that there is a third approach to re-theorizing the concept of 
revolution in their philosophy that has been left out of  this debate. Namely, one that does not simply affirm 
deterritorialization or difference-in-itself  as a sufficient political concept, nor that merely relies on a critical 
analysis of  power, but rather picks up where Deleuze and Guattari left off: with the creation of  political 
concepts proper to concrete revolutionary situations. By drawing on Deleuze and Guattari’s work after their 
“constructivist turn” in A Thousand Plateaus, I maintain that a specifically constructivist theory of  revolution 
provides a viable third reading of  their political work that is better equipped to overcome the dangers hindering 
a return of  the concept of  revolution today. This is similarly the case with the Zapatistas whose post 2003 
constructivist turn is so often misunderstand as an “inward” and “silent” one.
representation (patriarchy, racism, statism, capitalism, vanguardism, etc.) and a concern for 
their immanent diagnosis in revolutionary praxis. My argument includes three crucial 
dimensions of  this rejection of  representation. Firstly, that it is a relative rejection, meaning 
that political representation always plays a more or less active role in political life even if  only 
in the mode of  “being warded off ” by revolutionary praxis. That is, even in its relative 
absence, it still exerts force as an immanent historical potential of  any political practice. 
Secondly, I argue that political representation is not an homogenous philosophical category, 
since there are several distinctly different types of  representation. These differences are 
found not only in terms of  content, such as race, class, gender, economics, and so on, but 
also in formal structure, such as coding, overcoding, and axiomatization. Thirdly, I argue that 
these types of  relative representation always intersect and coexist with each other to 
different degrees in every political situation. 
 In order to defend these claims, this chapter is divided into three sections. The first 
begins by rejecting two notions of  universal history: the notion of  the necessary and 
sequential emergence of  different types of  political power and the notion of  the merely 
contingent and coexistent emergence of  different types of  political power. Both of  these notions, 
I argue, are unable to conceive of  a sustained alternative to representational politics. The 
next two sections then propose an alternative theory of  history based on its specifically 
diagnostic usage to help discern the immanent political dangers and opportunities of  
revolutionary praxis. Section two argues that Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of  historical 
topology functions as such a multi-centered political diagnostic. And section three argues 
that the Zapatistas practice of  “diagnosing suffering” used in La Otra Campagna also 
functions as such a multi-centered political diagnostic (Marcos 2004b, 314).
43
Revolution and Universal History
 In this first section, I distinguish the concept of  a multi-centered political diagnostic 
from two competing and notions of  universal history both unable to conceive of  a sustained 
alternative to representational politics. 
The Universal History of  Succession
 According to the first concept, universal history is the succession of  inevitable 
moments of  crisis moving toward increasingly superior forms of  political organization. 
Revolution is thus a progressive, evolutionary, and teleological force. The notion that 
political history functions through the sequential passing of  distinct instants or epochs relies 
on the idea of  a unity, ground, or identity beneath these epochs such that they can both be 
distinguished from each other and from the ground upon which they pass. Each epoch is 
distinct but connected causally to the previous one under the condition of  an underlying 
arrow of  history itself. But whether this universal political succession is teleological, 
evolutionary, or progressive, it still defines revolution as the transformation of  one state into 
another, guided by the knowledge of  an underlying historical continuity between them. 
Revolutionary movements, according to this theory, proceed by a successive and increasingly 
accurate transformative repetition of  states toward their predefined goal: the perfect state-
form itself, state-liberalism, state-communism, state-capitalism, etc. 
 The problem that this theory of  universal historical succession poses, however, is 
that because it assumes a pre-given synthesis of  identity to account for the passing of  
causally different instants, it ends up reproducing only repetitions of  the same historico-
political presupposition without the possibility of  external change: a universal history of  
states and their capture. It defines history as the tendency of  the development of  “x,” where 
x is the perfection of  the present dominant political ideology: the state form. In other words, 
the concept of  succession pre-supposes a given present moment and then understands the 
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past and future as repetitions of  this present moment: as effects of  its primary cause. 
Unfortunately, this closes off  the possibility that a contingent and revolutionary event might 
undermine this unity as such; that it might change the very presuppositions of  history (and 
not simply repeat its underlying laws of  relation: resemblance, representation, acquisition of  
state power, etc.). Historical succession can thus allow for change, but only within pre-given 
parameters themselves unchanged by new political events: there may be non-state power, but 
only as a developmental stage moving toward the perfection of  state power.  
 What this theory of  revolutionary history has failed to think, however, is a concept 
of  non-state historical novelty. The question of  a revolution’s positive composition as a real 
form of  power apart from the telos of  state seizer has not yet been taken seriously. 
Revolutionary Marxism historically aimed to replace the bourgeois State-body with the 
communist Party-State-body, but what has yet to be thought today is a new kind of  non-
State body that would replace them both.2 
The Universal History of  Contingency
 According to the second concept, universal history is the coexistent potentiality of  
multiple and contingent forces. Revolution in this case is the potentiality of  transformation 
as such. The universal history of  contingency rejects the concept of  historical progress, 
teleology, the state, and an underlying historical unity. Unfortunately, the mere contingency 
and coexistence of  historical political forms is insufficient for understanding how it is that 
revolutions actually emerge. One way of  reading Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of  political 
history is to read it as the universal history of  contingency and coexistence. 
 In Deleuze and Guattari’s Philosophy of  History, Jay Lampert argues precisely this. The 
universal history of  succession “assumes,” Lampart argues, “that events have their primary 
causal impact on just those events which they resemble; it treats events as if  they were 
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2 A “collective” or “participatory-body:” a political horizontalism. 
entirely determined by prior causes unaffected either by chance or by subsequent events, and 
it reads events teleologically” (2006, 7). Opposed to succession, Lampert argues instead that
we might think of  time as the folding and unfolding of  a topological field. When 
folded over on to itself, the field is present one small square at a time, with its other 
parts moved around back—present but backgrounded. When unfolded out again, 
the presents get reorganized, and new foregroundings take place. Instants are always 
being reformulated on the shifting topology; as the smallest possible points of  view, 
they are in a sense real. In sum, the smallest points, and their order of  presentation, 
are dependent on the folds and unfoldings of  the general field that envelops them 
(2006, 16).
If  we consider “universal history [as] the history of  contingencies, and not the history of  
necessity” and historical events as folded intersections of  all “previous, present, and future” 
events (some more foregrounded, others more backgrounded), then there can be no 
necessary or pre-given teleology, evolution, or progress in history, only different 
arrangements of  temporally heterogenous moments continually open to recomposition 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 163). According to Deleuze and Guattari 
It is thus right to understand retrospectively all of  history in the light of  capitalism, 
on condition that we follow exactly the rules formulated by Marx: first, universal 
history is one of  contingencies, and not of  necessity; of  breaks and limits, and not of 
continuity. For it required great chances, astonishing encounters, which could have 
been produced elsewhere, previously, or might never have been produced, in order 
that fluxes escape coding, and, escaping, would constitute no less a new machine 
determinable as a capitalist socius. . . . In short, universal history is not only 
retrospective, it is contingent, singular, ironic, and critical. (1983, 140)
Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of  universal history is thus ironic in the sense that it begins 
from the perspective of  the “end” of  history (capitalism), but that this “end” is not its final 
end. It is critical in the sense that it is continually pushing beyond the limits of  capitalism 
toward the ever new elements that continue to break free from it, and it is singular in the 
sense that historical events are based on contingent encounters that do not express the same 
unified condition. 
 History is universal, for Deleuze and Guattari, not because a pre-given social identity 
is able to see itself  in all its predecessors, but because capitalism has detached beings from 
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their “natural” or “proper” space-times to be exchanged on a world market. These 
deterritorialized historical events are then able to bear directly upon the constitution of  the present. 
According to Lampert, the way around the neo-liberal cul-de-sac of  political history is thus the 
“revolutionary potential of  co-existential history” (140). “In short,” Lampert argues, 
following Deleuze and Guattari’s claim that “the undecidable is par excellence the germ and the 
place of  revolutionary decisions” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 473), that “[revolutionary] 
events are contingent not because they do something new, but because they do something 
undecidable” (Lampert 2006, 169). If  history is universally contingent and some or any of  its 
revolutionary events of  the past, present, or future may be contingently revived at any 
moment (the French revolution, May 1968, events-to-come, etc.) then the concept of  
revolution can never be exhausted and “the Deleuzian historian” becomes “the revolutionary 
who reorganizes bodies into war machines” and affirms the undecidable coexistence of  all 
events as the potential for a new revolution (2006, 111). 
 But while I believe Lampert’s account is well written and not inaccurate, I also 
believe that its contribution to a political philosophy of  revolution is, as it is in Anti-Oedipus, 
radically insufficient. While it is true that a universal history of  contingency and coexistence 
can be located in Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy and is able to avoid the problems of  
succession, the undecidable affirmation of  revolutionary co-existential potentiality, however, 
remains ultimately ambivalent. On this point I am in agreement with Badiou’s criticisms of  
Anti-Oedipus in “Flux and the Party.” Simply valorizing or affirming the historical potentiality 
of  the political situation to “become other than it is” through the aleatory re-emergence of  
revolutionary historical events may be emancipatory just as much as it may mean the return 
of  more archaically violent forms of  repression or a new market opportunity for capitalism. 
While the universal history of  contingency certainly admits the possibility of  revolution, it 
does not directly contribute to its clarification or development.
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 In some places, however, Lampert’s reading of  Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy of  
history does seem to offer us some clues to continue developing a theory of  revolution 
based on this contingent coexistence of  political events. “For a historical event,” Lampert 
insists, “to be actualized at a particular moment in time means nothing other than for it to 
exhibit all four kinds of  temporal relations [territorial, statist, capitalist, and nomadic] at 
once, all of  which are real, and all of  which are diagrammed together concretely” (2006, 17). 
Lampert may not have used this method to understand the actualization of  revolutionary 
praxis, but it is the aim of  this chapter to do so. 
Deleuze and Guattari’s Historical Topology
What Is Political History?  
 How then are we to understand political history such that non-representational 
revolutionary praxis is not only possible but actually constructed? So far I have argued that it 
cannot be by necessity, progress, and state-seizer, nor can it be by mere contingency and 
coexistence. Neither of  these offer us a way to understand a sustained political alternative to 
the history of  representational politics. Taking Lampert’s lead seriously however, I argue in 
this next section that we can use Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of  historical topology as a 
multi-centered diagnostic of  revolutionary praxis. Doing so, we can extract a truly 
revolutionary use of  political history untethered to representation and the affirmation of  
undecidable contingency. Although first begun in Anti-Oedipus, I believe the best resources 
for reading Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of  history as a revolutionary diagnostic are to be 
found in A Thousand Plateaus. While Deleuze and Guattari do not directly describe their 
theory of  historical topology as a “multi-centered political diagnostic,” nor do they use it for 
the sole purpose of  assessing the positive power of  revolutionary struggle, I argue that doing 
so will resolve our dilemma and help us asses the dangers of  building a revolutionary praxis: 
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by “diagramming all its four kinds of  temporal relations together, concretely” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987, 435).3  
 To this end, and following the above quote from A Thousand Plateaus, in this section I 
describe three of  the different historical political processes described by Deleuze and 
Guattari in Capitalism and Schizophrenia and argue that these processes are useful for 
diagnosing the dangers and opportunities for revolutionary transformation, even though 
Deleuze and Guattari did not completely do so themselves. To what degree does a 
revolutionary situation operate by territorial coding, statist overcoding, or capitalist 
axiomatics? What dangers do these pose to revolutionary praxis? But the argument that 
Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of  history should be used as a political diagnostic is not an 
original argument on my part and has, to some degree, been made by others, whose work I 
draw on in my own reading (Bell and Colebrook 2009). What is original in my reading 
however, is that I focus this diagnostic specifically on the question of  the actualization of  
revolution and the dangers it faces as a positive (not merely potential or undecidable) form of  
power. 
 At this point, however, the reader might be wondering where Deleuze and Guattari 
have derived these three political processes and why we should draw on them to understand 
the contemporary return to revolution. Firstly, the political processes of  territorial coding, 
statist overcoding, and capitalist axiomatization did not fall from the sky. Deleuze and 
Guattari spend the vast majority of  Anti-Oedipus and a good part of  A Thousand Plateaus 
extracting the general characteristics of  these processes from the concrete practices and 
events of  political history by drawing on a variety of  well known sociologists, 
anthropologists, archeologists, and historians. For Deleuze and Guattari, these political 
processes are not universal categories imposed upon history and political life from the 
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3 I deal with the fourth kind of  temporal relation in chapter IV and V.
outside. But neither are they merely reducible to the concrete empirical phenomena that they 
are meant to characterize. Statist overcoding, for example, is not an empirical state nor is it a 
universal category given in advance and by necessity; it is, as Foucault says, a “process of  
statification” (2008, 77). For Deleuze and Guattari, these three processes of  political power 
have no fixed essence or universality independent from the contingent and concrete effects 
that compose them. In fact, they are themselves nothing but effects, the mobile shape of  a 
perpetual process in the sense that they are incessant transactions which modify, move, or 
change. But within these changes there are still general characteristics of  each process that 
remain “transcendentally empirical” (See Bryant 2008). That is, they are transcendental in the 
sense that they describe the conditions under which a wide variety of  phenomena occur, but 
they are also empirical in the sense that they are real, singular, mutable, and historically 
contingent themselves. Being contingent, however, also means that they may reappear and 
disappear at different moments in history and in different combinations.4 
 Secondly, and accordingly, we should use Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of  historical 
topology to understand the relationship between history and revolution because unlike the 
political history of  succession, which Lampert rightly critiques, historical topology is able to 
theorize the possibility of  the novel and non-representational process that characterizes the 
contemporary return to revolution. Opposed to assuming a prior historical unity based on 
states, and here I am in full agreement with Lampert, Deleuze and Guattari develop a 
political history of  contingency based on revolutionary potential. If  we want to be able to 
think a return to revolution that is not based on the teleological political development of  
state, party, or vanguard representation, then we need to be able to think of  history as both 
contingent and topological. Exactly how Deleuze and Guattari succeed at this task is the 
subject of  several scholarly works (Burchill 2007). However, the argument I put forward in 
50
4 Beyond their usefulness as diagnostic tools, these processes have no universally descriptive power. 
this section moves beyond the scholarship on this topic that has for the most part read 
Deleuze and Guattari as proposing a merely potential and topological theory of  history. I 
argue instead that Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy of  political history it is not merely 
topological, but that it should be used as a diagnostic of  political power in order to construct a 
positive revolutionary praxis. We should use Deleuze and Guattari’s historical topology as 
more than the mere accurate description of  the world and its potential for transformation; 
we should use it to build another world within it that actively wards off  representational 
politics.  
 Before describing the general characteristics of  each of  these processes and arguing 
for their use as a multi-centered political diagnostic of  revolutionary praxis, I want to 
highlight the four central characteristics of  Deleuze and Guattari’s topological theory of  
political history that guide my argument. Political history, according to Deleuze and Guattari, 
is (1) topological, (2) applied immanently “in the course of  events” (Deleuze and Guattari 
1987, 251), (3) exists as a mix of  political processes, and (4) is able to help us to avoid the 
dangers of  political representation. 
(1) Political History Is Topological
It was a decisive event when the mathematician Riemann uprooted the multiple from 
its predicate state and made it a noun, "multiplicity." It marked the end of  dialectics 
and the beginning of  a typology and topology of  multiplicities. (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987, 482–83)
 Taken from mathematics, the concept of  a topological field is a single surface 
composed of  multiple heterogeneous points that are connected together by foldings or 
morphisms in their surface (like a piece of  origami). Independent of  linear contiguity, 
succession, or dialectics, topological shapes move and change by folding themselves into new 
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networks of  relations. Sierpi#ski’s sponge, Von Koch’s curve without tangent, and 
Mandelbrot’s fractals are examples of  iterated topological fields in geometry.5 
 The concept of  a specifically topological theory of  political history thus provides a 
way to consider political events as having several overlapping and contingent tendencies at 
once, each to a greater or lesser degree. For example, perhaps a political event has a strong 
anti-capitalist tendency but also has a strong territorial or religious tendency toward 
patriarchal norms that weakly manifests as a non-national solidarity across borders. This 
heterogeneity is not a matter of  contradiction or exclusion. Topologically speaking, there is 
no central axis or “essential political ideology” operating here. There is only a relative mix of 
political tendencies folded on top of  each other without a fixed center or necessary 
relationship. Each of  these political tendencies, according to Deleuze and Guattari, acts as 
the “loci of  a topology that defines primitive societies here, States there, and elsewhere war 
machines” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 430). Thus, topologically speaking these political 
tendencies or types are really distinct insofar as they occupy different locations, and yet they 
can also be contingently connected insofar as the coexistent space itself  folds them together. 
If  we imagine political events as successive points on a line, then there is no way for one 
point to directly affect another except through a mediated chain of  causal unity. However if  
we imagine political events as heterogeneous points on a one-dimensional folded surface, 
then any event can be directly connected to any other in any combination by spatial 
proximity: without mediation or causal unity.6
 The consequence of  this political coexistence, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is 
that “these directions are equally present in all social fields, in all periods. It even happens 
that they partially merge” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 360). All political types merge and 
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5 See (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, 487) for diagrams of  these images.
6 This point is similarly argued in (Lampert 2006, 16).
coexist simultaneously in all social fields at once in the sense that they actively ward each 
other off  and prevent what is to come while also providing the conditions for their 
replacement. Kinship relations in primitive societies, for example, Deleuze and Guattari 
argue, actively anticipate the state capture of  their surplus storage and the decoded flows of  
capital, but also actively ward them off  through specific practices of  potlatch and alliance 
(marriages, dowries) with other tribes. In this sense there is a “presentiment” or action of  
the inexistent future upon the present already in action, even if  the “future” form does not 
empirically exist yet. 
 Primitive societies cannot ward off  the formation of  an empire or State without 
anticipating it, and they  cannot anticipate it without its already being there, forming part of  
their horizon. And States cannot effect a  capture unless what is captured coexists, resists in 
primitive societies, or escapes under new forms, as towns or war machines (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987, 435). Thus, “To ward off  is also to anticipate” they say (Deleuze and Guattari 
1987, 431). Even contemporary physics and biology have developed similar notions of  
“reverse causalities” that are without finality but testify to the action of  the future on the 
present, or of  the present on the past (Prigogine and Stengers 1997).
(2) Political History Is Applied in the Course of  Events
 But Deleuze and Guattari’s historical topology or “speculative cartography…is not 
there to provide an inventory of  modes of  existence” (Stivale 1998), or provide an 
exhaustive taxonomy of  beings. Such an inventory would presuppose a higher unity or 
totality of  being from which to derive its universality. Only when a political history, Deleuze 
and Guattari say, “ceases to express a hidden unity, becoming itself  a dimension of  the 
multiplicity under consideration” does it cease to represent a political situation and become 
constitutive of it (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 22). That is, the revolutionary situation does 
not pre-exist its topological construction, it “must be made” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 6), 
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or expressed through the diagnostic labor itself, such “that one cannot distinguish it from the 
existential territory” (Stivale 1998, 219). There is thus, as Deleuze and Guattari say, “no 
difference between the map and the territory. That means that there is no transposition, that 
there is no translatability, and therefore no possible taxonomy. The modelization here is a 
producer of  existence” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 219). 
 When Deleuze and Guattari describe the kinship relations of  credit and debt in 
primitive societies or the desert wanderings of  moses’ nomads, these are not anthropological 
or historical claims meant to represent or factually reference some past “state of  affairs” 
accurately or inaccurately as some critics have misunderstood (Miller 1993). Representational 
anthropology and history presuppose a prior unity of  humanity and time such that one point 
may stand in for another through succession and identity. Rather, Deleuze and Guattari draw 
on anthropology and history “to isolate certain political concepts, concepts which are proper 
to politics, but which can only be formed philosophically” (Deleuze 1989, 280). Such 
political concepts do not bear any resemblance to the situation but are a dimension of  it, 
constitutive and expressive of  it. 
 Thus, historical topology does not ask if  characteristics accurately represent the truth 
of  the state of  affairs or what they mean, signify, symbolize, or stand for. Instead it 
composes a practical dimension of  how they work and what they do. Topology is thus a 
creative practice: a constructivism itself  transformed by what it transforms.
(3) Political History Exists as a Mix of  Political Processes
 But if  political history is not the continuous evolution of  a single telos, or the pure 
potentiality of  coexistence as such, but rather the contingent, multiple, and folded mix of  
“aggregates of  consistency,” or “consolidations of  very heterogeneous elements, ” in co-
existing historical events, then how can we explain time: the quasi-historical phenomena of  
limited political sequences, retroactive interpretations, dates, causes, and breakdowns 
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(Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 335)? If  every event in history is coexistent then how are we to 
distinguished different topologically mixed “blocks of  becoming” from one another? 
 Every situation or “block of  becoming,” as Deleuze and Guattari call it, has its own 
particular admixture of  political types that are more or less anticipated or prevented. For 
instance, different political processes may create blockages to transformation in a situation 
through different modes of  historico-political succession: territorial successions of  
genealogy and filiation, state successions-in-coexistence of  pre-given laws and despots, and 
capitalist coexistences of  successions through axiomatic exchange on the world market.7 
Succession exists then, not with a presupposed unity of  time, but as a secondary effect of  a 
more primary network of  folds in a political topology. 
 These “mixed regimes,” Deleuze and Guattari say, “presuppose these 
transformations from one regime to another, past, present, or potential (as a function of  the 
creation of  new regimes)” [my italics] (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 436). That is, because all 
political events are potentially or virtually active in any given event (and must be warded off  
or precipitated) they do not constitute a necessary succession but can produce the effect of  
one. A political topology based on thresholds and neighborhoods (statism here, territorial 
formations there, etc.) accounts for distinct “sequences” through transhistorical folding. 
Completely heterogenous space-times are held together through a particular “sequence” of  
resurrected and prefiguring components given a historical name and date to mark their 
configuration. Sequence is then constructed from topological heterogeneity. Dates and 
names thus do not refer to or represent past or future political events but are simply markers 
indicating the creation of  a “sequence.” 
 “Contrary to the Marxist view,” according to Paul Patton, “no single logic of  
development governs the direction of  history understood in these terms. All events are the 
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7 I use here Jay Lampert’s historico-political distinction between these three regimes of  representation. 
effects of  the interplay of  forces, as things are transformed or reinterpreted to serve new 
ends” (2000, 56). Instead of  asking how a political event further articulates the becoming of  
a pre-given “end of  history,” we should ask instead, “what are the relative blockages, 
anticipations and mixed political processes at work in a given event?,” “how do future events 
transform those of  the past and present, and how do those of  the past transform those of  
the future?” That is, “what is the relative mixture of  the event’s political anticipations and 
repressions?” and “how can we avoid the dangers of  representation while creating a 
constructive alternative?” In this way we can use Deleuze and Guattari’s political topology as 
a diagnostic to avoid the blockage of  an identity-based universal history (that understands 
difference only as a difference from the same) and the ambivalence of  a universal history that 
merely affirms the potentiality of  revolutionary coexistence.    
(4) Political History Helps us Avoid the Dangers of  Political Representation
 The goal of  political history is to aid in determining the dangers that confront a 
revolutionary praxis. As Deleuze and Guattari pose the issue after writing Anti-Oedipus, “the 
problem one always comes up against is how to ensure that the movements of  decoding, the 
movements of  deterritorialization, are revolutionarily positive, but at the same time that they 
do not recreate artificial forms like perversion or the family, that is, that they do not create in 
their own way types of  codes and territorialities” (Deleuze 1972).8 
 In order to effectively avoid “social orders of  representation,” as Deleuze and 
Guattari call them, a political and topological history must be able to distinguish between 
types and deselect the ones that isolate, self-destruct, or try and capture all other modes of  
valorization (1983, 262). The mono-mania of  movements demanding recognition of  their 
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8 Deleuze, Seminar of  7 March 1972. “Le problème auquel on se heurte toujours, c’est comment faire pour que les 
mouvements de décodage, les mouvements de déterritorialisation soit à la fois révolutionnairement positifs et qu’à la fois ils ne 
recréent pas des formes comme perverses ou des formes artificielles de famille, c’est à dire qu’ils ne recréent pas à leur manière des 
espèces de codes et de territorialités.”
single-issue causes, the subjection of  citizens by legal and representational statism, the global 
machinic enslavement by techno-capitalist market production, and no less the lines of  escape 
from these dangers that fail to create new alternatives, potentially falling instead into the 
black holes of  revolutionary purity, drugs, or cynicism, are all coexisting potential dangers. 
 But as Deleuze and Guattari say, “politics is by no means an apodictic science. It 
proceeds by experimentation, groping in the dark, injection, withdrawal, advances, retreats. 
The factors of  decision and prediction are limited” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 461). Since 
the very practice of  historical topology is, as they define it, constitutive of  the situation, any 
“identification” of  “what types are functioning here” is both effective and effected by acts of 
determination. Hence historical topology is by no means axiomatic or formally unaffected by 
the determinations it makes. Rather, it is at each point reciprocally transformed in an 
experimental feedback loop always in danger and requiring caution. Revolution is thus not an 
unrestrained unleashing of  desire, freedom, or lines of  flight, nor is it a matter of  having 
“the right plan.” Rather it’s a risky experimentation requiring caution and commitment to lay 
out a practical diagnostic of  action: adding one more dimension or fold to the last.
 Revolution is neither about a progressive strategic assault on state power, nor its 
absolute potential to contingently allow things to become other than they are. Rather, a 
revolutionary situation is a specifically held tension of  heterogenous historical/political 
forces of  anticipation and prevention. It is the diagnostic creation of  new space-times or 
consistent events simultaneous and coexistent to the forces and dangers of  political 
representation. It is not a radically external force, but rather an exterior force folded into the 
interior of  the situation: it is, or can be, as Guattari says, an “anti-capitalist force within 
capitalism” (1996, 89).9 How then should we use Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of  
57
9 "I am in favor of  market economy but not geared only at profit and its valorization of  status, hierarchy
and power. I am in favor of  an institutional market economy, one founded on another mode of  valorization. 
Instead of  being more capitalistic, we want to make anti-capitalism within capitalism" (Guattari 1996, 89).
historical topology as a creative diagnostic of  the positive (not merely potential) power of  
revolutionary praxis? 
Historical Topology as Diagnostic of  Revolutionary Praxis
 I have thus far argued two points. Firstly, that the renewal of  the concept of  a non-
representational revolution is blocked by two theories of  universal history. If  history is the 
unity of  successive moments culminating in political representation, then non-
representational revolutionary novelty is impossible. If  history is a virtual coexistence of  
contingent moments, then revolutionary novelty is possible but ambivalent. Secondly, I 
argued that Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of  political history provides an alternative to 
both these theories insofar as it is (1) topological, (2) applied immanently “in the course of  
events,” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 251). (3) exists as a mix of  political processes, and (4) is 
able to help us to avoid the dangers of  political representation (although the exact details of  
these dangers will be addressed in the following section). In what follows I will argue in this 
next section that this historical topology should be understood as indicative of  a new 
revolutionary strategy based on its use as a diagnostic of  revolutionary praxis.
 In order to do this I examine each one of  the political processes described by 
Deleuze and Guattari (territorial coding, statist overcoding, and capitalist axiomatization) in 
detail and show how each diagnoses a type of  representational process that poses a danger 
for revolutionary praxis: (a) territorial representation poses the dangers of  mono-mania and 
micro-fascism; (b) state representation poses the dangers of  fear, machinic enslavement, and 
subjectification; and (c) capitalist representation poses the dangers of  total war, and a new 
form of  machinic enslavement.
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(1) Territorial Representation   
 Territorial political representation, a concept Deleuze and Guattari extract10 from the 
practices of  “primitive societies,” is characterized by what they call coding, supple 
segmentation, and itinerancy. But “why return to the primitives, when it is a question of  our 
own life?” Deleuze and Guattari ask (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 209). One of  the more 
politically significant (and yet under-attended) moves Deleuze and Guattari make away from 
Anti-Oedipus is to extend their political typology, previously restricted to libidinal and 
economic domains, into a broader “general logic of  assemblages” in A Thousand Plateaus 
(Deleuze 2006, 177). According to Deleuze, the features that previously characterized the 
historical, libidinal, and economic sequences of  primitivism, statism, and capitalism in Anti-
Oedipus become, in A Thousand Plateaus, the general political and topological features of  all 
kinds of  assemblages. Following this, the present approach extracts only the most basic and 
transferable aspects of  these three logics without suturing their origins to the narrowly 
historical context in which they emerge in Anti-Oedipus. Topologically, as I have shown, the 
basic characteristics of  all historical political processes can be just as operative in the past as 
they can be in the present or future.11 
(i) Coding, Supple Segmentation, and Itinerancy 
 Territorial representation, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is characterized by the 
use of  polyvocal codes, supple kinds of  segmentation, and itinerant territories. These are the 
basic processes, according to Jason Read, by which social “traditions, prescriptions, and rules 
bearing on the production and distribution of  goods, prestige, and desire” are represented in 
a political situation (2006, 142). They are the “natural” norms of  social life. Territorial 
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10 Deleuze and Guattari do not claim to be representing actual primitive peoples lives or doing an anthropology 
(even though they cite anthropologists). Their goal it so create concepts that are heterogenous to these 
practices and yet connect to them and coexist along side them.
11 Nick Thoburn offers and excellent account of  this topology in action on the subject of  political militancy. 
See (Thoburn 2009).
processes express the pre-given, essential, and proper limits and usage of  persons and 
objects in a given situation by repressing decoded flows (the unexplainable) and re-
presenting others as coded (meaningful) ones. Codes are thus naturalized as “related to the 
past, to an inscription of  memory, 'this is how things are done, how they have always been 
done'” (1983, 142). According to Anti-Oedipus, these “qualitatively different chains of  mobile 
and limited code” are formed by three basic actions: 1) “a selection cut” allowing something 
to pass through and circulate, 2) “a detachment cut” that blocks part of  that circulation, and 
3) a “redistribution of  the remainder” to begin a new chain of  code (1983, 247). 
 The processes of  coding, Deleuze and Guattari say, begins not on the basis of  a 
primary code but from a territorial repression of  “uncoded or decoded flows”: a kind of  
primordial ch1983,s inherent to the earth itself. Before there are any social norms or 
traditions there is a more primary “scission” (1983, 153) where the “whole process of  
production is inscribed, on which the forces and means of  labor are recorded, and the 
agents and the products distributed” (1983, 141). Confronted with the “terrifying 
nightmare” (1983, 140) of  this essentially ch1983,tic and fragmented world, territorial 
peoples repress these uncoded flows and inscribe upon this ch1983,s their own territorial 
representations (140). 
 The first synthesis of  territorial coding (the synthesis of  connection) attempts to 
ward off  this chaos by making a “selection cut” from these uncoded flows allowing some of 
them to pass through while others are blocked. This primary repression of  non-codable 
flows accomplishes two things: it wards off  an absolutely chaotic world by deselecting some 
of  its flows, and it puts into circulation and connection the others to be coded. By marking a 
separation of  some of  these non-coded flows the connective synthesis is able to serialize and 
qualitatively organize them into an identity, “coded stock” or what Deleuze and Guattari call 
an “inscription on a full body” or “socius.” The “entry pole” of  selection here initiates a 
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filiative line following a genealogical or hereditary decent of  hierarchically coded stock: 
codes of  kinship, codes of  worship, codes of  communication, codes of  exchange, codes of  
location (places of  worship, places for eating, places for trash). Everything has its proper 
code: the proper time for revolution, the proper people to undertake it. 
 The second synthesis of  territorial coding (the disjunctive synthesis or “detachment 
cut”) also accomplishes two tasks: it blocks some of  these connections from attaching 
themselves to the political body (by code prohibitions, limits, etc.) so that a finite stock of  
code may circulate within a qualitatively distinct territory, and detaches a remainder or 
“residual energy” in order to begin a new chain of  code further along. These are the borders 
to towns, prohibitions on kinship, and boundaries to racial, ethnic, and gender identities. The 
revolutionary vanguard similarly detaches itself  from the proletariat mass and forges ahead 
of  them. These are the limits produced by the disjunctive synthesis.  
 The third synthesis of  territorial coding (the conjunctive synthesis or the 
“redistribution of  the remainder”) wards off  the fusion of  all codes into a single qualitative 
stock by producing a residuum, but also begins a new line of  code by redistributing this 
surplus through an alliance with different lines of  code. There are many different 
mechanisms for warding off  the fusion of  codes and redistributing surplus code through 
alliances with other lines of  code: practices of  potlatch (giving away wealth in order to gain 
prestige), practices of  struggle (itinerant raids and theft eliminating accumulation), practices of 
dowry (giving away wealth and establishing alliances with other kinship lines) gifts and counter 
gifts, etc.  
  These codes, lineages, and territories “form a fabric of  relatively supple 
segmentarity” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 208). Codes and territorial representations 
segment us from all around and in every direction, Deleuze and Guattari say in A Thousand 
Plateaus (208). “The house is segmented according to its rooms' assigned purposes; streets, 
61
according to the order of  the city; the factory, according to the nature of  the work and 
operations performed in it” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 208). There are, according to 
Deleuze and Guattari, 
 multiple binary segments “following the great major dualist oppositions: social 
 classes, but also men-women, adults-children, and so on,” circular segments, “in 
 ever larger circles, ever wider disks or coronas, like Joyce's  ‘letter’: my affairs, my 
 neighborhood's affairs, my city's, my country's, the world's,” and linear segments, 
 “along a straight line or a number of  straight lines, of  which each segment represents 
 an episode or ‘proceeding’: as soon as we finish one proceeding we begin another, 
 forever proceduring or procedured, in the family, in school, in the army, on the 
 job. School tells us, ‘You're not at home anymore’; the army tells us, ‘You're not in 
 school anymore.’" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 208) 
 Sometimes the segments belong to individuals or groups, and sometimes the 
individuals or groups belong to many segments at once and change according to the 
perspective. Territorial segments frequently have a leeway between the two poles of  chaotic 
scission and static fusion. They have considerable communicability between heterogeneous 
elements such that one segment may fit with another in many ways without the prior 
determination of  a base domain (economic, political juridical, artistic, etc.). They have 
situated properties and relations independent of  any structure and have a continuous activity 
such that segmentarity is always segmentarity-in-progress, operating by outgrowths, 
detachments, and mergings. 
 Finally, “by switching territories at the conclusion of  each operation period 
(itinerancy, itineration),” and within each operation period repeating a temporal series that 
tends toward its marginal or limit object, primitive political distributions create a 
“disequilibrium of  excess and deficiency” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 440). That is, every 
time a territory is delimited, an outside or surplus is produced through this process of  
delimitation or “detachment.” This surplus or credit is then redistributed to another line 
(through an alliance) where it will again produce a surplus and so on in a perpetual 
disequilibrium: making its very dysfunction an essential element of  its ability to function 
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(1983, 151). But what would it mean to use this as a diagnostic of  a positive revolutionary 
praxis? 
(ii) Errors and Dangers of  Territorial Representation for Revolutionary Praxis 
 As a diagnostic tool, and not as a mere historical contingency, territorial 
representation reveals two errors and two dangers within revolutionary praxis. “The first 
[error],” Deleuze and Guattari say, “is axiological and consists in believing that a little 
suppleness is enough to make things ‘better’” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 215).
 Supple reforms based on the representation of  an essential group identity only 
appear to be transformative when in fact they leave deeper structural problems intact. That 
is, if  revolutionary movements produce their own coded values, essential meanings, and 
segmented territories, they may appear to have made important reforms by legitimating their 
own identities/values. But by representing their culture as a coded identity, they are only that 
much easier to incorporate into a flexible but not radically transformable state-capitalism 
with a “human face.”  
 “The second [error], Deleuze and Guattari say, “is psychological, as if  the molecular 
[territorial] were in the realm of  the imagination and applied only to the individual and 
interindividual. But there is just as much social-Real on one line as on the other” (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1987, 215). That is, territorial social struggles may not be state politics but that 
does not mean that they are “social-imaginaries,” reducible to psychological or 
phenomenological cases of  subjects-who-imagine. Segmentary distributions are real political 
representations even if  they are not represented by the state.12 
 The first danger of  supple segmentarity, Deleuze and Guattari say, is the clarity of  
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12 There are two other dangers. “Third, the two forms [state and primitive] are not simply distinguished by 
size,” but by type of  distribution. Fourth Finally, the qualitative distinction between the two [state overcoding 
and territorial coding] does not preclude the two cutting into each other or boosting each other in inverse 
proportion (215). 
“monomania.” That is, 
 Interactions without resonance. Instead of  the great paranoid fear [of  the state], we 
 are trapped in a thousand little monomanias, self-evident truths, and clarities that 
 gush from every black hole and no longer form a system, but are only rumble and 
 buzz, blinding lights giving any and everybody the mission of  self-appointed  judge, 
 dispenser of  justice, policeman, neighborhood SS man. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 
 228) 
Monomania is the danger that revolutionary movements can become what Deleuze and 
Guattari call “neoterritorialities,” gangs, bands, minorities, margins, and “tribalisms” that 
“continue to affirm the rights of  segmentary societies” but tend to persist within the 
interiority of  the state. These neoterritorialities remain relatively independent from each 
other by presuming a coded clarity of  their own issue, campaign, or identity. However, the 
clarity afforded by independent single-issue struggles is ultimately unable to form a cohesive 
alternative to state-capitalism. 
 These modern archaisms are extremely complex and varied. Some are mainly 
 folkloric, but they nonetheless represent social and potentially political forces (from 
 domino players to home brewers via the Veterans of  Foreign Wars). Others are 
 enclaves whose archaism is just as capable of  nourishing a modern fascism as of  
 freeing a revolutionary charge (the ethnic minorities, the Basque problem, the Irish 
 Catholics, the Indian  reservations)…(neighborhood territorialities, territorialities of  
 the large aggregates, “gangs”). Others are organized or promoted by the State, even 
 though they might turn against the State and cause it serious problems (regionalism, 
 nationalism). (1983, 257–58)
While the revolutionary potential of  these groups is not to be dismissed entirely (the second 
error), the danger of  political isolation and single-issue reform campaigns, without the larger 
horizons of  revolution, remain as exceptions that only prove the rule of  state-capitalism 
(!i"ek 1997). 
 The second danger of  supple segmentarity for revolutionary praxis is what Deleuze 
and Guattari call “microfascism.” Coded revolutionary movements, bands, gangs, sects, 
families, towns, and neighborhoods can recreate, on their own territorial scale, the 
hierarchical, authoritarian organization present at the state bureaucratic level. Within 
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revolutionary struggles, patriarchal, racist, classist, etc., codes and segments can all reappear. 
These microfascisims spare no one. “Leftist organizations will not be the last to secrete 
microfascisms,” Deleuze and Guattari warn us. “It's too easy to be antifascist on the molar 
level, and not even see the fascist inside you, the fascist you yourself  sustain and nourish and 
cherish with molecules both personal and collective” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 215). 
Supple segmentarity may undermine the rigid state segments, “but everything that it 
dismantles it reassembles on its own level: micro-Oedipuses, microformations of  power, 
microfascisms” (1987, 205). 
 But what dangers are posed for revolutionary praxis when these segmentary 
processes begin to resonate together in a process of  state overcoding? 
(2) State Representation
 The second type of  historical political process that Deleuze and Guattari describe in 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia, and that I argue can be used as a diagnostic of  revolutionary 
praxis, is state representation. Just as territorial representation operates between the two 
poles of  fusion and scission, state representation operates between two poles: the despotic 
and the juridical. While the first pole of  the state brings coded territories into a resonance of 
concentric circles through the process of  what Deleuze and Guattari call “overcoding” and 
“machinic enslavement,” the more developed juridical pole of  the state disciplines the 
territories through law and “social subjection.” While the first creates public stocks of  land, 
work, and money in order to extract rent, profit, and tax, the second creates private property 
and legal contracts in order to circulate land, work, and money horizontally among 
symmetrically related citizens. The despotic pole of  the state is characterized by overcoding 
and rigid segmentation and poses two dangers for revolutionary movements, fear and 
machinic enslavement, while the juridical pole of  the state poses the danger of  social 
subjection. I examine each pole of  the state and its dangers for revolutionary praxis in turn.   
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(i) The Despotic State Pole 
 Despotic state representation is characterized by its overcoding of  territorial codes 
and its rigid segmentation of  territorially supple segments. Instead of  the surplus code 
generated through territorial representation that would normally form an alliance with other 
blocks of  code, this surplus of  code may instead begin to form an unchecked accumulation 
(agricultural, social, political, etc.) requiring the maintenance of  a specialized body. This 
special body of  accumulation then reacts back upon the territories and brings them into 
resonance around a centralized point of  transcendence: the despot. The extended filitations 
of  old communities and groups are then replaced by the direct filiation of  the despot to his 
deity while the lateral alliances are replaced by a new alliance of  the despot with his people. 
Overcoding, according to Deleuze and Guattari, thus: 
makes points resonate together, points that are not necessarily already town-poles 
but very diverse points of  order, geographic, ethnic, linguistic, moral, economic, 
technological particularities. It makes the town resonate with the countryside. It 
operates by stratification; in other words, it forms a vertical, hierarchized aggregate 
that spans the horizontal lines in a dimension of  depth. In retaining given elements, 
it necessarily cuts off  their relations with other elements, which become exterior, it 
inhibits, slows down, or controls those relations; if  the State has a circuit of  its own, 
it is an internal circuit dependent primarily upon resonance, it is a zone of  recurrence 
that isolates itself  from the remainder of  the network, even if  in order to do so it 
must exert even stricter controls over its relations with that remainder. (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987, 433)
 State overcoding is thus characterized by centralized accumulation, forced resonance 
of  diverse points of  order, “laying out a divisible homogenous space striated in all 
directions” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 223), and by its vertical and redundant center (on 
top), scanning all the radii. The figure of  the despot or emperor, as he is called in A Thousand 
Plateaus, is the “sole and transcendent public-property owner, the master of  the surplus or 
the stock and the source of  public functions and bureaucracy” (427–28). The state is the 
bond or knot that deterritorializes the polyvocal political segments and forces them into a 
new regime of  overcoding.
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 Just as there are three kinds of  supple segmentation, Deleuze and Guattari also 
describe three kinds of  rigid segmentation proper to the process of  statification: binary, 
circular, and linear. Whereas binary supple segmentations are defined by multiple binaries 
that are always determined by a third (an alliance between the two), binary rigid 
segmentations are self-sufficient and assure the prevalence of  one segment over the other 
(hierarchy). Whereas circular supple segments do not imply the same center but a multiplicity 
of  centers (round but not quite circular), circular rigid segments form a resonance of  
concentric circles around an axis of  rotation, converging on a single point of  accumulation. 
Whereas linear supple segmentation functions by “segments-in-progress,” alignments but no 
straight line, and supple morphological formations, linear rigid segments function by 
homogenized segments geometrically organized around a dominant segment through which 
they pass: a space or “spatio” rather than a place or territory.  
 But there remains no opposition between the central and the territorial. The state is a 
global whole, unified and unifying, but it is so only because it implies a constellation of  
juxtaposed, imbricated, ordered subsystems: a whole micropolitical fabric (pedagogical, 
juridical, economic, familial, sexual). As Foucault similarly observes, the most general 
character of  the statification consists in organizing these micropolitical arts of  
governmentality around a sovereign agency (Foucault 2007, 11–12). Hierarchy is, thus, not 
simply pyramidal, it is differential because territorial and State distributions are “inseparable, 
overlapping and entangled… forming a supple fabric without which their rigid segments 
would not hold” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 213). 
(ii) The Dangers of  State Representation for Revolutionary Praxis
 Despotic state representation, I argue, poses at least two significant dangers for 
revolutionary praxis: fear and “machinic enslavement.” Despotic regimes create a generalized 
terror and paranoia of  scission resolvable only by a transcendent unity, “national security is 
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at risk! Let the executive decide.” “The more rigid the segmentarity, the more reassuring it is 
for us,” Deleuze and Guattari say (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 227). States often declare a 
“state of  emergency” in order to suspend normal law and stop riots, demonstrations, or 
potential revolutions. The more violent the state’s response to popular revolt, the “safer” the 
population is under the state’s protection. Revolutions themselves also risk creating a party-
state apparatus that makes everyone a piece in a single megamachine. “There is 
enslavement,” Deleuze and Guattari say, “when human beings themselves are constituent 
pieces of  a machine that they compose among themselves and with other things (animals, 
tools) under the control and direction of  a higher unity” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 456–
457). Really existing socialist states in Russia and China were examples of  revolutions turned 
state megamachines. 
(iii) The Juridical State Pole
 At the other pole of  the state overcoding process is the juridical pole of  the city-state 
defined by its topical conjugations and its danger of  social subjection. According to Deleuze 
and Guattari, while despotic States certainly included towns, depending on how complete the 
State’s monopoly over foreign trade is, town distributions tend to “break free when the 
State’s overcoding itself  provoke[s] decoded flows” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 434). 
Eastern empires, they continue, had created large stockpiles that trading towns (like ancient 
Athens) took advantage of  without having to constitute a stock of  their own (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987, 432). Juridical town distributions thus formed topical conjunctions that were 
achieved through this autonomy, or else through corporative and commercial networks freed 
from the despotic State-form of  asiatic production. 
 As despotic rigid segmentations unleash flows of  decoded functionaries necessary for 
collecting taxes, rent, and profit, keeping laws, and policing, so legal conjunctions harness 
and engender these flows into towns but keep them from streaming together. Topical 
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conjunctions are magisterial or legal structures immanent to towns that “stand as so many 
knots or recodings” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 452) and act as distinct focal points in 
resonance with the State. Yet they also form their own network of  camps, fortifications, and 
“boundary lines” in place of  the previous territorial segments-in-progress. Imperial law thus 
undergoes a mutation, becoming subjective, disciplinary, and conjunctive. “And unlike the 
relatively uniform imperial pole, this second pole presents the most diverse of  forms. But as 
varied as relations of  personal dependence are, they always mark qualified and topical 
conjunctions” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 451). 
(iv) The Danger of  Juridical Representation for Revolutionary Praxis
There is subjection when the higher unity constitutes the human subject linked to a 
now exterior object, which can be an animal, tool, or even a machine. The human 
being is no longer a component of  the machine but a worker, a user. He or she is 
subjected to the machine and no longer enslaved by the machine. (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987, 457) 
 Opposed to being a cog in a megamachine, the processes of  juridical subjectification 
constitutes human beings as subjects of  an external machine. Revolutionary praxis risks 
either subordinating itself  to juridical representation as a form of  resistance against the 
despotic state (law suits, human rights, and legal representation, etc.), or it risks re-creating 
juridical representation in its own autonomous territories (popular justice, Maoist people’s 
courts, etc.). Laws, contracts, and conventions discipline and create private citizens. These 
laws are then enforced by local revolutionary officials. Private individuals are users of  
contracts and workers of  animals, tools, and machines, no longer just one more part in a 
megamachine. They are users of  machines held together by the transconsistency of  being 
subjects of  the law. But the egalitarian pretensions and human face of  such subjection 
should not conceal the local centralization of  power, hierarchy, and disciplinary apparatuses 
of  juridical representation set in motion to force the coordination of  subjects.13 
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13 See “On popular justice: a discussion with Maoists” in (Foucault 1980, 1–37).
(3) Capitalist Representation
 The third type of  historical political process that Deleuze and Guattari describe in 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia, and that I argue can be used as a diagnostic of  revolutionary 
praxis, is capitalist representation. Where Deleuze and Guattari defined territorial 
representation by its codes and microfascisms, despotic representation by its overcoding and 
machinic enslavements, and juridical representation by its topical conjugations and social 
subjections, they define capitalist representation by its axiomatization and its new form of  
machinic enslavement. 
(i) Axiomatics 
 Deleuze and Guattari define capitalist representation by its processes of  
axiomatization. An axiom, they say, is an independent or disengaged point that forces 
unqualified elements into homologous quantitative relations (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 
138). Axioms are not theoretical propositions, they say, but “operative statements that enter 
as component parts into the assemblages of  production, circulation, and 
consumption” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987 461). That is, Deleuze and Guattari do not mean 
the word “axiomatic” as a scientific “metaphor;” social axiomatics are not derived from 
scientific, mathematical, or logical axiomatics,14 but the reverse: “The true axiomatic is that 
of  the social machine itself, which takes the place of  the old codings and organizes all the 
decoded flows, including the flows of  scientific and technical code, for the benefit of  the 
capitalist system and in the service of  its ends” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 233). 
 So whereas codes determine the qualities of  flows (types of  places, types of  goods, 
types of  activity) and establish indirect relations (of  alliance) between these 
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14 Badiou claims that mathematics (specifically axiomatic set theory) alone is the thinking of  Being qua Being. 
Social and political being, for Badiou, are thus derived from the more primary ontological axioms of  set theory 
that are independent from phenomenological or political transformations and their affections. So when Badiou 
claims that Deleuze has no political philosophy but only an ethics, this cannot be the case since axiomatics, 
according to Deleuze and Guattari, are primarily social and political mechanisms they are not purely 
mathematical but an effect of  a larger social axiomatic.   
incommensurable, qualified, mobile, limited codes, and overcodes (as well as topical 
conjunctions) capture and recode these flows through extra-economic forces (political or 
juridical), capitalist axioms establish a strictly economic general equivalence between purely 
unqualified (decoded) flows. 
 The axiomatic, however, is not the invention of  capitalism, Deleuze and Guattari say, 
since it is identical with capitalism itself. Rather, capitalism is the offspring or result, which 
merely insures the regulation of  the axiomatic; “it watches over or directs progress toward a 
saturation of  the axiomatic and the corresponding widening of  the limits” (1983, 252–53). 
Capitalist axiomatics create denumerable finite representations of  social processes divested 
of  their qualities. Each independent from the others, they are added, subtracted, and 
multiplied to form more or less saturated markets for the generation of  wealth.     
 Just like the other political types, two poles also form capitalist distributions. What 
capitalism continually decodes at one pole, it axiomatizes at the other (1983, 246). Deleuze 
and Guattari give several examples of  the “decoded flows” constituting capitalist 
axiomatization. For the free worker decoding means: (1) the deterritorialization of  the soil 
through privatization, (2) the loss of  the means of  consumption through the dissolution of  
the family, and the decoding of  the worker in favor of  the work itself  or of  the machine 
(industrial production). For capital it means: (1) the deterritorialization of  wealth through 
monetary abstraction, (2) the decoding of  the flows of  production through merchant capital, 
(3) the decoding of  States through financial capital and public debts, and 4) the decoding of  
the means of  production through the formation of  industrial capital (1983, 225). 
 While territorial representation “implies” that qualified pieces of  labor correspond to 
a particular quanta of  abstract labor (activity required to create a given artifact), and State 
exchange introduces the general equivalent of  currency formally uniting “partial 
objects” (goods and services) whose overcoded value is determined by non-capitalist 
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(imperial or juridical) decisions, neither decode or de-qualify exchange to the degree that 
capitalism does. 
 In Rome, for example, Deleuze and Guattari say, there may have been a privatization 
of  property, a decoding of  money through the formations of  great fortunes, the decoding of 
producers through expropriation and proletariazation. But despite all these decoded 
conditions it did not produce a capitalist economy, but rather reinforced feudal offices and 
relations in a regime based on slavery (1983, 223). Capitalism goes further. At one pole it 
decodes qualitative relationships through the privatization of  all aspects of  social life, free 
trade, advertising, freeing of  labor and capital, imperialism; and, at the other pole it 
axiomatizes them as “productions for the market.” 
 Here, however, it is crucial not to make the error Slavoj !i"ek and others have made 
by concluding from this that all “decoded flows,” are necessarily contributions to capitalism 
(!i"ek 2004, 184). Neither, I argue, should we conclude the opposite: that decoded flows are 
necessarily revolutionary. The struggle over the assembly of  decoded flows is a revolutionary 
struggle and far from decidable in advance. Revolutionary praxis struggles to unite a 
consistency of  decoded flows, and capitalism struggles to have them “bound into a world 
axiomatic that always opposes the revolutionary potential of  decoded flows with new 
interior limits” (1983, 246). The details of  this struggle are developed at length in chapter IV. 
 Capitalism is thus constituted by two decoded flows: on the one hand, the flow of  
naked labor, freed from serfdom and able to sell its labor capacity, and on the other hand the 
pure flow of  capital, independent from landed wealth, that is capable of  buying labor. The 
first “has its roots in simple circulation where money develops as means of  payment (bills of 
exchange falling due on a fixed date, which constitute a monetary form of  finite 
debt)” (1983, 229), and is distributed as “income” to wage earners for the purchase of  
products and services. The second, however, is the money inscribed on the balance sheet of  
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the firm, and is based on the circulation of  drafts rather than money. This second money 
constitutes what Deleuze and Guattari call the capitalist form of  infinite debt. 
 Rather than using preexisting currency as a means of  payment, finance capital is an 
instantaneous creative flow that banks create spontaneously as a debt owing to themselves, a 
creation ex nihilo that 
 hollows out at one extreme of  the full body a negative money (a debt entered as a 
 liability of  the banks), and projects at the other extreme a positive money (a credit 
 granted the productive economy by the banks)-‘a flow possessing a power of  
 mutation’ that does not enter into income and is not assigned to purchases, a pure availability, 
 non-possession and non-wealth. (1983, 237)
 This so-called stateless, monetary mass that circulates through foreign exchange and 
across borders forms a supranational ecumenical organization in many ways untouched by 
governmental decisions. For example, 96% of  money circulated in the United States alone is 
financial capital. This money does not exist as concrete payment or exchange-money but 
rather as credit or investment money loaned out by banks (to other banks, or other 
investors) at specific interest rates. How much this investment-capital is “worth” at any given 
moment depends on an incredibly complex host of  speculations, desires, predictions, 
interest rates, stock prices, etc., that no one can predict with total accuracy. At any given time 
U.S. banks are required to have no less than 3% of  their total money as payment-money to 
distribute for bank withdraws.15 
 This dualism between types of  money—“the formation of  means of  payment and 
the structure of  financing, between the management of  money and the financing of  
capitalist accumulation, between exchange money and credit money” (1983, 229)—is 
fundamental to the capitalist system: but how are such unqualified monetary flows then 
quantified by an axiomatic?    
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 It would be a simplistic reading of  Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis to say that 
capitalist axiomatics were defined solely by the “abstract quantification of  decoded flows.” 
In part, this is the case because the quantification of  the creative flow of  financial capital 
poses a real difficulty: “no one knows exactly where to draw the line” on this speculative, 
non-existent monetary mass. But what makes the capitalist social field unique is that its 
quantifications are based on “differential conjunctions” between flows of  unqualified labor 
and flows of  unqualified capital. That is, simple “quantity” as a variable relation between 
independent terms (goods and services) has taken upon itself the independence. 
Denumerable quantification no longer depends on the independent qualities of  the terms 
being exchanged, but is determined independently from these concrete terms. Just as axioms 
remain “independent” and “disengaged” from their social or mathematical demonstrations, 
so the capitalist market also determines the quantitative value of  commodities independently 
of  their qualification, that is, determines them “axiomatically.” 
 The capitalist machine thus begins when capital ceases to be a capital of  alliance (a 
variable relation between two qualified terms) to become filiative capital (an independent 
determination of  abstract quantities) where “money begets money, or value a surplus 
value” (1983, 227). Capitalism’s “differential conjunctions,” as Deleuze and Guattari describe 
them, are precisely the axiomatization of  this “differential relationship,” “…where Dy 
derives from labor power and constitutes the fluctuation of  variable capital, and where Dx 
derives from capital itself  and constitutes the fluctuation of  constant capital (‘the definition 
of  constant capital by no means excludes the possibility of  a change in the value of  its 
constituent parts’) (1983, 227–28). The relation is differential (dy/dx) because both terms are 
decoded and unqualified. But by measuring (quantifying) these two orders of  magnitude, 
non-existent (unqualified) finance capital and variable (unqualified) labor, in terms of  the 
same analytical unit, Deleuze and Guattari claim that capitalist axiomatics are “a pure fiction, 
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a cosmic swindle, as if  one were to measure intergalactic or intra-atomic distances in meters 
and centimeters” (1983, 230). 
 These “cosmic fictions” are the basis of  an endless accumulation of  profit. Unlike a 
surplus value of  code, defined by the difference between labor capacity and the value created 
by labor capacity, capitalist “surplus values of  flux” are defined by the incommensurability 
between two flows that are immanent to each other (free capital and free labor). The 
difference between what labor can do and what it can be sold for is its profit. But by 
completely decoding labor and capital and axiomatizing their incommensurable relation, 
capitalism is able to generate “surplus flux” or profit without the limitations created by 
certain kinds of  codes (or qualities). “Anything whatever” can be axiomatized and circulated 
on the world market. Under the capitalist axiomatic, according to Deleuze and Guattari, 
profit accumulation has been unleashed from any external limitations.      
(ii) The Dangers of  the Axiomatic for Revolutionary Praxis
 The first danger of  axiomatization is that it harnesses a world-wide war machine that 
sets out to reorganize the entire world based on the exploitation of  planetary resources. 
“War,” as Deleuze and Guattari say, “clearly follows the same movement as 
capitalism” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 466). The growing importance of  finance capital in 
the axiomatic means that the depreciation of  existing capital and the formation of  new 
capital take on the speed of  a war machine incarnated in the State as models of  realization 
that “actively contribute to the redistributions of  the world necessary for the exploitation of  
maritime and planetary resources…The power of  war always supersaturates the system’s 
saturations, as its necessary condition” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 466). States no longer 
appropriate the war machine but constitute a war machine of  which they themselves are only 
the parts: the worldwide capitalist war machine. As States increase military, techno-scientific 
spending to absorb or compensate for the massive surplus values of  corporations, they find 
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their new object in the absolute “peace” of  terror or deterrence, Deleuze and Guattari argue. 
State-organized capitalism operates against an “unspecified enemy” as an organized 
insecurity. The danger for revolutionary praxis is that this war-machine, unlike the state, has 
no center that can be “overthrown.” Capitalist resistance then must take a very different 
form than mere capture.   
 Another danger of  capitalism is the disappearance of  enjoyment as an end, and its 
replacement with the sole end of  abstract wealth and its realization in forms other than 
consumption. Where the despotic State had emperors of  anti-production to consume 
surplus, the bourgeois field of  immanence has no such external limit and has integrated anti-
production inside production itself. It has instituted an unrivaled slavery, an unprecedented 
subjugation. No longer are there any masters but rather only slaves commanding other 
slaves, slaves of  the social machine. “The bourgeois sets the example,” Deleuze and Guattari 
argue; “he absorbs surplus value for ends that, taken as a whole, have nothing to do with his 
own enjoyment: more utterly enslaved than the lowest slaves, he is the first servant of  the 
ravenous machine, the beast of  the reproduction of  capital, internalization of  the infinite 
debt. ‘I too am a slave’—these are the new words spoken by the master” (1983, 254). The 
social subjection of  juridical statism combined with the machinic enslavement of  states by 
the market create a new form of  machinic enslavement in which States and capitalists alike 
are merely parts of  a larger social machine that no one is in control of: the capitalist world 
market. The excessive surpluses are so large they cannot be enjoyed but merely absorbed 
through other mechanisms. The danger for revolutionary praxis is to be enslaved by this 
process. 
 In response to the question, “what is the relationship between history and 
revolution?” I have argued in the the above section that what I am calling the “return to 
revolution,” influenced by the political philosophy of  Deleuze and Guattari, can be 
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characterized less by the theory of  necessary historical succession (whether chronological or 
dialectical) or by the theory of  a purely contingent historical rupture, but rather by a 
historico-political diagnostic of  multiple coexisting political dangers to be warded off  by 
revolutionary praxis. Deleuze and Guattari were the first to lay the philosophical 
groundwork for this theory of  diagnostic analysis based on the topological mixture of  past, 
present, and future political forms. Today, the field of  political struggle is not dominated by 
a single or central figure like the state, proletariat, capital, etc., that can orient all 
revolutionary analysis. Rather, it is much more like “a motley painting of  everything that has 
ever been believed” (1983, 34). The challenge then is to understand and avoid all these 
motely processes of  political representation and create something new. But this chapter has 
so far only been a theoretical interrogation. In the next and final section, I argue that the 
Zapatistas invent the practice of  a multi-centered political diagnostic. 
The Zapatista’s Diagnostic of  Suffering
 Practically, Zapatismo is one of  the first and most sustained non-representational 
revolutionary efforts to diagnose political power from the perspective that “there is no single 
front of  struggle.” The Zapatista’s return to revolution can thus be characterized by a 
practical analysis of  power based on a multi-centered diagnostic of  political history. This 
analysis is motivated by the relative rejection of  all previous forms of  historical 
representation in both form (coding, overcoding, and axiomatization) and in content 
(patriarchy, racism, statism, capitalism, vanguardism, etc.) as well as a concern for their 
immanent diagnosis. The Zapatista’s rejection and diagnostic of  these processes is 
demonstrated through the practice of  what Marcos calls a “diagnostic of  suffering” used in, 
La Otra Campagna: the Zapatistas literally traveled across Mexico listening and taking note of  
peoples problems and sufferings. The Zapatistas, contrary to centrist or vanguard analyses 
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that revolve around a privileged method/science, site, or dimension of  struggle, offer instead 
an inclusive intersectional analysis that does not necessarily privilege any single method, 
front, or site of  struggle. Revolution, according to Marcos
is about a process which incorporates different methods, different fronts, different 
and various levels of  commitment and participation. This means that all methods 
have their place, that all the fronts of  struggle are necessary, and that all levels of  
participation are important. This is about an inclusive process, which is anti-vanguard 
and collective. The problem with the revolution (pay attention to the small letters) is 
then no longer a problem of  THE organization, THE method, THE caudillo 
[dictator, political boss]. It becomes rather a problem which concerns all those who 
see that revolution is necessary and possible, and whose achievement, is important 
for everyone. (Marcos 2004b, 164)
Even the Zapatista’s own uprising forms a “motley historical assemblage.” Consider the way 
in which they have selected some moments from Mexican history (Emilio Zapata’s peasant 
uprising of  1910–1917), some components from Marxist history (red stars, the use of  the 
word “comrade,” etc.), some components from their own indigenous history (consensus 
decision-making, autonomous village networks, etc.) as well as some components of  the 
future (a non-neoliberal future) to compose the historical hodgepodge of  their own political 
event. In what follows, I argue that the Zapatistas use a practical diagnostic to understand 
and ward off  the three coexisting political dangers found in the parallel historical topology 
of  Deleuze and Guattari: territorial coding, statist overcoding, and capitalist axiomatization. 
Zapatismo and Territorial Representation 
 By 2004, the Zapatistas had lost many battles but still held strong in their 
commitment to autonomy and autonomy. It is around this time that the Zapatistas also 
turned their critical diagnostic to their own forms of  organization. They began to look at the 
various different ways that their movement was creating forms of  political representation: 
not at the traditional level of  the state or capital, but at the territorial level. That is, they 
began a multi-centered or intersectional diagnostic of  their own revolutionary praxis.   
 “[T]here are two mistakes,” Subcomandante Marcos says in a 2004 communiqué,
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which seem to have persisted in our political work (and which flagrantly contradict 
our principles): the place of  women, on the one hand, and, on the other, the 
relationship between the political-military structure and the autonomous 
governments. (Marcos 2004a)
These are two mistakes/dangers that have been historically neglected by revolutionary 
movements, in part because they are more supple non-state kinds of  social power ignored by 
dialectical and insurrectionist theories of  history. Rejecting the premise that the only 
revolutionary praxis that matters is that of  the historical progress of  the state, the proletariat, 
etc. the Zapatistas have attempted to diagnosis and ward off  the processes of  territorial 
coding. But the problem of  patriarchy in the Zapatista revolution existed in the indigenous 
communities well before the EZLN arrived in Chiapas in 1983.   
Before Zapatismo the conditions women lived in were dreadful: sexual abuse was rife 
through rape or early forced marriage, domestic violence was high, giving birth to 
large families ruined a woman's body and gave them a heavy responsibility for social 
reproduction through household chores. Moreover they were expected to reduce 
their food intake so that the husband and children could eat sufficiently, though even 
this was unable to staunch the high rates of  infant mortality. In short they were 
virtual slaves in their own villages. (Yakubu 2000) 
 This type of  patriarchy uses a process of  territorial coding. Certain patriarchal and 
filial lines of  hierarchically coded male stock are selected (genealogically) from the decoded 
flows of  the earth, and detached at certain places through violence (domestic and otherwise) 
to create the essential ethnic, gender, and spatial boundaries/identities between men and 
women, adults and children, and different linages of  indigenous peoples. Without forming a 
complete fusion of  all these codes, however, the remaining surplus code (an unmarried 
woman) is then used to form itinerant alliances between male filiations through arranged 
marriages. As Deleuze and Guattari say, 
 Through women, men establish their own connections; through the man woman 
 disjunction, which is always  the outcome of  filiation, alliance places in connection 
 men from different filiations. (1983, 185)  
   
The pre-given linear codes of  male power and violence are then repeated and represented 
through each new alliance. 
 But allowing women insurgentas and comandantas the EZLN political-military structure 
(by no means entirely egalitarian) creates a relative decoding of  this patriarchal filiation and 
alliance by permitting “young indigenous women [to] go to the mountains and develop their 
capacities more, [creating] consequences in the communities” (Ramírez 2008, 312), and 
giving them “the right to choose their partner and not [be] obliged to enter into marriage,” 
to “occupy positions of  leadership in the organization and hold military ranks in the 
revolutionary armed forces,” as well as other rights detailed in the EZLN’s Women’s 
Revolutionary Law (EZLN 1994). These laws are being increasingly implemented in the 
Autonomous Townships through new women’s alliances (craft cooperatives, women’s 
councils, etc.). However, the decoding of  certain patriarchal traditions comes at the risk of  
creating a new set of  vanguard military codes. Hence the second territorial mistake or 
danger.
 These groups operate through detachment, election, and residual selection: they 
 detach a supposedly expertavant-garde; they elect a disciplined, organized, 
 hierarchized proletariat; they select a residual sub-proletariat to be excluded or 
 reeducated. (Deleuze 2004, 198)
 
 As Deleuze warns (and the EZLN is well aware) the detachment of  EZLN 
commanders living in the mountains (particularly from 1983 to 1993) that elects/recruits 
campasin@s from the villages to be disciplined, organized, hierarchized into the EZLN, and 
then creates a residual selection of  campasin@s to be excluded/reeducated in ever widening 
circular segmentations, risks creating new military codes that undermine the autonomy and 
self-management of  the Zapatistas. As Marcos says,      
 The idea we had originally was that the EZLN should accompany and support the 
 peoples in the building of  their autonomy. However, accompaniment has 
 sometimes turned into management, advice into orders and support into a 
 hindrance. I've already spoken previously about the fact that the hierarchical, 
 pyramid structure is not characteristic of  the indigenous communities. The fact that 
 the EZLN is a political-military and clandestine organization still corrupts processes 
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 that should and must be democratic. (Marcos 2004a)
 
 Patriarchy and militarism in Zapatismo are two examples of  what Deleuze and 
Guattari call micro-fascism. Micro-fascism is a significant threat to be diagnosed in 
revolutionary praxis: “everything that [supple segmentation and coding] dismantles [at the 
level of  the state] it reassembles on its own level: micro-Oedipuses, microformations of  
power, microfascisms” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 205). Zapatismo, as a revolutionary 
movement, also risks falling prey to what Deleuze and Guattari call “monomania” by 
becoming a strictly ethnic struggle for indigenous rights. Segmentary societies, indigenous 
peoples, gangs, and ethnic minorities without a “shared acceleration” or solidarity beyond 
the narrow “self-evident clarities” of  their individual causes (for indigenous rights, etc.) risk, 
at worst, extermination by the state, and at best becoming a “rumble or buzz” under its heal. 
As a revolutionary movement with an intersectional diagnostic, the Zapatistas have rejected 
this monomania by universalizing their struggle and making it a global one against 
neoliberalism, inclusive of  everyone engaged in this struggle: “We are all Zapatistas!”16 But 
what dangers does the process of  statification pose to the Zapatista uprising? 
Zapatismo and Despotic State Representation
 In addition to their diagnosis of  territorial coding, the Zapatistas also deployed a 
significant and vocal diagnostic analysis of  the danger of  state overcoding. What external 
and internal dangers does it pose to the flourishing of  their revolutionary praxis? Despotic 
state representation (over-coding) in the executive branch of  the Mexican government aims 
to force indigenous “activity” into work, to extract taxes from its communities, to create a 
concentric political resonance of  its territories (states, cities, neighborhoods, and 
autonomous territories) into exchangeable and rentable land through forced relocation and 
redistribution to large land owners (latifundistas), and to establish a stockpile of  exchange into 
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currency (the peso) mostly withheld from the campasin@s. While the modern Mexican state 
certainly has more than just despotic components, its despotic components, more or less 
socialist or capitalist, threaten to enslave every aspect of  life into the Work-model. 
 Any and all States, according to the Zapatistas, pose similar dangers and threats of  
capture for revolutionary struggles insofar as collective action becomes the mere 
representation or resemblance of  this central executive authority. In the case of  Mexico, the 
agricultural surpluses of  indigenous labor (controlled by the latifundistas, through sugar, 
coffee, and rubber production) create an unchecked accumulation requiring the maintenance 
of  a specialized (politico-military) body for its management that replaces the multi-lineal 
filiations of  the older coded communities with the direct filiation of  a despot or president. 
The Mexican executive system thus makes a very diverse group of  points (geographic, 
ethnic, linguistic, moral, economic, and technological) resonate together under a single 
hierarchized and transcendent unity. 
 The Mexican state captures the territories not by the opposition of  over-coding to 
diverse territorial codes, but by unifying the constellation of  imbricated, micro-political 
systems. Each territory is given a place as a piece of  a single mega-machine of  public-works. 
The state’s hierarchy is thus not pyramidal but vertically held together by innumerable coded 
territories. On the one hand, Zapatismo confronts this danger as an external one because 
state over-coding, despite its juridical pretensions to negotiation (the betrayal of  the San 
Andreas Accords),17 is unable to accept decoded flows or coded ones that do not resonate 
around its central unity. The state thus aims to exterminate them or bring them into 
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17 The Mexican government negotiated and agreed to the San Andres Peace Accords but never followed 
through with them. While they negotiated they also escalated military relocation, murder, and harassment of  
the indigenous. “In these agreements [San Andres] the government promised to recognize the right to 
autonomy of  indian peoples in the constitution, to broaden their political representation, to guarantee full 
access to the justice system, and to build a new legal framework that guaranteed political rights, legal rights and 
cultural rights. The government promised also to recognize indigenous people as subjects of  public 
rights” (Ramírez 2008, 138).
resonance as subordinate parts of  its central machine.18  
 More than 6,000 displaced by the war are the result of  the attacks of  paramilitary 
 bands and state police, both directed by the state government, with the blessing 
 of  the federal government. (Ramírez 2008, 162)
 Assassinations, intimidations, dozens of  arrested, tortured and jailed, military and 
 paramilitary harassment, thousands displaced, and the burning of  autonomous 
 townships were the norm during these seven months of  the year 1998. 
 (Ramírez 2008, 175)
 However, Zapatismo also confronts the danger of  statist overcoding as an internal 
one. In both its early (1983) vanguard strategy to militarily overthrow the Mexican 
government and seize power in a popular revolutionary style familiar to Mexico and Latin 
America, and in its later (1994–2007) strategy to intervene in electoral politics without 
becoming partisan or a political party Zapatismo risked overcoding. While the likelihood of  
the Zapatista’s actually seizing state power is slim, the dangers of  reproducing the processes 
of  over-coding are real. As Macros says, “The worst that could happen to [the EZLN] . . . 
would be to come to power and install itself  there as a revolutionary army” (Marcos 2001a).  
 Every vanguard imagines itself  to be representative of  the majority. We not only 
 think that is false in our case, but that even in the best of  cases it is little more 
 than wishful thinking, and in the worst cases an outright usurpation. The moment 
 social forces come into play, it becomes clear that the vanguard is not such a 
 vanguard  and that those it represents do not recognize themselves in it. 
 (Marcos 2001c)
 Mexican state representation and rigid segmentation, according to Marcos, deploy 
the paranoiac fear that national security will crumble if  the indigenous are given autonomy. 
War, the state threatens, will only continue if  the rigid state segments do not prevail. This 
fear, the state claims, can only be resolved if  everyone submits to being part of  a machinic 
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18 “There was the scene when on Dec. 22, 1997, one of  the most atrocious and sadly predictable massacres in 
the history of  the nation occurred. In the community of  Acteal, located in the township of  Chenalho in Los 
Altos of  Chiapas, forty-five indigenous people, most children and women belonging to the civilian group “Las 
Abejas,” were massacred with firearms and machetes by sixty armed men from a paramilitary band made up of  
indigenous from the PRI and the Cardenist Front (PFCRN). The shooting lasted over six hours, while dozens 
of  Public Security police remained 200 meters away from where the killings took place, listening to the shots 
and screams without lifting a finger” (Ramírez 2008, 164).
enslavement orchestrated by the state. But this is only half  the story of  the danger of  the 
state. Zapatismo also confronts the danger of  being subjected to the juridical power of  the 
state. 
Zapatismo and Juridical State Representation
 Despite their early interest in establishing legal rights and representation for 
indigenous people across Mexico, the Zapatistas have remained diagnostically aware of  the 
danger of  becoming merely incorporated into the judicial norms of  the state by having their 
demands satisfied and/or redefined.  Marcos describes the Juridical State Pole as “the aspect 
which incorporates popular struggles and their demands, and regulates, through judicial 
norms, the satisfaction of  such demands and/or their redefinition” (Marcos 2004b, 311). 
Once revolutionary demands are met, the revolution is over, over-coded and conjuncted as 
one more subject of  law. 
 Additionally, what Mexican despotic/federal over-codes are not entirely able to 
capture (autonomous peasant movements, local laws, personal contracts, state functionaries, 
tax collectors, and local ranchers), other channels of  unofficial power in Chiapas, like 
paramilitary groups and the caciques (local self-appointed bosses and landowners) juridical 
conjunctions, are able to recode through legal structures immanent to the region. Much 
more flexible, diverse, and personal, these recoding focal points for the state are all the 
processes that endlessly negotiate with the peasants and indigenous movements without ever 
granting them autonomy, create local laws like not allowing campasin@s to walk in the street 
in San Cristóbal de las Casas, harass and abuse Zapatista communities in the name of  “tax 
collection,” legally sanction paramilitary groups like the ones responsible for the Acteal 
Massacre (while federal troops 200 meters away did nothing) (Ramírez 2008, 164), and fund 
local caciques who 
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deliver some of  the basic demands of  the campesino and mediate his needs. They 
are usually older men who are involved in local commercial activities and have a 
reputation as fixers, usually with some access to local state funds. Many are PRIistas, 
most are corrupt and violent and all believe they 'serve the people'. In fact they serve 
to demobilize and suppress rural struggle and are invaluable to the landowners. 
(Yakubu 2000) 
But such legal mediations and democratic pretensions found in city halls, private property 
owners, and local law enforcement should not disguise the real disciplinary apparatuses of  
juridical representation set in motion to force the coordination (recoding) of  revolutionary 
subjects like the Zapatistas. 
Zapatismo and Capitalist Representation
 The Zapatistas political diagnosis of  capitalism is no more central or foundational 
than any of  their other analysis of  power. The territorial coding of  patriarchy and militarism 
within Zapatista communities; the statist overcoding of  fear, war, and centralization; and the 
juridical recoding of  legalization and local management are all equally important dangers that 
need to be diagnosed and avoided within their revolutionary praxis. As they say, “all fronts 
are important,” not just the front against state power or capitalism. That said, they do have a 
diagnosis of  capitalist representation. 
 In Chiapas, the previous (1876) forms of  non-innovatory local capital (private cattle 
ranchers and cotton, sugar, and coffee latifundistas) that had turned many small landholders 
and ejidos (communal production units) into either poorly-paid day-laborers (i.e. seasonally 
employed) or debt-peons (little more than slaves), gave way to new patterns of  accumulation 
in the 1970’s: free/unqualified labor and mobile decoded capital. As capital increasingly freed 
itself  from national boundaries, transforming itself  into highly mobile finance capital, 
investment flooded away from the industrial heartlands of  both North America and Mexico 
to the Pacific Rim economies (Yakubu 2000).
 The local farmers and ranchers that previously needed very small amounts of  
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 quasi-slave labor and large areas of  land in Chiapas are now selling their land to 
 make way for the region’s new importance as a resource for hydroelectric power, oil, 
 eco-tourism, patented genetic technology, and uranium for national and international 
 accumulation.19 
 And while it may make up a small part of  this accumulation, Zapatismo itself  has 
been turned into a market in several ways that it is well aware of: as a revolutionary tourist 
destination, as a cultural commodity, as the content of  revolutionary kitsch sold around the 
world (even by those who do not sympathize with the EZLN) like Zapatista dolls, posters, t-
shirts, and condoms (“for those who rise up”) (Kersten 1997). In other words, what the 
processes of  capitalism decode with one hand (land, family, work, wealth, states, and 
production),20 they continually axiomatize with the other. By privatizing previously coded 
and over-coded relations in Chiapas and placing them all for sale or investment on a world 
market, their “qualities” or “unique specificities” have become completely relative to the 
speculative investment patterns of  a transnational ecumenical organization (themselves 
relative to the abstract “forces of  the market”) (Yakubu 2000). 
 Capitalist representation, as the differential relation (dy/dx) between these decoded 
flows of  unqualified campesin@ labor, Lacandón jungle, rivers, culture (participatory 
democracy, Zapatismo resistance, etc.) on the one hand, and the decoded flows of  financial 
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19 “New dams were built in this period to provide electricity for petrochemical plants in Tabasco and Veracruz: 
Chiapas is Mexico's largest producer of  hydroelectricity, though half  of  its homes have no power. Dam 
construction has provided sporadic employment for some parts of  the indigenous population, while others 
have had to abandon their villages to rising flood waters. Further dam construction is planned, much of  it 
targeted at the Zapatista stronghold of  Las Canadas (the Canyons), a region of  Los Altos. . . . The importance 
of  hydroelectricity pales in comparison with the discovery of  oil, however. The deposits in the north-east of  
the state are part of  the Gulf  of  Mexico field that produces 81% of  Mexico's crude export. But new deposits 
have also been found in the east, just north of  the Guatemalan border (the so-called Ocosingo field), bang in 
the middle of  Zapatista territory. Most of  this new oil is not yet being pumped, but exploratory wells have 
been drilled both by PEMEX, the national oil company, and international oil interests” (Yakubu 2000).
20 Deleuze and Guattari describe several modes of  deterritorialization that occurred in Chiapas. For the free 
worker: 1) the deterritorialization of  the soil through privatization, 2) the loss of  the means of  consumption 
through the dissolution of  the family and the corporation, and the decoding of  the worker in favor of  the work 
itself  or of  the machine (industrial production). For capital: 1) the deterritorialization of  wealth through 
monetary abstraction, 2) the decoding of  the flows of  production through merchant capital, 3) the decoding of 
States through financial capital and public debts, and 4) the decoding of  the means of  production through the 
formation of  industrial capital. See (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 225). 
capital (world stock speculation, bank finance, international investment, etc.) on the other, 
fixes both into an abstract “differential” quantification or axiomatic equivalence for the sole 
purposes of  profit.    
 The “war in Chiapas” is an instance of  how the Mexican state has become a “model 
[or axiom] for the realization of  international capital” by “actively contribut[ing] to the 
redistributions of  [Chiapas] necessary for the exploitation of  maritime and planetary 
resources” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 466). As Marcos says, “the indigenous peoples at a 
global level (who number more than 300 million) are located in zones that possess 60% of  
the natural resources of  the planet. The reconquest of  these territories is one of  the 
principal objectives of  the capitalist war” (Fuentes 2007). The Mexican state is now less an 
appropriation of  its own war machine (a standing army), but rather forms a mere part in the 
larger worldwide capitalist war machine aimed at securing the axiomatization of  the 
unqualified flows of  oil, water, biogenetic code, and Zapatista resistance culture for their 
exchange on the global market.21 “Neoliberalism,” as Marcos puts it, “is the catastrophic 
political management of  catastrophe” (Marcos 1995). This new form of  capitalist machinic 
enslavement, as Deleuze and Guattari call it, however, takes little enjoyment in the massacres, 
humanitarian crises, and ecological devastations that result from its “structural 
readjustments” in Chiapas. Rather, capitalist axiomatization has de-qualified all other coded 
values of  enjoyment except for one pre-given condition for representation that everyone is 
enslaved to (to a certain degree): the abstract accumulation of  wealth. Zapatismo faces an 
external capitalist war of  resource extraction against Chiapas, but also faces an internal 
appropriation of  its resistance by the culture industry.  
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21 The Mexican government has aimed to secure international capital in a variety of  ways. (1) The creation of  
highways into Zapatista territory for the construction of  dams, extraction of  oil, and militarization of  
ecological preserves. (2) The forced relocation of  indigenous people from their land that has been sold by the 
Mexican government to private companies. (3) The harassment of  indigenous peoples living in these “capital 
rich” areas by tanks, airplanes, and government funded paramilitary attacks. See (Ramírez 2008).
 But here the reader may wonder if  this analysis of  Zapatismo might be significantly 
undermined if  the Zapatistas were to do something that suddenly rejected their previous use 
of  a  multi-centered diagnostic. Since I am not arguing that the Zapatistas are a model by 
which we should hold future revolutionary strategy to, this would not be the case. A multi-
centered political diagnostic, especially considered topologically, would still remain a practice 
that they created and that could be adapted for use elsewhere. 
Conclusion
 What is the relationship between history and revolution in the contemporary return 
to revolution? In a word, I have argued that political history is used as a multi-centered 
political diagnostic to develop a non-representational revolutionary praxis. In order to 
defend this response I drew on two early and influential figures of  its practical and 
theoretical use: Deleuze, Guattari, and the Zapatistas. Deleuze and Guattari were the first to 
develop the philosophical basis for an analysis of  interlocking forms of  oppression based on 
a topology of  multiple heterogenous axes of  political power, in content (class, race, gender, 
etc.) and in form (coding, overcoding, axiomatization). Contrary to the universal history of  
succession and necessity based on the political body of  the state and its representation, 
political topology understands history as a single folded and refolded surface. Events are not 
tied by chronological or dialectical causality but by contingency and proximity to one another 
in space-time. Without unity or identity, political history is thus capable of  producing non-
representational revolutionary political forms. However, beyond the mere affirmation of  
revolutionary historical potential, my argument was that this historical topology should be 
used instead as a diagnostic by which we can asses the dangers confronting revolutionary 
praxis itself. 
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 Practically, Zapatismo is one of  the first and most sustained non-representational 
revolutionary efforts to diagnose political power from the perspective that “there is no single 
front of  struggle.” No one single type of  power threatens their autonomy and self-
determination “in the last instance,” but rather a mix of  several different processes from 
history coexist in recombined forms both external and internal to their struggle. With no 
single front or axis on which power turns, there is also no single type of  marginalized 
subject, nor is there a single axis or pivot by which to discern the proper direction, critique, 
or teleology of  history. There are simply different types of  multiplicities in need of  diagnosis 
and redirection. My argument was that without the predicative power of  Marxist science, or 
a determinate universal history, the Zapatista’s revolution has become contingent, non-
representational, and flexible like a folded topological shape. Zapata’s peasant rebellion can 
emerge from the past, direct democracy can emerge from the future, and both can bear 
directly on the transformation of  the present. Zapatismo is a creation of  the past and a 
nostalgia for the future at the same time.  
 These arguments were accomplished in three sections. The first outlined and 
problematized two theories of  universal history (succession and contingency) and showed 
how each failed to conceive of  a sustained alternative to representational politics. The 
second laid out, in turn, four basic characteristics of  an alternative concept of  revolutionary 
history drawn from Deleuze and Guattari’s historical topology. I then expanded this theory 
and argued that it should be used as a political diagnostic based on three contingent, 
coexisting, and recombinable political processes: territorial coding, state overcoding, and 
capitalist axiomatization. Each of  these types was developed in turn to show how they 
inform revolutionary praxis. The third and final section showed how the Zapatistas also 
practice a multi-centered political diagnostic based on their “diagnostic of  suffering.” What 
remains to be addressed, however, is how such a folded intersection of  representational 
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processes is transformed through the process of  revolutionary intervention. This will be the 
subject of  the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER III
INTERVENTION AND THE FUTURE ANTERIOR
Unlike history, becoming cannot be conceptualized in terms of  past and future. Becoming 
revolutionary remains indifferent to questions of  a future and a past of  the revolution; it 
passes between the two. Every becoming is a block of  coexistence.
(Deleuze and Guattari  1987, 292)
Introduction
 In chapter II I argued that political history should be used as a multi-centered 
political diagnostic used to construct a revolutionary praxis. In order to defend this response 
I drew on two early and influential figures of  its practical and theoretical use: Deleuze, 
Guattari, and the Zapatistas. I argued first against two conceptual blockages confronting the 
relationship between history and revolution: on the one hand, the concept of  succession 
based on the repetition of  a pre-given unity of  history (and its capture by the state) that 
blocks the emergence of  non-state political events, and on the other, the concept of  
revolutionary contingency based on the affirmation that history may become other than it is 
(that remains politically ambivalent). The contemporary return to revolution I argued, is not 
a successive or inevitable moment of  crisis moving toward an increasingly superior form of  
political organization, nor is it merely an undecidable moment of  contingency. Rather, it 
takes place at the intersection of  various coexistent political processes of  representation 
(territorial coding, state overcoding, and capitalist axiomatization) irreducible to (but 
inseparable from) historical phenomena. Accordingly, this return to revolution is neither a 
matter of  historical necessity, or even potentiality. Rather, it can be characterized by a 
continual diagnostic examination of  the limits and dangers of  its own praxis in order to 
identify and actively ward them off  by other means. 
 This concept was drawn from Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of  historical topology 
because it proposes, as an alternative to succession and coexistence, a way to conceive 
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contingent and non-representational revolutionary events. That is, it conceives of  them as 
topologically folded spaces of  heterogenous political processes that simultaneously 
anticipate, ward off, and overlap with each other to a greater or lesser degree and provides 
the tools to analyze these processes within revolutionary praxis. It is then by practically 
mobilizing this immanent diagnostic of  multiple, intersecting processes of  representation that 
the Zapatistas have been able to determine the political dangers they face without falling 
back on the theory of  a central “axis of  historical struggle,” (the party, state, class, race, etc.), 
a revolutionary teleology, or an undecidable coexistent matrix of  heterogenous forces. The 
goal of  chapter II was to propose and defend a non-linear theory of  political history that 
moved beyond state teleology and undecidable propositions and toward a theoretical practice 
of  determining simultaneously occurring heterogeneous forms of  political representation as 
they immanently posed dangers to revolutionary praxis.
 But how do revolutionary events emerge from this polyvalent intersection of  
representational processes (coding, overcoding, axiomatization) and sustain something new? 
How are these processes “warded off  by other means?” This is an important question left 
unanswered both by Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of  historical topology and my proposed 
concept of  a multi-centered diagnostic. While Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of  political 
topology may be able to provide us with the tools to diagnose the three processes of  
political representation, it is unable to account for how they changed or warded off  by 
revolutionary interventions. That is, if  a political arrangement is composed of  multiple, 
coexistent processes (present to varying degrees), as discerned by an immanent diagnostic of 
the event, how can the situation then be transformed? How can we assess the risks of  such 
an intervention? Who and what is intervening, and upon what do they intervene? 
 This chapter is organized into three sections. In the first section I argue that the 
contemporary return to revolution is defined neither by opposing reactions against pre-
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existing political ills (processes of  representation), nor is it defined by an absolute 
insurrectionary break with the dominant situation. In the second section I argue instead that 
the return to revolution is characterized by a transformation that emerges through a careful 
labor of  evental prefiguration, connection, and condensation that brings together what 
seemed to be inexistent and invisible elements within the arrangement into a new existence 
and visibility. This process of  revolutionary intervention brings into existence a new world 
of  the present, not as a consequence of  the past, or as the potential for a new future “to 
come,” but through the construction of  a new present in a future anterior that “will have 
been.” My argument here is that such a theory of  prefiguration is able to provide an 
alternative to the transformative methods posed by opposition and insurrection. To help 
develop this concept of  prefiguration I draw on two concepts from Deleuze and Guattari: 
Aeon (the time of  the future anterior) and deterritorialization (their theory of  change). In the 
third section I further develop this argument drawing on its practical deployment in the 
Zapatista’s creation and maintenance of  the Juntas de Buen Gobierno (Committees of  Good 
Government).   
 
Revolution and Political Intervention 
Opposition | Negation 
 Revolutionary interventions can create change in the dominant mix of  political 
power by opposing or negating them. That is, given a certain mixture of  codes, overcodes, 
and axioms that define the heterogeneous field of  political subjects and objects, opposition 
to, negation of, or a difference from these processes of  representation can create change, but 
only by first accepting the pre-given parameters of  the political problem at hand to-be-
changed: it must accept a priori the identity and unity of  what it is in opposition to. 
Revolutionary interventions and transformations, in this way, aim at a modification of  this 
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unity. They intervene in the internal development and transformation of  legitimate political 
processes (territorial, legal, economic, etc.) by accepting the terms in which the political 
problems and questions are posed and then modifying their relations. 
 In more traditional revolutionary struggles oppositional interventions can be seen in 
the teleological imperative to seize the state apparatus and re-appropriate its bureaucratic, 
legal, and military mechanisms toward other ends. What remains the same in these struggles, 
however, is the identity of  their initial parameters for collective social organization: hierarchy, 
militarism, and state bureaucracy. In the case of  more social democratic struggles, this 
internal reform of  legal and economic processes opposes the present mechanisms of  
representation, not from a different non-representational ground but from the grounds of  
mis-representation and its rectification or correction. Its transformative intervention aims 
for an increasingly accurate representation of  the differences not-yet-represented. 
 This kind of  oppositional intervention, however, is always an internal difference: an 
oppositional difference subsumed into the unity of  a state apparatus, an economic market, 
or a new identity. Revolutionary opposition can thus create political change, but only insofar 
as such a change is a change within the regime of  representation: a new election, a new more 
environmentally friendly capitalist market, or a new, more democratic state apparatus. We can 
thus define such an interventional tendency as “the modification of  an existing domain of  
objects and identities without a change in the fundamental conditions and coordinates of  the 
political problem itself.”          
Insurrection and the Revolutionary Conditions for the Production of  the New
 In, “Events, Becoming, and History” Paul Patton argues that Deleuze and Guattari 
propose a compelling alternative to revolutionary opposition. “Far from being the 
actualisations of  a particular pre-existing event,” Patton argues, “[revolutions] are eruptions 
of  ‘eventality,’ pure eventness or becoming: absolute deterritorialisation” (Patton 2009, 43). 
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Rather than define revolutionary events as simply expressing oppositions or internal reforms 
to the pre-existing domain of  political givens (identities, subjects, rights, private property, 
etc.) that would condition in advance what new forms of  collective action were possible in a 
situation, Patton argues that Deleuze and Guattari provide a theory of  revolution based on 
difference or deterritorialization in-itself. 
Deleuze defines the pure event as that part of  every event that escapes its own 
actualisation. Pure eventness in this sense is the highest object of  historical thought. 
It is what must be thought from [a] historical point of  view, but at the same time that 
which can never, or never exhaustively, be thought since it is only given to us through 
what actually happens. (2009, 47)   
 Revolution, according to Patton, is a groundless, unconditioned, unthinkable (in-
itself) difference “that is the condition of  there being events at all” (2009, 42). Insofar as 
actual political struggles exhibit this “hermeneutical sublime in the highest degree . . . they 
realize the potential break with existing frameworks of  understanding” (2009, 43). They 
constitute a “pure exteriority and metamorphosis” (2000, 114) (absolute deterritorialization) 
from the state of  affairs and its processes of  representation. Rather than presuppose existing 
political conditions, revolution, or the pure eventness of  transformation, change, and 
becoming itself, Patton argues, must be considered as “the source or condition of  the 
emergence of  the new” (2009, 50). 
 Similarly, as Dan Smith argues in “Deleuze and the Production of  the New,” “if  
identity (A is A) were the primary principle, that is, if  identities were already pregiven, then 
there would in principle be no production of  the new (no new differences)” (2008, 151). 
Thus, Smith continues, “for Deleuze, the conditions of  the new can be found only in a 
principle of  difference” (2008, 151), “no less capable of  dissolving and destroying 
individuals than of  constituting them temporarily” (Deleuze 1994, 38). While Patton and 
Smith accurately develop the important concept of  “difference-in-itself ” drawn from 
Deleuze’s earlier works, I believe that this concept not only remains unable to account for a 
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theory of  revolutionary intervention and political change but even risks blocking it by 
affirming the unconditioned ambivalence and non-relational “exteriority” of  political action. 
By valorizing revolution as the unconditioned (real) potentiality for “change as 
such” (liberatory change as well as non-liberatory change) or what Patton calls, “critical 
freedom” (2000, 83), radical politics remains optimistically tied to an ultimately indifferent 
and ambivalent principle of  difference for its own sake: the aleatory “temporal constitution 
no less than the destruction of  individuals:” spontaneous insurrection.   
 However, the contemporary return to revolution, I argue, is more than an 
affirmation that “another world is possible.” And insofar as revolution affirms pure 
eventness “as that part of  every event that escapes its own actualisation” exterior to history, 
it remains ultimately (in its pure form) abstracted from all actual and concrete political 
relations as well as different political events in their specificity. To be clear, this is not the 
same criticism well refuted by John Protevi in his review of  Peter Hallward’s Out of  This 
World (Protevi, John. 2006). It is not the case that the virtual simply remains abstractly above 
the actual as a spiritual realm. Insofar as revolution is the “general transformative movement 
between actualization and counter-actualization” it remains non-related to any determinate 
quasi-causal political event and its singular concrete consequences. It remains unable to 
conceptualize the multiple intermediate stages of  any local political intervention. I disagree 
that concrete revolutionary struggles are radical only insofar as they abandon their actual 
relations and affirm “only” their capacity to become-other-as-such in a pure becoming-
actual-becoming-virtual.
A Time for Revolution 
The Future Anterior 
 How then are we to understand political transformation such that a non-
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representational revolutionary praxis is not merely possible but actually constructed? Distinct 
from the notion that  revolutionary intervention is based on opposition and from the notion 
that it is a form of  pure “eventness” that conditions all events as such, in this next section I 
argue that in order to understand the contemporary return to revolution we need to analyze 
four intermediate and concrete stages between the various processes of  representation 
(developed in chapter II) on the one hand, and the so-called pure exteriority of  “eventness” 
or “absolute deterritorialization” on the other. Between the pre-given facts, subjects, and 
objects of  the situation and their history (the past), and the radically unconditioned 
potentiality for their transformation “to come” (the future), I argue, there are four 
intermediate stages of  political transformation distributed by a revolutionary event.
 Within these four intermediate stages of  political transformation the fourth stage, in 
particular, describes the type of  revolutionary transformation that defines the contemporary 
return to revolution. This fourth type of  revolutionary transformation is prefigurative and 
takes place in the time of  the future anterior. But the purpose of  this concept is not to re-
establish a “pure becoming” of  the past and future as such or to privilege one against the 
other (the pre-evental over the post-evental or vice-versa). Rather, what I propose instead in 
this section is a theory of  revolutionary intervention that accounts for both the concepts of  
revolutionary precipitation and its post-evental consequences. My aim is to understand this 
process as a theoretical practice of  what I call prefiguration. In order to help develop this 
theoretical practice I draw on Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of  deterritorialization that 
describes four modes of  change. The first type of  change is what they call “relative negative 
deterritorialization.” This is a change that is able to break free from the processes of  political 
representation (coding, overcoding, and axiomatization) but only momentarily and in such a 
way that obstructs further transformations. The second type of  change is what they call a 
“relatively positive deterritorialization.” This type of  change succeeds in creating an 
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undecidable point of  tension within the processes of  political representation that might lead 
to revolution, but may also lead to a mere reform of  power. The third type of  change is 
what Deleuze and Guattari call an “absolutely negative deterritorialization.” This type of  
change creates a radical rupture within the processes of  representation but fails to connect 
to any others and enters a line of  isolated self-destruction. The fourth type of  change is 
what they call an “absolutely positive deterritorialization.” This type of  change is not only 
able to break free from from power but is able to connect up to other such ruptures and 
create a collective alternative to representational politics in the future anterior.    
 These different modes of  change, their mixtures, temporalities, and relations are the 
conceptual tools Deleuze and Guattari have to offer for understanding the process of  
revolutionary transformation. This chapter aims to demonstrate their usefulness first 
conceptually against the concepts of  opposition and insurrection and then practically as they 
are paralleled in the Zapatista’s prefigurative strategy. However, before continuing with this 
demonstration two problems pertaining to the usage of  the temporality of  the future 
anterior need be clarified and avoided up front. In the next three subsections I argue that the 
future anterior should (1) not be understood as a complete synthesis of  the past and future 
(an “event of  becoming”), (2) nor should it be understood as merely privileging pre- or post-
evental actions, but should rather (3) be understood as the creation of  a new present. 
(1) The Future Anterior Is not an Event of  Becoming
 The process of  revolutionary prefiguration, I am arguing, takes place in the time of  
the future anterior, that is, as an event which will have been. But the conjunction of  past, 
present, and future that creates the future anterior should not at all be understood as a global 
synthesis of  these three times as such. If  we define revolutionary transformation as the 
synthesis (even the differential one Deleuze describes in Difference and Repetition, 70–128), of  
the past, present, and future, then the revolutionary future anterior would be the absolute 
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conditions for all change as such. That is, the revolutionary future anterior would be the 
principle of  difference-in-itself. As such, revolution would have no actual, concrete existence 
or political force by which to offer an alternative to the competing processes of  political 
representation.1 It would be the mere potentiality of  change, not any actual, positive political 
power. Put simply, if  revolution is an “event of  pure becoming” between all pasts, presents, 
and futures, then there is only one ambivalent event that conditions all types of  political 
power.   
 Truly different revolutionary events with their own conditions for action, agency, and 
organization could therefore not exist but would instead only be derived as effects from a 
single eternal event: genesis, “the event of  being.”2 Following many others who also hold that 
Logic of  Sense “is Deleuze’s most noteworthy effort to clarify his concept of  the 
event” (Badiou 2009, 382), Alain Badiou locates what I believe to be a significant danger for 
a Deleuzian theory of  revolutionary intervention: if  the condition for all transformation 
itself  is an event, then there can be no real change, only the endless modification of  a single 
event. In Logics of  Worlds, Badiou argues that if, as Deleuze says in Logic of  Sense, there is only, 
“one single event for all events; one and the same aliquid for that which happens and that 
which is said; and one and the same being for the impossible, the possible, and the 
real” (Deleuze 1990, 180), then such an ontological condition becomes both the condition 
and the conditioned, leaving no room for real disjunction, rupture, and change (Badiou 2009, 
385). 
 If, Badiou continues, “the event is always a synthesis of  past and future. . . . The 
expression of  the One within becomings,” or “what lies between a past and a future, 
between the end of  one world and the beginning of  another,” it expresses the eternal and 
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1 This is precisely why Deleuze cant offer a theory of  concrete political topology in Difference and Repetition. 
2 “By removing the abyss from between being and event, his ontology opens the way for the event of  being from 
within what presents itself  in actual situations” (Egyed 2006, 83).
continual being of  time itself, and NOT the separation or disjunction necessary for thinking 
a determinate political change in the world (2009, 382–83). Ultimately, Deleuze’s theory of  
the event is caught between two poles, neither of  which are able to think the emergence of  a 
new revolutionary present: either the present is split entirely into the future and past and 
thus does not exist, or the present is the eternal synthesis of  all futures and pasts and is thus 
everything.             
 However, while it may be the case that Deleuze’s earlier works, Difference and Repetition 
and Logic of  Sense, develop the concepts of  “event” and “becoming” at length, I maintain, 
following Alberto Toscano, that in A Thousand Plateaus, 
the terrain seems to have shifted considerably with respect to [Deleuze’s] earlier 
preoccupation with conditions of  realization—a preoccupation that seemed to 
afford a certain continuity with naturalized or materialist accounts of  ontogenesis. 
The individuations that Deleuze and Guattari foreground in A Thousand Plateaus are 
not of  the sort that engender individuals; rather, they traverse already constituted 
individuals, drawing them towards impersonal becomings, compositions of  one 
multiplicity with another. (2006, 176)
 In A Thousand Plateaus (a work Badiou and other critics rarely draw from), Deleuze 
and Guattari no longer privilege the so-called “ontological conditions for the production of  
events as such,” but proceed from the principle that “politics precedes being,” replacing 
earlier theories of  “structure and genesis” with a theory of political relation and a logics of  
assemblages (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 203, 266; Deleuze 2006, 177). That is, rather than 
aiming to show that “difference in-itself ” or “pure becoming” is the ontological condition 
and singular “event of  being,” Deleuze and Guattari’s later work instead develops a complex 
political logic (or constructivism) of  the various types of  abstract and concrete machines 
that compose the immanent relations of  and among events and their degrees of  
transformation. Lacking the political typology and the more nuanced theory of  change 
(deterritorialization) found only in A Thousand Plateaus, Logic of  Sense and Difference and 
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Repetition remain, I believe, not unhelpful or “pre-political,” but wholly inadequate for 
retrieving a concept of  revolutionary intervention based on the future anterior.3            
(2) The Future Anterior Is Neither “Pre” Nor “Post” Evental
 Just as the revolutionary future anterior cannot be understood in terms of  an 
absolute synthesis of  the future and past (the “event of  becoming”), neither can it be 
understood as a “pre” or “post” evental intervention. In his essay, “What is a Political 
Event?” Iain Mackenzie distinguishes between two approaches to understanding the 
emergence of  political events: a pre-evental approach developed by Deleuze and a post-
evental approach developed by Badiou. Ultimately, Mackenzie concludes that “Deleuze’s 
‘pre-occurrence’ approach is more persuasive than Badiou’s ‘post-occurrence’ theorisation” 
because it does not require a subject to miraculously nominate the event (Mackenzie 2008, 
2). True or not, what I find interesting about this account is the way that Mackenzie and 
others have framed the problem of  political transformation. 
From a Deleuzean perspective, and in stark contrast to Badiou’s emphasis upon the 
revolutionary event, events usually occur when we are least aware of  them. Yet, it is 
as an effect of  these apparently insignificant moments that significance is produced; 
the possibility of  meaning enters the world, we might say, behind our backs. 
(Mackenzie 2008, 15)
 For Deleuze, Mackenzie argues, it is only when we are least aware, or at our most 
impersonal, that a whole host of  seemingly insignificant elements that we do not control can 
come out of  nowhere and create an evental disjunction with the (actual) state of  affairs. 
Rather than requiring any active precipitation, construction, or evental surveillance, the 
Deleuzian pre-occurrence of  potential forces will suddenly raise up from behind our backs 
and disjoint us from the actual pre-determinations of  the past and toward the revolutionary 
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3 For example, what would it mean to “affirm Difference in the state of  permanent revolution” (Deleuze 1994, 
53), without an analysis of  how this same continual revolution is also valorized by capitalist deterritorialization 
and axiomatization? Or in Logic of  Sense, what it mean to argue that “Counter-actualisation is 
revolutionary” (Egyed 2006, 83), without the warnings, found in A Thousand Plateaus of  “self-destruction” and 
“fascism” that temper such the process of  political transformation?   
future “to come.” Far from being reducible to identifiable, epochal shifts, Deleuzian pre-
evental singularities are according to Paul Patton “molecular,” “indiscernible,” and 
“happening all the time” (2000, 108). 
 This is in contrast to the post-evental philosophy of  Alain Badiou that is concerned 
primarily with the consequences, fidelities or “truth procedures,” that happen only after an 
event has occurred and vanished. "Self-belonging” or the evental site, as Badiou says, “annuls 
itself  as soon as it appears. A site is a vanishing term: it appears only as disappearing. The 
problem consists in registering the consequences of  the appearing" (2009, 392). Badiou’s 
clear privileging of  evental “retroaction” and “post-evental commitment” has lead critics
(Hallward 2003; Bensaïd 2004; Marchart 2005) to argue that such a clear denial of  pre-
evental conditions leads Badiou into a kind of  quasi-religious mysticism of  evental miracles. 
That is, if  there are no “pre-evental subjects” and one is unable to pre-eventaly precipitate 
events or even locate their precursors, then how and why events happen seems entirely 
miraculous. All that remains coherent are the militantly faithful subjects to events past. While 
this dilemma has led others like Adrian Johnston and Nick Srnicek to try and supplement 
this pre-evental shortcoming in Badiou’s work, I would like to proceed in a different 
direction (Johnston 2007; Srnicek 2008).  
 The apparent split between Deleuze’s “pre” and Badiou’s “post” theory of  the event, 
as Badiou himself  observes, “exposes the original ambiguity in the notion” of  the event 
(2009, 382). Adopting either position (the future-looking pre-evental or the backward-
looking post-evental), it seems, we end up affirming a kind of  mysticism of  the political 
event. Either we simply sit around, do nothing, and wait for the invisible, pre-evental, and 
spontaneous potentialities to mystically congeal and bring about real revolutionary 
transformation behind our backs, or the mystical event has “always-already” occurred 
(insofar as we are subjects of  it) and we just need to “get out there” and be militantly faithful 
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to its consequences. This characterization may seem like a straw man or polarization of  the 
problematic, and perhaps I have over emphasized to demonstrate a debate in the literature 
on this topic. But even Deleuze and Badiou’s most generous readers have acknowledged a 
real difference in emphasis between these two temporalities (Johnston 2007; Srnicek 2008). 
 Thus, it must also be admitted that the issue is a bit more subtle than this. Traces of  
the pre-evental exist in Badiou (both in Being and Event and Logics of  Worlds), just as traces of  
the post-evental exist in Deleuze and Guattari (Logic of  Sense and A Thousand Plateaus). But 
even this observation still misses the point. “Traces” hardly constitute a full resolution to this 
problem. The temporality of  political intervention in Deleuze, Guattari, and Badiou is 
poorly understood in terms of  pre- and post- eventality. What I am arguing instead is that 
Deleuze, Guattari, and Badiou all share a theory of  political intervention based in the future 
anterior that has yet to be sufficiently examined (Badiou 2005b, 201–11; Badiou 2009, 357–
80; Deleuze 1990, 58–65; Deleuze and Guattari 1987; 232–309). So while Deleuze, Guattari, 
and Badiou have all, at one point or another, clearly stated that revolutionary events do not 
emerge miraculously ex nihilo,4 what remains to be developed in detail is a theory of  such a 
revolutionary intervention that is demonstrably consistent with such a position. This is the 
aim of  the present chapter.          
(3) The Future Anterior Is a New Present
 With the aim of  proposing a theory and practice of  revolutionary prefiguration I 
have first distinguished two perilous sides of  the future anterior to be avoided: on the one 
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4 “First of  all, it is necessary to point out that as far as its material is concerned, the event is not a miracle. What 
I mean is that what composes an event is always extracted from a situation, always related back to a singular 
multiplicity, to its state, to the language connected to it, etc. In fact if  we want to avoid lapsing into an 
obscurantist theory of  creation ex nihilo, we must accept that an event is nothing but a part of  a given situation, 
nothing but a fragment of  being” (Badiou 2004, 98). 
“In other words, the issue of  the singular assemblages of  enunciation does not emerege ex nihilo from a chaotic 
reality: there are thousands of  outlines, thousands of  catalyzing elements, highly differentiated and capable of  
being articulated  to one another or being engaged in a creative process, or entering into phenomena of  
implosion, self-destruction, or microfascism—which, even then, does not transform them into 
chaos.” (Guattari 2008, 317). 
hand, a past and future fused together in the “eventess” of  a “pure becoming” where the 
revolutionary present has disappeared, and on the other hand a past and future divided into 
pre- and post- evental worlds where the present has been infinitely divided into an empty or 
absent time. The first fails by equating revolutionary events with the absolute condition for 
all events as such. The second fails by positing a miraculous origin at the heart of  any given 
event. What I am proposing instead is a concept of  the future anterior that functions as a 
new present moment within and along side the other processes of  political and temporal 
representation. This new present moment is not an infinitely split time but a productive one 
that both projects a new future and retrojects a new past.5 It is, as Deleuze says, the creation 
of  a whole new space-time (Deleuze 1995, 176). 
 In the last few lines of  series twenty three (of  Aion), in Logic of  Sense, Deleuze 
distinguishes between three kinds of  presents: (1) a subverted present (empty and infinitely 
split), (2) an actualized present (diffused into everything), and (3) a third present that acts as 
the “quasi-cause” of  a distinctly new past and future: a present-past and present-future 
(1990, 168). “It would seem, no doubt,” Deleuze says, “that the Aion cannot have any 
present at all, since in it the instance is always dividing into future and past. But this is only 
appearance” (1990, 168). In reality, the third present (of  the future anterior) is a real “quasi-
causal” condition for a new past and future transformed immanently within the old. But, 
how exactly is this new present precipitated? How are its consequences concretely distributed 
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5 Husserl proposes a similar notion in his theory of  time consciousness. But this is not nearly radical enough 
since for Husserl time consciousness is immanent to something else outside time. What I am proposing instead 
is that revolutionary political events themselves establish new truly immanent space-times that do not transcend 
the matrix of  political representation but are equally immanent to it. Here I am in agreement with Deleuze and 
Guattari when the say that with Husserl discovers “the mole of  the transcendent within immanence itself. 
Husserl conceives of  immanence as that of  the flux lived by subjectivity. But since all this pure and even 
untamed lived does not belong completely to the self  that represents it to itself, something transcendent is 
reestablished...first, in the form of  an ‘immanent or primordial transcendence’ of  a world populated by 
intentional objects; second, as the privileged transcendence of  an intersubjective world populated by other 
selves; and third, as objective transcendence of  an ideal world populated by cultural formations and the human 
community” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 46). 
without becoming representational? What are its dangers? How are we to understand the 
more intermediate degrees of  such a transformation? And what is its relationship to the 
political situation and its typology of  different representational processes? These questions 
are not fully answered in the Logic of  Sense.  
 In fact, Deleuze and Guattari are not able to fully answer them until 1980 when they 
co-write A Thousand Plateaus: their first constructivist effort.6 What is important to 
distinguish, however, in this concept of  the third present of  the future anterior, introduced 
in Logic of  Sense,7 is that such a present is capable of  becoming the “quasi-causal” or real 
condition for a new world neither diffused or split. Once this “moment” emerges it re-
conditions not only the political situation of  the new present, but also that of  a new past and 
future. Revolution is thus not an opposition nor an ex nihilo insurrection, it is a prefiguration 
in the sense that it creates a new world parallel to the old one. This prefiguration takes place 
in the future anterior in the sense that it does not assume a pre-given past which it opposes 
or a merely possible future which it hopes to attain. Revolutionary prefiguration is instead 
future anterior insofar as it creates, as Deleuze says, an entirely new space-time of  its own 
(1995, 176). It creates the past and future it wants to see in the present. According to 
Deleuze and Guattari this is the positive meaning of  presentiment. Not the inert hope that 
“another world is possible,” but the direct action of  that particular world within the present. 
 In order to give a positive meaning to the idea of  a "presentiment" of  what does not 
 yet exist, it is necessary to demonstrate that what does not yet exist is already in 
 action, in a different form than that of  its existence. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 
 431)
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6 Deleuze and Guattari refer to Anti-Oedipus as a constructivist work only retroactively. Anti-Oedipus may have 
introduced the concept of  schizonanalysis that Deleuze and Guattari equate to constructivism in A Thousand 
Plateaus, but Anti-Oedipus also lacks a fully developed theory of  revolutionary “consistency” and “nomadism.” 
“Desire has always been a constructivism” (Stivale 2004). 
7 The concept of  the future anterior is not present in Difference and Repetition. 
 This real action of  the constructed past and future within the present is what 
Deleuze and Guattari call “neo-archaism” and “ex-futurism” (1983, 257). If  space-time is a 
topological plane of  various contingent and heterogenous processes connected together 
through folding and morphism, as was argued in chapter II, then a revolutionary 
intervention does not emerge dialectically or developmentally, or ex nihilo, it emerges by 
creating a new fold or connection between various points in space-time: a new arrangement 
of  past, present, and future. Thus, revolution today does not seize the state, it creates 
something better from below and outside it. 
 I will return to this concept of  revolutionary prefiguration and the future anterior in 
my development of  Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of  absolute positive deterritorialization. 
But with the concept of  the future anterior, distinguished from a synthesis for the past and 
future and from a complete split between past and future, the problem now is how to 
understand the role this revolutionary prefiguration plays and what dangers it faces in the 
larger process of  political transformation. In order to do so in the next four sub-sections I 
draw on Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of  transformation, or what they call 
“deterritorialization.”
Four Concepts of  Change or “Deterritorialization”    
 The concept of  change is arguably one of  the most central concepts throughout 
Deleuze and Guattari’s work. And while it has undergone many different names and 
terminological shifts over time, it remains safe to say that there are two concepts in their 
work that are the most important for understanding this concept: “becoming” and 
“deterritorialization.” It is of  no coincidence then, that the chapter most centrally devoted to 
these two concepts not only composes the largest of  all the chapters in A Thousand Plateaus 
(77 pages) but is also the only place in the book where the concept of  the future anterior 
(Aeon) is deployed: 1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible. . . . 
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 Given the clear centrality of  this chapter and these two concepts in their work, I 
propose to draw from them a theory of  revolutionary transformation that provides an 
alternative to strategic opposition and revolutionary “eventness,” as well as the synthetic and 
divided concepts of  the future anterior. Additionally, my argument is that a theory of  
revolutionary intervention in the future anterior or what I am calling prefiguration, cannot 
be understood without also understanding the four concepts of  change in the theory of  
deterritorialization. In the next four sub-sections I thus develop the four concepts of  change 
briefly outlined at the beginning of  this section (relative negative, relative positive, absolute 
negative, and absolute positive deterritorialization). Afterward, in the third and final major 
section of  this chapter, I argue that the Zapatistas deploy a practice of  revolutionary 
prefiguration. 
(1) Relative Negative Deterritorialization
 The first type of  change is what Deleuze and Guattari call “relative negative 
deterritorialization.” This is a change that is able to break free from the processes of  political 
representation (coding, overcoding, and axiomatization) but only momentarily and in such a 
way that the change obstructs further transformations. A relative negative deterritorialization 
is a normalized transformation internal to the functioning of  a representational process that 
secures its further expansion. It is a mistake to think that power is ever total or homogenous. 
Rather, the opposite is true. Representational power, according to Deleuze and Guattari, 
functions only through its internal breakdowns: relative negative deterritorializations.  
 In the processes of  territorial coding for example, there are certain prohibitions and 
boundaries that define the limits proper to a society: how things are to be used, how desire is 
to be directed, where activities are to take place, etc. A coded territory is thus what it is only 
by virtue of  where it draws the disjunctive limits of  its code. On one side it connects 
qualitative codes, while on the other side it disjuncts a remainder or surplus yet-to-be-coded. 
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But since territorial coding is based on the primary repression of  “uncoded or decoded 
flows” (absolute deterritorialization), something is always remerging outside the limits of  a 
given block of  code. As each coded territory approaches its marginal limits, after which it 
will cease to be what it is, it undergoes an internal transformation by conjuncting and 
redistributing the surplus to another line of  code (through alliance). “By switching territories 
at the conclusion of  each operation period” territorial coding becomes itinerant (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1987, 440): creating multiple binary segments-in-progress. That is to say, its 
power to represent the natural codes of  social life function only through a perpetual 
“disequilibrium of  excess and deficiency” (1983, 150). Relative negative deterritorialization 
(stabilized dysfunction) is thus an essential element of  its very ability to function (1983, 151). 
Elements are structurally excluded only to be reintegrated under a new hierarchy later on. 
 Statist overcoding also functions through internal break-down and transformation, 
but in a different way. Opposed to the territorial coding of  primarily unstable flows of  
absolute deterritorialization, statism is itself  a deterritorialized and uncoded remainder from 
the territorial stock that becomes a centralized point of  accumulation (of  land, work, 
currency, etc). This point of  accumulation in turn performs a relative negative 
deterritorialization back upon the qualitative territorial codes by removing their 
heterogeneous qualities and stratifying them into a single vertical and hierarchical line of  
machinic enslavement within a central overcoding apparatus (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 
427–28). But in retaining given coded elements, the state necessarily cuts off  relations with 
other elements, which become exterior to it. Opposed to territorial itinerancy that merely 
begins a new line of  code with the remainder, the state’s form of  relative negative 
deterritorialization aims to either destroy all remainders or capture them “once and for all.” 
But since neither of  these are possible (due to the inexhaustible contingencies of  political 
history discussed in chapter II) the state is continually entering into increasingly violent states 
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of  security, emergency, and internal change: relative negative deterritorialization. The state is 
thus paranoiac and ultimately impotent. But, “it is precisely its impotence that makes power 
so dangerous,” as Deleuze and Guattari say (1987, 229). The more power and security a state 
deploys the more its impotence grows. The more its impotence grows, the more power is 
required to secure it, and so on.      
This is both the principle of  their power and the basis of  their impotence. Far from 
being opposites, power and impotence complement and reinforce each other in a 
kind of  fascinating satisfaction that is found above all in the most mediocre 
Statesmen, and defines their "glory." For they extract glory from their 
shortsightedness, and power from their impotence. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 225)
 Above all, capitalist axiomatization is the representational process most adapted to 
the rapid and fluid process of  internal transformation, that is, relative negative 
deterritorialization. Opposed to the paranoiac and totalitarian drive toward total capture or 
destruction that requires so many “states of  emergency” and paranoiac suspensions of  law, 
capitalist axiomatization takes non-totality and incompleteness to be its point of  departure. 
Opposed to codes that qualify, and overcodes that bring codes into a single resonance, 
axioms function by directly conjugating unqualified and decoded flows themselves. Thus 
capitalism goes furthest in its relative negative deterritorialization. At one pole it deploys an 
aggressive decoding of  qualitative relationships through the privatization of  all aspects of  
social life, free trade, advertising, freeing of  labor and capital, imperialism, and at the other 
pole conjugates them as abstract quantities for exchange on the world market (1983, 246).8 
Where the despotic states had emperors of  anti-production to consume and capture surplus, 
the bourgeois field of  immanence has no such external limit; it has integrated anti-
production inside production itself. Since axiomatization takes contingency, change, and 
deterritorialization to be its presupposition, it also makes the internal and inevitable 
destruction or saturation of  markets themselves the condition for its ever widening limits 
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8 “It axiomatizes with one hand what it decodes with the other” (1983, 246).
(1983, 253). “War,” as a type of  relative negative deterritorialization, Deleuze and Guattari 
say, thus 
 clearly follows the same movement as capitalism . . . actively contribut[ing] to the 
 redistributions of  the world necessary for the exploitation of  maritime and planetary 
 resources . .  . [thus] the power of  war always supersaturates the system’s saturations, 
 as its necessary condition. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 466) 
(2) Relative Positive Deterritorialization
 The second type of  political change described by Deleuze and Guattari is defined as 
a real transformation of  political representation that prevails over secondary 
reterritorializations (codes, overcodes, and axioms) but fails to connect with other positively 
deterritorialized elements or create a new arrangement. Relative positive deterritorialization 
on its own is thus only the mere affirmation that something has escaped the dominant 
regimes of  political representation at the borderlines. This kind of  change is ultimately 
insufficient to sustain a revolutionary struggle. It is thus a mistake to think that just because 
something has escaped political representation that it is inherently revolutionary. Again, the 
opposite is true. Political transformations, according to Deleuze and Guattari, are 
experimental and require sustained and committed connections with others to become 
revolutionary.
 It is because no one, not even God, can say in advance whether two borderlines will 
 string together or form a fiber, whether a given multiplicity will or will not  cross 
 over into another given multiplicity, or even if  given  heterogeneous  elements will 
 enter symbiosis, will form a consistent, or cofunctioning, multiplicity susceptible to 
 transformation. No one can say where the line of  flight will pass: Will it let itself  get 
 bogged down . . . Or will it succumb to another danger, for example, turning into a 
 line of  abolition, annihilation, self-destruction, Ahab, Ahab... ? We are all too familiar 
 with the dangers of  the line of  flight, and with its ambiguities. The risks are  
 ever-present, but it is always possible to have the good fortune of  avoiding them. 
 Case by case, we can tell whether the line is consistent, in other words, whether the 
 heterogeneities effectively function in a multiplicity of  symbiosis, whether the 
 multiplicities are effectively transformed through the becomings of  passage. 
 (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 250)
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 Relative positive deterritorialization is thus a borderline phenomena, a “Thing, which 
arrives and passes at the edge,” that functions as the two-sided limit of  political 
representation (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 244). Because “the politics of  becomings,” for 
Deleuze and Guattari, are so “extremely ambiguous,” this borderline is split in two: on one 
side it exists as an “Anomalous” element unaccounted for within the state of  affairs but still 
recognizable as an exception, and on the other side it exists as an “exceptional individual” 
that holds together the increasing connections of  a new world in formation (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987, 247). Insofar as it “ceases to be a definable aggregate in relation to the 
majority,” it both reveals the possibility of  further connection as well as the possibility of  
inevitable co-optation (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 291).  
(3) Absolute Negative Deterritorialization
 The third type of  political change described by Deleuze and Guattari is defined as a 
real transformation that moves absolutely beyond all the borderlines of  territorial, state, and 
capitalist representation.9 But in doing so it not only fails to connect with other 
deterritorialized elements and create a new arrangement, it deterritorializes too fast, too 
much, and becomes self-destructive. Ultimately, it ends up strengthening the processes of  
political representation. Radical political transformation is thus not merely ambiguous. This 
would be putting things too lightly, it is dangerous. “Staying stratified—organized, signified, 
subjected—is not the worst that can happen;” Deleuze and Guattari warn, “the worst that 
can happen is if  you throw the strata into demented or suicidal collapse, which brings them 
back down on us heavier than ever” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 161).  
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9 Absolute deterritorialization though, does not simply come after relative deterritorialization. Rather, “relative 
Deterritorialization itself  requires an absolute for its operation,” and “conversely, absolute Deterritorialization 
necessarily proceeds by way of  relative Deterritorialization, precisely because it is not transcendent” (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1987, 510).
 When a “line of  flight” or a degree of  political transformation “makes [change] an 
unlimited movement with no other aim than itself,” this is what Deleuze and Guattari call 
fascism (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 421).10 Provided that we do not strictly apply this 
concept to its narrow and literal reference in the traditional categories of  political ideology, 
there can be all kinds of  fascisms to the degree to which they exhibit a certain “passion for 
self-destruction.” There is a molar fascism when a totalitarian state values war over its own 
self-preservation, as in the case of  Nazi germany, in Hitler’s final days. “If  the war is lost, may 
the nation perish,” Hitler declares in telegram 71. “Here,” Deleuze and Guattari say, “Hitler 
decides to join forces with his enemies in order to complete the destruction of  his own 
people, by obliterating the last remaining resources of  its life-support system, civil reserves 
of  every kind (potable water, fuel, provisions, etc.)” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 231; Virilio, 
1993, 1–15; Arendt 1966, 326). There is a molecular fascism when groups or individuals 
collapse in on themselves in isolation: “a rural fascism and city or neighborhood fascism, 
youth fascism and war veterans fascism, fascism of  the left and of  the right, fascism of  the 
couple, family, school and office” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 214). It is a general thirst for 
every kind of  destruction, “whose only outcome is death” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 162). 
 Therefore, it is because one is unable to “reach the . . . plane of  consistency, by 
wildly destratifying,” that Deleuze and Guattari, for the first time in their work together, 
advise, not wisdom, but “injections of  caution” into the process of  political transformation 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 160, 150). 
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10 Deleuze and Guattari are not referring to the merely historical phenomena of  Fascism. Rather they are 
extracting a concept from it strictly defined as a “war machine of  self  abolition” that may apply to some 
historical situations in some ways and not in others. Nazi Germany was a totalitarian state plus an impulse for 
war and national self-destruction (the murder of  its own people and the liquidation of  industry for the sake of  
the war effort). Nick Land thus misunderstands Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of  Fascism when he asks, 
“does anyone think Nazism is like letting go?” (Land 1993, 76). 
(4) Absolute Positive Deterritorialization
The fourth, final, and most important type of  political change described by Deleuze and 
Guattari is a kind of  transformation that not only escapes the absolute limits and borders of  
political representation, but connects up to an increasing number of  other absolutely 
positive deterritorialized elements whose ultimate collective aim is the immanent 
transformation of  the present intersection of  political processes through the prefigurative 
construction of  a new world (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 142). But it would be a mistake to 
think that this radical transformation is a kind of  ex nihilo miracle or absolute Other/Outside 
of  political representation. Deleuze and Guattari are quite clear, and the previous types of  
change have shown, that absolute deterritorialization is already presupposed as the absolute 
internal limit immanently confronted by all other forms of  social organization. Absolute 
positive deterritorialization is thus in no way transcendent, oppositional, or merely potential, 
but rather a kind of  immanent and creative process from within the situation that harnesses 
all of  its inevitable breakdowns and exclusions. It does so not in order to develop a new 
form of  political representation, or stabilize the old ones, but to create a new non-
representational social body.        
 But is it really sufficient to say that absolute positive deterritorialization is merely the 
connection of  all such heterogenous breakdowns and exclusions? Not at all. It is precisely 
this move that reads absolute positive deterritorialization as a transcendental condition for all 
political change as such: difference-in-itself, potentiality, or pure becoming. While Peter 
Hallward’s book, Out of  This World, is perhaps the most extreme formulation of  this 
“theophantic” conclusion, it should indicate to us the risks of  such a position and the 
necessity of  thinking absolute positive deterritorialization as a real, concrete revolutionary 
force. I thus present the following alternative reading.  
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 Absolute positive deterritorialization does not form a single transcendental or 
ontological condition for all revolutionary change. Deleuze and Guattari are extremely clear 
about this when they say that “politics precedes being,” and that “the plane of  consistency 
does not preexist the movements of  deterritorialization that unravel it, the lines of  flight that 
draw it and cause it to rise to the surface, the becomings that compose it” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987, 25, 270). Rather case by case, very specific, singular elements become 
dislodged, marginalized, and deterritorialized from the intersection of  representational 
political processes (or what Deleuze and Guattari call, “the plane of  organization”). These 
singular elements then “combine into blocks [of  becoming]” based on a “topological zone 
of  proximity that marks their belonging to [each other]” in a given situation (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987, 268, 273). 
 Far from forming a muddy and inconsistent multitude, each relational “block of  
becoming” that is assembled from the immanent breakdowns and unrepresentable elements 
within the situation, “does not have the same forces or even speeds of  deterritorialization as 
another; in each instance, the indices and coefficients must be calculated according to the 
block of  becoming under consideration, and in relation to the mutations of  an abstract 
machine” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 306–7). Far from affirming the vague and ambivalent 
potentiality of  transformation as such, Deleuze and Guattari insist on the “fragment by 
fragment” political calculation, comparison, and assembly of  powers of  deterritorialization 
(Deleuze and Parnet 1987, 146; Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 307). Thus, and this is crucial to 
the entire thesis of  this dissertation, “it is in concrete social fields, at specific moments, that 
the comparative movements of  deterritorialization, the continuums of  intensity, and the 
combinations of  flux that they form must be studied” (Deleuze and Parnet 1987, 135). 
 Absolute positive deterritorialization is prefigurative in the sense that it follows out 
the consequences of  a specific event immanent and parallel to the processes of  
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representation. “The question” of  sustaining the event, as Guattari puts it, “is how to ensure 
that the singular processes—which almost swerve into the incommunicable—are maintained 
by articulating them in a work, a text, a way of  living with oneself  or with others, or the 
invention of  areas of  life and freedom to create” (2008, 259). In other words, absolute 
positive deterritorialization doesn't just lay preparatory groundwork for an event, it also 
“captures the [unrepresentable] elements of  the situation” and “constructs its own types of  
practical and theoretical references, without remaining dependent in relation to global power, 
whether in terms of  economy, knowledge, technology, or segregations, and prestige that are 
disseminated” (2008, 62). 
 To return to the central thesis of  this chapter, revolutionary political transformation 
occurs as the prefigurative emergence of  a particular new present (within and along side the 
old) that both “rewrites and reinterprets the totality of  potentials that already existed in 
stratified form,” as well as creates “an action of  the future on the present,” and “the present 
on the past” (Guattari 2008, 252; Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 431). This is what Deleuze and 
Guattari call “reverse causalities.” More than a break or zig zag in history, they argue, what is 
to come already acts upon “what is” before the future can appear, insofar as it acts as a limit 
or threshold continually being warded off  by the past’s attempt to preserve itself. But once a 
new present emerges it is seen to have been on its way the entire time (Deleuze and Guattari 
1987, 431). If, from the perspective of  the plane of  organization, revolutionary novelty may 
seem to emerge “out of  nowhere,” this is only because it was unable to see or represent the 
prefigurative labor of  deterritorialization before it had transformed the political conditions 
under which it could be seen and understood as such. However, from the perspective of  the 
revolutionary struggle, the emerging event appears entirely consistent and intelligible as that 
which will have been. This prefigurative labor, according to Guattari, 
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consists in detecting the outlines, indicators, and crystals of  molecular productivity. 
If  there is a micropolitics to be practiced, it consists in ensuring that these molecular 
levels do not always succumb to systems that coopt them, systems of  neutralization, 
or processes of  implosion or self-destruction. It consists in apprehending how other 
assemblages of  the production of  life, the production of  art, or the production of  
whatever you want might find their full expansion, so that the problematics of  power 
find a response. This certainly involves modes of  response of  a new kind. (2008, 
339)
 The new revolutionary present thus emerges from strategic sites of  struggle that 
draw it “in negative outline,” Deleuze and Guattari say. “But for it to be realized there must 
be a whole integral of  decoded flows, a whole generalized conjunction that overspills and 
over-turns the preceding apparatuses” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 452). That is, it must 
“cause the other elements to cross a threshold enabling a conjunction of  their respective 
deterritorializations, a shared acceleration. This is . . . absolute, positive 
deterritorialization” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 142), not only an escape but the creation of 
“new weapons” (Deleuze and Parnet 1987, 136): “the creation of  great machines of  
struggle” (Guattari 2008, 210).
 However, lest I risk arguing in favor of  a purely subterranean and imperceptible 
form of  revolutionary transformation, I should highlight, because some often forget to, that 
the purpose of  absolute positive deterritorialization is not simply to become-imperceptible 
in relation to the plane of  organization for the sake of  doing so: this has too much fascist 
potential. The purpose of  prefigurative revolutionary interventions are to render everything 
“fragment by fragment” imperceptible from the plane of  organization in order to create “the 
plane of  consistency, which is nevertheless precisely where the imperceptible is seen and 
heard (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 252). The task is not to relish the theory of  an impossible 
and invisible revolution, but rather to “bring the imperceptible to perception” by changing 
the dominant conditions for visibility (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 267). It is neither by 
oppositional destruction or by ex nihilo creation but “by conjugating, by continuing with 
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other lines, other pieces, that one makes a world that can overlay the first one, like a 
transparency” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 280).
The Prefigurative Politics of  Zapatismo
 It would be a mistake to think that the Zapatistas or any other revolutionary political 
struggle were ever confined to expressing only a single type of  political transformation. Just 
as in the previous chapter we saw how the Zapatistas use an intersectional diagnostic to asses 
the external and internal dangers of  their struggle on all fronts, so in this chapter we see to 
what degree they have chosen to intervene in each of  the above four ways. Zapatismo thus 
takes place at a particular intersection of  all four types of  political change, although 
ultimately, I argue, their greatest degree of  intervention is in the prefigurative future anterior. 
Relative Negative Deterritorialization: the EZLN, the Peace Accords, and Biopiracy 
 Power is never total or homogenous, and thus change, disfunction, and break-down 
are inevitable aspects of  any intersection of  social orders. To the degree that the Zapatistas 
intervene in their political situation, they always risk having any transformations they 
contribute not only neutralized or coopted, but turned into changes that actually expand the 
power of  political representation. For example, given the territorial codes of  representation 
sustaining the patriarchal culture of  indigenous life in Chiapas, the EZLN made a very 
specific intervention at the limits of  this coding process: the creation of  the Women's 
Revolutionary Law. By allowing women (regardless of  race) to join the resistance, to work and 
receive fair wages, to be educated, to choose their partner to choose the number of  children 
they have, and to be free from sexual violence, etc. (EZLN 1994), they were able to 
deterritorialize the coded lines of  patriarchal filiation and forced marriage alliance (to some 
degree). However, in doing so they faced the danger of  merely deploying a relative negative 
deterritorialization that only strengthened the vanguard military apparatus (EZLN) and 
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initiated a new hierarchal line of  filiation and military order still dominated to some degree 
my men and male values. As Marcos says of  the EZLN, 
 accompaniment has sometimes turned into management, advice into orders and 
 support into a hindrance. I've already spoken previously about the fact that the 
 hierarchical, pyramid structure is not characteristic of  the indigenous communities. 
 The fact that the EZLN is a political-military and clandestine organization still 
 corrupts processes that should and must be democratic. (Marcos 2004)  
 The Zapatistas also risked a relative negative deterritorialization with their 
intervention into the overcoding state apparatus in their early attempts from 1994 to 1996 to 
negotiate a peaceful settlement with the Mexican government. 
In the [San Andres] agreements the government promised to recognize the right to 
autonomy of  Indian peoples in the constitution, to broaden their political 
representation, to guarantee full access to the justice system, and to build a new legal 
framework that guaranteed political rights, legal rights and cultural rights. The 
government promised also to recognize indigenous people as subjects of  public 
rights.” (Ramírez 2008, 138)
But it was not the bare fact of  negotiation with the Mexican government that made the 
Zapatista’s intervention a relative negative one (winning these rights would have been a 
historic victory, even if  it was through a state juridical process). What made them relatively 
negative was the fact that the government negotiated and agreed to the San Andres Peace 
Accords but never followed through with them. During these years of  negotiation the 
Zapatistas tried not to take any risky or radical actions or retaliations that might jeopardize 
the Peace Accords. Meanwhile, however, paramilitary forces, permitted by the government, 
as well as military troops and local police, escalated their attacks on Zapatista and Indigenous 
communities in Chiapas (including murder, assassination, harassment, and military 
relocation). The entire Peace Accords process was nothing but a temporary deterritorialization 
that allowed for the Mexican state’s paranoid and impotent attempt at extermination and 
total capture.     
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 Finally, after being murdered, harassed, and relocated, the Zapatistas were forced 
further and further back into the Lacandon Jungle. As food, building materials, and water 
became scarce, the Zapatistas increasingly entered into a mutual deterritorialization with the 
Jungle: they relied more on their traditional knowledges of  the forest, wild plants, and 
animals, while they ultimately ate less and tried not to damage the jungle ecosystem. But this 
deterritorialization was soon transformed into a relatively negative one as the Indigenous 
people were accused by the government and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) of  
“exacerbat[ing] already existing deforestation pressures in the Lacandon jungle” (O'Brien 
2000). Police, military, and environmental conservationists were brought in, not just to 
secure the jungle from the indigenous people, but to protect the increasing private 
axiomatization of  the newly deterritorialized “biopolitical market” of  indigenous knowledge, 
plants, animals, and tourism that had been opened up both by state and NGO protection as 
well as the actions of  the Indigenous people themselves whose environmental “damage” 
needed “repairing” by conservation scientists and/or bioprospectors. 
Relative Positive Deterritorialization: the First Declaration of  the Lacandon Jungle
 Is its also possible, however, that revolutionary interventions really split political life 
down the middle and force people to take action, or not. For example, the Zapatista’s January 
1st Uprising in 1994 marked out the real limits of  political life in Mexico. The day that the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) went into effect, the Zapatistas “burst 
upon a world that denied their existence,” as Zapatista scholar John Holloway says. Armed 
men and women from the indigenous communities took by force 7 towns and over 500 
privately owned ranches in the state of  Chiapas (Holloway 1998, 1). From the perspective of 
Mexican politics and the dominant referents of  politicians, corporations, voting citizens, etc., 
the Zapatistas surely “appeared” to “burst onto the scene” from nowhere. The existence of  
the Zapatistas was thus definitely at the borderline of  popular political intelligibility. Who are 
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“the Zapatistas” and what is the meaning of  their call to “Revolutionary War on the Mexican 
government?” The First Declaration of  the Lacandon Jungle was this first call for the radical 
deterritorialization of  Mexican politics.
To the People of  Mexico: We, the men and women, full and free, are conscious that 
the war that we have declared is our last resort, but also a just one. The dictators are 
applying an undeclared genocidal war against our people for many years. Therefore 
we ask for your participation, your decision to support this plan that struggles for 
work, land, housing, food, health care, education, independence, freedom, 
democracy, justice and peace. We declare that we will not stop fighting until the basic 
demands of  our people have been met by forming a government of  our country that 
is free and democratic. JOIN THE INSURGENT FORCES OF THE ZAPATISTA 
ARMY OF NATIONAL LIBERATION
—General Command of  the EZLN, 31 December 1993 (Marcos 2004b, 642)
 This evental call to popular revolutionary war split political reality in two. On one 
side it is still possible to see the January Uprising as a temporary anomalous (although not 
immediately recuperable) blip of  resistance in the prevailing political world; on the other side 
it is also the first visible manifestation of  what will have been the beginning of  a 
revolutionary war for popular and direct democracy across Mexico. But what clearly marks 
this event as a relative positive deterritorialization is that when confronted with this evental 
splitting of  the situation, the Mexican people (for the most part) chose to both support the 
Zapatista’s struggle and tolerate the Mexican government’s continued existence as a 
negotiator in the Peace Accords. Thus without a sufficient popular mobilization of  
deterritorialized connections across Mexico, the event remained mostly affirmed in name 
without a large scale-connection of  increasingly deterritorialized elements or building of  
alternative institutions. This type of  political intervention is perhaps best exemplified in the 
creation of  counter institutions: institutions that both affirm revolutionary struggles like the 
Zapatistas’ and want to protect it, but also do so through the struggle for rights, peace 
accords, negotiations, and legal reforms within representational politics.
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Absolute Negative Deterritorialization: a War Against the Mexican Government? 
 But these kinds of  revolutionary failures are not the worst thing that can happen. In 
addition to failing to connect to other vectors of  deterritorialization sufficient to sustain a 
revolutionary struggle, interventions can also become suicidal. For example, the EZLN no 
doubt had to seriously assess the Mexican people’s degree of  support for the First Declaration 
of  the Lacandon Jungle’s Declaration of  War in relation to the Mexican military and paramilitary 
power. Who are the “Mexican people?” What is the minimal support needed for a successful 
“advance to the capital of  the country, overcoming the Mexican federal army, protecting in 
our advance the civilian population and permitting the people in the liberated area the right 
to freely and democratically elect their own administrative authorities” (Marcos 2004b, 642)? 
What is the strength of  our army? Are we prepared for death in combat? 
 When popular support turned out to be (or was diagnosed as such) largely against 
revolutionary war, the EZLN had to decide to either continue a prolonged guerrilla war 
(something for which they had been training for the past ten years) surrender, or proceed by 
other means. Had they chosen to fight an unpopular military war against the Mexican 
government, knowing that they would likely lose, and were unable to find another way out of 
their situation, there is clearly a potential for revolutionary fascism and self-destruction.11  
 Thus we can see in the Zapatista’s Second Declaration (June, 1994) the adherence to an 
“offensive cease-fire,” and a call-out for a “peaceful and civic mobilization effort” by the 
Mexican people against the government. This begins a new long-term strategy of  popular 
mobilization efforts across Mexico and around the world. Clearly aware of  the potential 
fascism that any revolutionary movement faces, Marcos writes:   
We don’t want to impose our solutions by force, we want to create a democratic 
space. We don’t see armed struggle in the classic sense of  previous guerrilla wars, 
121
11 Like the revolutionary fascism of  militant terrorists groups of  the 60’s and 70’s: the Red Army Faction, the 
Weather Underground Organization, etc. 
that is, as the only way and the only all-powerful truth around which everything is 
organized. In a war, the decisive thing is not the military confrontation but the 
politics at stake in the confrontation. We didn’t go to war to kill or be killed. We went 
to war in order to be heard. (Marcos 2009)
Absolute Positive Deterritorialization: Prefiguration and the Juntas de Buen Gobierno  
 Perhaps most interesting, however, is when political interventions not only escape 
the secondary reterritorializations of  power but manage to connect up with others to 
transform the dominant political conditions through the creation of  a new world. For 
example, despite their initial failure to incite a revolutionary war against the Mexican 
government, or perhaps because of  this failure, the Zapatistas proceeded to initiate another 
kind of  warfare no less revolutionary, or perhaps more so: the popular organization of  civil 
society and the creation of  the Juntas de Buen Gobierno (Councils of  Good Government). In 
addition to many country-wide tours in previous years (to mobilize popular solidarity), in 
2006 the Zapatista’s began a concerted national effort to meet with and mobilize a popular 
unity of  Left forces in Mexico around the up-coming electoral campaign: they called it La 
Otra Campaña. 
 The purpose was not to form a party or select a candidate but to build connections 
and networks between left and radical groups across Mexico: to strengthen their shared 
deterritorializations. Along with the sustained use of  internet communiqués, calls and 
responses for national and international support, the Zapatistas began holding large annual 
international events (Intercontinental Encuentros for Humanity and Against Neoliberalism) and 
participating in annual Peoples Global Action and World Social Forum events in order to further 
increase their connections and solidarities with other deterritorialized groups around the 
world. What remains so unique about the Zapatistas as a revolutionary movement is the 
degree to which they have increasingly broadened their struggle beyond their own 
indigenous territorial situation and taken on others’ struggles as their own (against racism, 
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homophobia, sexism, imperialism, neoliberalism, and environmental destruction). Many 
Marxists had previously denied the possibility of  a non-industrial-working-class revolution, 
much less one specifically focusing on indigenous autonomy. But through a much more 
radical form of  mutual deterritorialization, the Zapatistas participate in a whole new type of  
revolutionary sequence.  
 Secondly, the Zapatistas have also deployed a prefigurative revolutionary intervention 
in two ways. First, the only way one could possibly say that the Zapatistas “burst onto the 
scene of  Mexican politics out of  nowhere” is if  they had not been aware of  the ten years of  
revolutionary activity, training, and indigenous mobilizations sustained in the jungles of  the 
Lacandon since 1983. Marcos and three others began as Che-inspired military vanguardists 
living outside indigenous communities and slowly earning the trust of, and radicalizing, the 
indigenous population. Far from appearing out of  nowhere, there was a long and ultimately 
collective decision by the assembly of  indigenous campasin@s to go to war. During this time 
the event of  Zapatismo certainly existed as a new present that had constructed a past (based 
on the justice of  Emiliano Zapata’s peasant revolution) and a future (of  directly democratic 
autonomous communes). Both the past of  Zapata and the future of  the communes, 
although technically non-existent, acted directly on the new present of  Zapatismo. During 
these ten years Zapatismo existed as a form of  invisibility that will have been visible. The 
future anterior of  Zapatismo is thus the revolutionary belief  that the past (Zapata) can be 
resurrected and requires us to follow out its consequences against the Mexican government 
and towards the creation of  a federated network of  autonomous communes. Despite 
objective evidence of  the fact, a Zapatista believes that Zapatismo will have been a 
revolutionary event. There is no objectivity or science of  the revolution, only committed 
experimentation. One either takes it up in the future anterior and wagers on its existence or 
one does not take it up. 
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 The second example, and perhaps the most original one, is the scale on which the 
Zapatistas have refused to “take power” and have instead continued their revolution by 
creating in the present the world they want to see in their own autonomous municipalities. 
They began in August of  2003 to create the Juntas de Buen Gobierno: directly democratic 
institutional frameworks for collective and autonomous decision-making. One JBG was 
created in each of  the Caracoles (regional communities, or snails) to 
promote and approve the participation of  compa@eros and compa@eras . . . to 
mediate conflicts which might arise between Autonomous Municipalities . . . to 
monitor the implementation of  projects and community work in the Rebel Zapatista 
Autonomous Municipalities . . . to serve and guide national and international civil 
society so that they can visit communities, carry out productive projects, set up peace 
camps, carry out research, etc. (Marcos 2004b, 619)    
Currently over 2,200 communities (over 100,000 people) are federated into 32 autonomous 
municipalities, each grouped into five local self-governments (JBGs). Today the Zapatistas 
remain committed to, among other things, autonomy, participatory self-government, 
consensus decision-making, respect for nature and life without the use of  pesticides, dams, 
unnecessary logging, and the inclusion of  “everybody without distinctions of  party, religion, 
sex, or color” (Marcos 2006). 
 By forming a specific block of  becoming through rotational self-government, the 
federation of  their communes, and ultimately their solidarity with an international network 
of  shared social struggle, the Zapatistas continue to make political interventions and 
alternative institutions that prefigure the kind of  democratic and equalitarian world they and 
their allies want to live in. Opposed to directly declaring war on the Mexican government 
and instituting a regime change in the state, or simply affirming the radical possibility that 
“another world is possible,” the Zapatistas are building, to what degree they can, another 
world within and alongside the old. 
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 The determination, including my own, that Zapatismo “will have been” a 
revolutionary event, however, has no objective status, only a conditional and experimental 
one: if you believe that Zapatismo is an event, then that belief  functions in the future anterior 
and can be supported by the network of  evidence I have outlined above. If  not, then 
Zapatismo is an inconsequential moment to be co-opted or crushed. Similarly, the normative 
sounding description of  “positive” or “negative” types of  deterritorialization can only be 
determined as such given the conditional engagement in revolutionary struggle. Radical 
political transformation is “positive” when it irrecoverably transforms representational 
power and “negative” when it does not. From the perspective of  representational power, 
however, this would seem not to be the case.   
Conclusion
 In chapter II I argued that the problem of  history and revolution should be 
understood neither as a universal history of  succession or contingency but rather as a 
diagnostic activity that examines several specific types of  coexistent political processes at 
once in order to assess the risks and dangers of  a given revolutionary struggle. But in the 
process of  this diagnostic practice we were confronted with the problem of  intervention and 
political transformation. In the practice of  diagnosing, where and how have we already 
intervened? How and where will we direct our future interventions based on a given 
intersectional analysis of  power, and what new political world are we creating within the old, 
if  any?   
 In this chapter I responded to this problem of  revolutionary intervention in three 
ways. I responded first by arguing that a post-representational revolutionary intervention can 
not be defined as an oppositional or reactionary struggle based on the same presuppositions 
of  political representation that it wishes to transform, nor can it be defined by the 
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ontological affirmation of  difference-in-itself  as the absolute condition for all political 
transformation. I responded secondly by arguing that contemporary revolutionary 
intervention is defined primarily by its prefigurative connections and constructions in the 
future anterior. Drawing on Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of  Aeon and 
Deterritorialization in A Thousand Plateaus, I supported this argument by showing that future 
anterior intervention can be distinguished from three other types of  political transformation: 
relative negative, relative positive, and absolute negative deterritorializations, remain 
insufficient to support a revolutionary political transformation of  the plane of  organization 
into a plane of  consistency. Finally, I responded by arguing that all revolutionary movements 
to some degree deploy, or confront the possibility of  deploying, all four of  these kinds of  
interventions. However, what distinguishes successful revolutionary interventions from 
others is the degree to which they deploy absolutely positive deterritorializations. By showing 
the degree to which the Zapatista revolutionary movement has made such deployments I 
have argued that they have, to a relatively high degree, been successful in transforming their 
political situation based on revolutionary prefiguration. 
 But while the theory of  prefigurative political intervention and deterritorialization 
developed in this chapter may provide an account of  how political change occurs and begins 
to connect up with other deterritorialized elements, it remains radically insufficient for 
understanding how it is that such prefigurative elements are able to cohere and organize 
themselves into distinctly non-representational kinds of  political bodies. Revolutionary 
organizations constantly risk falling back into patterns of  political representation on the one 
hand, and embracing the unrepresentable conditions for transformation as such on the 
other. Thus the task of  chapter IV is to avoid both of  these dangers and propose a theory of 
political participation drawn from Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of  “consistency” and the 
Zapatista’s participatory practice of  Rule by Obeying (Mandar Obedeciendo). 
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CHAPTER IV
THE BODY POLITIC AND THE PROCESS OF PARTICIPATION
It's not a question of  worrying or of  hoping for the best, but of  finding new weapons.
(Deleuze and Parnet 1987, 178)
Introduction
 What is revolutionary political change? In chapter III I proposed three responses to 
this question. First, I argued that the return to revolution could not be defined as an 
oppositional or reactionary struggle based on the same presuppositions of  political 
representation that it aims to transform: the coding processes of  military vanguardism, the 
overcoding processes of  statism, or the axiomatic processes of  capitalism. Nor can the 
return to revolutionary change be defined by the ontological affirmation of  difference-in-
itself, as the absolute condition for all political transformation as such. The mere assertion 
that things may “become other than they are” is an entirely insufficient and ambivalent 
definition of  revolutionary change. 
 Secondly, I argued that revolutionary intervention in the current return should be 
defined primarily by its prefigurative connections and constructions in the future anterior. 
Drawing on Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of  Aeon and deterritorialization in A Thousand 
Plateaus, I supported this argument by showing that future anterior intervention not only 
provides a way to conceptualize the emergence of  a new present from within the old but can 
be distinguished from three other types of  political transformation that occur to some 
degree in revolutionary interventions: a relative negative change, a relative positive change, 
and an absolute negative change. I showed how all three of  these types of  intervention failed 
to sufficiently support a revolutionary political transformation and in what ways absolute 
positive deterritorialization might succeed in the future anterior. 
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 Finally, I argued that the revolutionary movement of  Zapatismo, to some degree, 
deploys all, or at least confronts the possibility of  deploying all, four of  these kinds of  
interventions. However, what distinguishes successful revolutionary interventions from other 
kinds is the degree to which they deploy absolutely positive deterritorializations or, what I 
am calling, prefigurative transformations. By showing the degree to which the Zapatista 
revolutionary movement has made such positive deployments, I argued that they have, to a 
high degree, been relatively successful in transforming their political situation through the 
process of  political prefiguration. 
 But while the theory of  political prefiguration and deterritorialization developed in 
chapter III may have provided an account of  how different types of  political transformation 
occur within several different representational processes (coding, overcoding, and 
axiomatization) it remained radically insufficient for understanding how revolutionary 
prefigurative practices, in particular, are able to cohere and distribute themselves into 
distinctly non-representational kinds of  political bodies. How is it possible, for instance, to 
carry out and sustain the consequences of  a non-representational revolution? Is there a new 
type of  body politic that would no longer be predicated on the party-body of  the nation-
state, the market-body of  capital, or territorial-body of  the vanguard? Under what 
conditions would such a political body operate? How might one determine the relative 
benefits or detriments of  the practices within its domain? And how might we understand the 
efficacy of  different forms of  agency without the reflection, contemplation, and 
communication of  self-knowing (i.e. representational) subjects? 
 This chapter answers these questions.1 Non-representational revolutions, I argue, do 
not simply establish new conditions for political life based on a “more just” sphere of  
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1 In contrast to the political processes of  coding, overcoding, and axiomatization examined in chapter II and 
three, the present chapter examines a fourth type of  political process: consistency.
political action whose foundational principles are still held independently from the 
constituted sphere where such principles are deployed. Nor do such revolutions merely aim 
to establish counter institutions, whose sole purpose is to undermine all forms of  
representation and await the possibility that something new, and hopefully better, may 
emerge. Rather, a non-representational revolutionary body politic is built and sustained 
through an expressive and participatory process whose founding conditions are constantly 
undergoing direct and immanent transformation by the various practices and people who are 
effected by them to varying degrees.
 This chapter thus poses three responses to the problem of  creating a new 
revolutionary body politic. I first argue that the return to revolution located in Deleuze, 
Guattari, and the Zapatistas is not based on creating a new process of  political 
representation nor is it based on a mere rejection of  all forms of  representation as such. 
Secondly, I argue that, opposed to these two dangers of  representation and anti-
representation, the body politic of  this return to revolution is defined instead by its 
participatory mutability: the degree to which its conditions are transformed by the 
participation of  the elements and subjects affected by such conditions. I further argue that in 
order to understand the structure and function of  participation in this revolutionary body 
politic we need to understand the unique relationship it articulates between three different 
dimensions of  its political body: (1) the conditions under which it emerges and determines 
who counts as part of  its body politic, (2) the distribution of  concrete elements that express 
and constitute its body, and (3) the kinds of  subjects who connect and transform these 
conditions and elements. Representational, anti-representational, and participatory political 
bodies each express a different type of  relationship between these three dimensions. In order 
to develop a theory of  a specifically revolutionary and participatory political body, I draw on 
Deleuze and Guattari’s similar concept of  consistency, found in A Thousand Plateaus and 
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What is Philosophy? but expand its application to the issue of  revolutionary politics. Thirdly, I 
argue that the Zapatistas have created a similar revolutionary and participatory body politic 
based on, what that they call, Rule by Obeying (Mandar Obedeciendo). Together, Deleuze, 
Guattari, and the Zapatistas form a theoretical practice of  revolutionary political 
participation.  
The Body Politic
The Representational Body Politic
 If  the crisis of  identity and representational politics poses such an enormous 
problem for us today it is because identity has, for so long, provided the philosophical 
foundation for, and definition of, Western politics as such. With few exceptions politics has 
aimed at securing bodies of  collective “capture” that ground and legitimate action through 
the presupposition of  a political unity and identity of  the governed: the identity of  natural, 
ethnic, or territorial bodies; the identity of  God, king, social contract, or modern state 
bodies; or the identity of  the money-body of  capital. While each of  these bodies may be 
different in operation, each attempts to sustain a political distribution that can classify and 
organize various political differences as different from something that is certain, stable, and 
unified in advance of  its reproduction. 
 Representational political bodies are thus made possible, in these cases, through the 
presupposition and subsequent repetition of  an identity in the grounding body itself  that 
establishes a political domain in advance of  the differential expressions that come to 
populate and repeat it. Its multitude of  political elements then differentially represent and 
repeat the generality of  this prior domain. Each “different” political element that strengthens 
or weakens a given domain does so only in relation to the pre-given criteria of  the general 
equality and exchangeability of  difference. These process of  representation were discussed at 
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length in chapter II as the body of  the earth, the body of  the state, the body of  capital. 
Subjective formations are no exception. They take place only within the pre-given scope of  
these conditions and elements representing, recognizing, reflecting, and communicating to and 
between themselves within the generally redundant parameters of  a prior field of  shared 
identity. This unifying process allows conflicting differences to be held together and 
mediated by a territorially shared “way of  life,” a governmentally enforced system of  
“rights/contracts,” or a profit driven world “market.” Self-consciousness, reason, and 
subjectivity presuppose these political models of  identity when thinking represents to itself  
different choices, thoughts, voices, and desires on a pre-given plane of  political organization. 
 We can see this type of  representational body politic at work in the notion of  
vanguardism as it expresses (1) the historical unity and necessity of  the relevant conditions of  
historico-political action: the factory site, the class struggle, labor power, and the overthrow 
of  the state; (2) the practical diversity of  elements conditioned on aiding or hindering this 
unified class struggle: “how does x represent the class struggle?” “how does x repeat the 
identity of  its body, favorably, poorly?”; and (3) the unity of  a revolutionary subjectivity, a 
proletarian-consciousness of  the real historical-material conditions and the epistemological 
certitude of  intervention: the seizer of  the state apparatus and the dictatorship of  the 
working-class. The vanguard “speaks for” its class, as a historical identity determined in 
advance by the science of  political economy, just as democratically elected representatives 
“speak for” their “citizenry,” determined in advance by the protection of  rights, the tally of  
votes, etc. and money “speaks for” the world’s consumer desires, determined by a prior 
axiomatic conjunction of  labor and capital. Political differences according to the politics of  
representation are always differences from the same and within the identical. 
 But there are three dangers of  representational political bodies: (1) Representational 
political bodies are necessarily exclusionary insofar as their founding principles are excluded 
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from modification in the political sphere they constitute. For example, the institution of  
state law by definition cannot be a legal act in itself  since there was no system of  law that 
proceeded its institution. The creation of  a political domain based on the identity and 
sameness of  its conditions is not only paradoxical, insofar as the creation of  law is illegal, it 
necessarily excludes certain people from political participation to the degree the state is 
unable to change its founding conditions. 
 (2) Accordingly, if  representational political bodies succeed in securing the evaluative 
criteria for relatively beneficial and detrimental political elements, they do so only on the 
precondition of  a hierarchy of  these elements, no matter what their egalitarian pretensions.2 
Since political differences are always different from the initial identity of  their grounding 
body, elements more or less resemble its general measure of  recognition: the filiation of  its 
territory, the laws of  its state, the market value of  its capital. 
 (3) Finally, representational political bodies produce subjects of  deliberation only by 
creating an inability for the subject itself  to change what it is. The subject of  identity is able 
to reason and deliberate on political actions and decisions only insofar as it presupposes the 
identity of  an undifferentiated body that such decisions or actions are distinguished from. 
The political subject then either asserts its positive freedom based on what it “self-
transparently” desires or asserts its negative freedom from others who would curtail such 
reflectively known desires. In either case the subject is allowed change or difference only on 
the pre-condition of  the initial unchanging transparency of  what it is and wants. 
The Anti-Representational Body Politic
 In the wake of  the above crisis of  representation, and the death of  the liberal 
subject, political counter-institutions and theoretical practices based on the rejection of  all 
forms of  representation have proliferated. Instead of  positing identity as primary, and 
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2 A “hierarchy based on the degree of  proximity or distance from a principle” (Deleuze 1994, 37). 
organizing political bodies based on their accurate representation of  this identity, anti-
representational political bodies presuppose difference as primary, and affirm it as a political 
condition radically exterior to all pre-given identities. Instead of  political differences being 
different from a prior identity, they are instead conceived of  as different in-themselves. Rather 
than the violent establishment of  an exclusionary political domain posited in advance of  the 
different political elements that would come to populate it, anti-representational political 
bodies leave the political domain radically open to potential political transformations and 
peoples yet “to come.”  
 The anti-representational body politic thus understands difference in itself  as the 
condition for all political transformation. “The political,” is thus perpetually open to all those 
who potentially participate in its non-exclusive community. The various different political 
elements that would then assay the strengths and weaknesses, the health and dangers of  this 
community, without an identity or representational condition to be defined against 
hierarchically, are instead understood as so many heterogenous elements. Each of  these 
elements are equally tied to one another in nested relations that at each level signal the 
impossibility of  political closure and open us up to the potentiality of  further 
transformation. Instead of  subjective transformations taking place solely within the pre-
given identity-political domains of  territorial, state, and capitalist representation, the subject 
itself  is, according to this body politic, part of  a larger “undefined work of  
freedom” (Foucault, 1984, 46): its own transformation beyond “self-evident” desires for 
something or from something. Rather than forming a unified plane on which to evaluate, 
deliberate, and decide different political actions, the differential subject is a fragmented, 
partial, and impersonal process of  becoming composed of  multiple drives and conflicting 
desires that produce the subject more as an effect or partial remainder than as a unified 
“self.” 
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 But how is one to put into practice a politics of  “the potentiality of  transformation 
as such?” Or is it the case, as Thomas Macarthy and others have argued (McCarthy 1991; 
Fraser 1989), that the politics of  difference has only a critical function contra the politics of  
identity and no coherent alternative of  its own? There are thus three dangers of  the anti-
representational body politic: (1) Since transformation as such cannot be delimited by any 
political domain in particular, it risks affirming an ambivalent condition for participation. 
Anything can happen. A political commitment to ambivalence, however, does not seem 
much different than the latent cynicism already pervading capitalist social life (1983, 225). If  
anything, such a position is indulgent and irresponsible given what’s at stake in the problems 
at hand.
 (2) Anti-representational political bodies may also be able to avoid the great 
hierarchical “chain of  being” assumed by a politics of  elements more or less identical to 
their original condition, but only at the cost of  a latent hierarchy of  “transformative 
potential” among the elements and the potential they express. While one may affirm their 
“equality” qua elements that may become otherwise than they are, it is also the case that in 
the particularity of  their concrete being some elements undergo transformation more or less 
so than others. This is roughly the criticism that Badiou, originally in Deleuze: the Clamor of  
Being, leveled against Deleuze’s pre-constructivist works, Difference and Repetition and Logic of  
Sense, and that Peter Hallward and Slavoj !i"ek have taken up in their own monographs 
against Deleuze (also citing, almost exclusively, Deleuze’s pre-constructivist works).3 
 (3) Similarly, the anti-representational body politic avoids the static character of  the 
representational subject who can never change the nature of  its “self,” but only by diffusing 
the self  into an endless multiplicity of  impersonal drives: a self  in perpetual transformation. 
But without a pre-given unity of  subjectivity, how do agents/multiplicities deliberate 
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3 See chapter I.
between and distinguish between different political decisions? The radically ambivalent and 
unlocalizable processes of  subjective potentiality seem then to have nothing to contribute to 
an analysis of  the basic function of  participatory democracy at the core of  many 
contemporary resistance movements (Notes from Nowhere 2003). Insofar as a theory of  
subjectivity is defined only by its potential for transformation, it is stuck in a kind of  
paralysis of  endless potential change no less disempowering than the politics of  identity. Or 
as Hallward frames this criticism against Deleuze, “he abandons the decisive subject in favor 
of  our more immediate subjection to the imperative of  creative life” (2006, 163).
The Revolutionary Body Politic
 Given the challenge of  these problems, I argue instead in this next section that the 
return to revolution influenced by Deleuze and Guattari can be defined by its creation of  a 
participatory political body. By participatory political body I mean a set of  political practices 
constitutive of  a social order that incorporates a maximal degree of  mutual and conflictual 
transformation. A participatory body politic is a social order that both transforms the 
subjects and objects that constitute it and is equally transformed by them. It is a new kind of 
participatory democracy or political self-management.4  
 In order to further develop this concept of  a participatory body politic in this 
section I draw on the notion of  consistency in Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy 
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4 The process of  participation, consistency, or ruling by obeying should not be confused with the process of  
liberalism or representative democracy. The process of  participatory politics is a rejection of  majoritarian 
democracy. Instead, it proposes a more direct and unmediated process of  political inclusion and self  
transformation much more similar to the the Zapatista process of  consensus decision making and rotational 
self  management found in the political, economic, and social life of  the Autonomous Municipalities. Those 
who are directly affected by it are not represented by it but rather participate directly in its management.
“quod omnes tangit, ab omnibus approbetur:” “that which touches all, should be decided by all.”
and expand its implications for revolutionary politics.5 I find Deleuze and Guattari’s concept 
of  consistency particularly useful because it allows us to conceive of  a non-representational 
social organization based on more than the mere rejection of  representation. Even as early 
as Difference and Repetition Deleuze had formulated a similar philosophical concept of  self-
management. “We remain slaves,” Deleuze says, “so long as we do not control the problems 
themselves, so long as we do not possess a right to the problems, to a participation in and 
management of  the problems” (Deleuze 1994, 158). It is, however, not until A Thousand 
Plateaus and What is Philosophy? that the theory of  consistency is fully developed and 
politicized. But even then, it is not developed as a theory of  a revolutionary body politic. 
The aim of  this section is thus to expand this concept in order to develop such a theory.
 But consistency is not just another word for static predictability; it is precisely the 
opposite. A revolutionary body politic is consistent insofar as it (1) sustains a constructive 
rupture or break from the intersection of  representational processes, (2) connects or 
consolidates a block of  collective practices, or capacities for action that have all been 
similarly deterritorialized, and (3) is continually and unpredictably transformed by the various 
elements and agents that compose it. Thus, what makes a revolutionary body politic 
consistent is precisely its participatory mutability around a locally determinate event. While 
the first of  these three characteristics was argued for at length in chapter III, the last two will 
be argued in the present section drawing on the work of  Deleuze and Guattari. In particular, 
I draw on their concept of  consistency and its three component concepts, the abstract 
machine, the concrete assemblage, and the machinic persona, to understand how a non-
representational political body works.
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5 Not all abstract or concrete machines are revolutionary. As we saw in chapter II there are four kinds of  
abstract machines for Deleuze and Guattari, three of  which support processes of  representation (territory, 
state, and capital). This chapter engages only the fourth type of  abstract machine: the revolutionary machine. 
 The problematic of  defining a distinctly non-representational social order has also 
been posed by other scholars of  radical political theory. A revolutionary politics requires, 
according to Bruno Bosteels, a “consistency and durability” (2005a, 594), that is, “the putting 
to work of  an event” (2004, 104), based on a careful “study [of] the consequences of  an 
event within the situation, not [the] elevat[ion of] the event into a wholly other dimension 
beyond being” (2004, 104). Or as Alberto Toscano frames it, to “articulate what the 
parameters and modalities for the consistency of  reality may be, [and] how this consistency 
might find itself  regulated and stabilized” (Toscano 2004), without, that is, being 
represented. Here, I am certainly in agreement with Bosteels and Toscano, except that I 
think that we can locate such a theory in Deleuze and Guattari.  
 But surprisingly, even Antonio Negri is unsympathetic to such a task. In an interview 
with Cesare Casarino, Negri claims that Deleuze’s political philosophy is still unable to 
translate the ontological theory of  the event, as the revolutionary potentiality of  
transformation, into “a logic of  collective action” (Casarino and Negri 2004, 157), that 
would “adequately describe the positive recomposition of  power” (2004, 152). “In Deleuze,” 
Negri says, “—and even in his last works—there is always a sense of  astonished stupor in 
the face of  Singularity, there is always an inability to translate the ontological Event into a 
prefiguration or schematism of  reason, into a constitution, or even into a merely virtual 
constitution that would nonetheless contain a constructive element. There is always surprise 
and chance” (2004, 155). For Negri, the question remains, “how can we translate the 
ontological substratum into logical dimensions?” (155), that is, into “the discovery of  the 
logic of  collective actions, the constitution of  such a logic in that moment of  
Singularity” (157).  
 Whether Negri’s criticisms are fair to Deleuze or not, his concerns articulate well the 
aim and challenge of  the present work, and in particular this chapter. That is, to advance, in 
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spite of  certain limitations in Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy and those of  their 
critics, a “logic of  collective action” or consistency drawn from their political philosophy and 
placed along side the revolutionary practices of  Zapatismo. The aim of  this is to discover an 
alternative political practice to the representational politics of  territory, state, and capital, as 
well as the merely anti-representational politics of  speculative or spontaneous leftism 
(Bosteels 2005b). In order to develop the concept of  what I am calling a revolutionary body 
politic, I examine each of  its constitutive components in turn: (1) the conditions under which 
this body politic emerges and determines who counts as part of  it, (2) the distribution of  
concrete elements that express and constitute its body, and (3) the kinds of  subjects who act and 
transform its body. Or as Deleuze and Guattari rename these components: the abstract 
machine, the concrete assemblage, and the machinic persona.  
The Revolutionary Abstract Machine
 What are the conditions under which a revolutionary political body can emerge and 
sustain itself ? Is there such a thing as a body politic that would no longer be conditioned by 
the old models of  territorial, state, and capitalist representation? We have seen already two 
ways that the problem of  establishing a set of  conditions for political emergence and 
inclusion can be answered. The conditions under which a being counts as a political being 
within an body politic can be considered fixed, unified, and representational of  its members. 
A body politic can have as its condition a limited territorial boundary based on ethnic, social, 
and geographical divisions; it can have as its condition the limited law of  a sovereign state 
based on social contract, natural law, and rights; or it can have as its condition the malleable 
but still limited value of  what is profitable for the capitalist market. Or the conditions in 
which beings are considered political begins within a body politic can be considered as 
radically open to the contingency and possibility that all beings can become other than they 
are: the body politic can be unconditioned.  
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 Given the previously argued dangers confronting both these types of  body politic, I 
propose instead in this section an alternative kind of  political condition that is neither 
limited, representational, nor merely open, but is flexibly open and transformable by its 
membership. This kind of  determinate but flexible political condition for inclusion in a body 
politic is what Deleuze and Guattari call a revolutionary abstract machine. A revolutionary 
abstract machine, Deleuze and Guattari say, is characterized by four distinct features, each of 
which I argue can help us understand the conditions for a revolutionary body politic. 
(1) A Revolutionary Abstract Machine Is both Singular and Absolute
In historical phenomena such as the revolution of  1789, the Commune, the 
revolution of  1917, there is always one part of  the event that is irreducible to any 
social determinism, or to causal chains. Historians are not very fond of  this point: 
they restore causality after the fact. Yet the event itself  is a splitting off  from, a 
breaking with causality; it is a bifurcation, a lawless deviation, an unstable condition 
that opens up a new field of  the possible. (Deleuze 2006, 233)
 The emergence of  the conditions for a revolutionary body politic, according to 
Deleuze and Guattari, do not resemble any recognizable, legal, or legitimate thing within the 
present state of  affairs. In this sense the conditions for a revolutionary body politic mark a 
“singular” event. As an abstract machine this condition is “free from all normal, or 
normative causalities” deduced or derived from the known possibilities of  what a political 
body is capable of  doing. A revolutionary body politic does not just establish another 
cultural identity, subject of  rights, or commodity in circulation, it creates a new condition for 
inclusion that is both contingent and heterogenous to the topology of  representational 
power. But this new condition is not the mere rejection of  all conditionality as such. Rather, 
the revolutionary abstract machine creates a unique and “unstable condition that opens up a 
new field of  the possible” alongside the state of  affairs that supports a whole “series of  
amplified instabilities and fluctuations” that constitute the localized struggle of  the body 
politic itself. Insofar as Lenin, the Paris Commune, and May 1968 were all contingent and 
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heterogenous ruptures in the processes of  political representation i.e. singular, Deleuze and 
Guattari argue that they were all revolutionary abstract machines (Deleuze 2006, 233; 
Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 100). 
 But the condition for a revolution works like an abstract machine not only in the 
sense that it is singular, but also in the sense that it is the self-referential basis by which the 
body politic legitimates its own existence. Without reference to a transcendent political 
power (God, Social Contract, Natural Right, Profit, etc.) to justify its emergence, the 
condition for a revolutionary body refers only to itself  as the guarantor of  its own existence 
and must be continually reaffirmed. “As concept and as event,” Deleuze and Guattari say, 
“revolution, is self-referential or enjoys a self-positing that enables it to be apprehended in an 
immanent enthusiasm without anything in states of  affairs or lived experience being able to 
tone it down” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 101). While representational political bodies 
presuppose the necessary and natural unity of  their social bodies, revolutionary political 
conditions, as contingent and self-referential, change in nature each time a new kind of  
element or agency effects a “redeployment” of  them, like a perpetually remade political 
feedback loop.6 “The possible,” contrary to the identical, Deleuze says, “does not pre-exist, it 
is created by the event. It is a matter of  life. The event creates a new existence, it produces a 
new subjectivity (new relations with the body, with time, sexuality, the immediate 
surroundings, with culture, work)” (2006, 234). The condition of  a revolutionary body 
politic is thus an abstract machine insofar as it is singular, self-supported, and allows for 
“new space-times” and new subjectivities antagonistic to representational power to emerge 
(1995, 172).  
 But the condition for a revolutionary body politic is also “a local absolute.” That is, “an 
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6 “In physics, Ilya Prigogine spoke of  states in which the slightest differences persist rather than cancel 
themselves out, and where independent phenomena inter-resonate” (Deleuze 2006, 233). 
absolute that is manifested locally, and engendered in a series of  local operations of  varying 
orientations,” as Deleuze and Guattari say of  revolutionary abstract machines. It is a 
singular-universal (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 382) or point of  “absolute survey” (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1994, 100) whose origins are contingent and local but whose consequences are 
potentially infinite. As such, a revolutionary body politic is radically inclusive of  anyone who 
wants to participate under its mutable and re-interpretable conditions, but only insofar as 
such participation changes the nature of  the entire assemblage.7 The absolute of  this 
abstract machine then, should not be confused with the absolutes or universals of  identity 
that remain the same (and pre-given) while only adding on an increasing number of  axioms 
or elements to be represented as in representational democracies and market economies. 
Rather, when Deleuze and Guattari speak of  a “devenir tout le monde,” “becoming-everybody/
everything” of  revolution (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 470), what this means is that 
everybody and everything may participate in an effectuation and transformation of  a 
revolution to the degree that they are also transformed by it and as they “respond to the 
demands of  the event.” (Deleuze 2006, 234). 
 Thus, the condition for participation in a revolutionary body politic is an abstract 
machine in the sense that it is a singular, self-referential, inclusive, and absolute. Its 
contingent and local emergence, can, with only itself  as its support, bring about inclusive 
and infinite consequences without representation or pre-given criteria or exclusion like a 
territory, state, or market, etc.. A condition for participation thus does not merely allow for 
the possibility that everyone may become other than they are, it names a singular and 
absolute condition under which everyone can participate in and shape the creation of  
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7 “Contingent holism sees the social world as composed of  practices that intersect with and affect one another 
(although not every practice intersects with every other practice), that change over time, that form the 
parameters within which we understand ourselves and our world, but that do not offer a foundation from 
which the world can be exhaustively or indubitably understood” (May 1997, 34).
another world alongside the old. It “posit[s] revolution as a plane of  immanence,” Deleuze 
and Guattari say, “infinite movement and absolute survey, but [only] to the extent that [its] 
features connect up with what is real here and now in the struggle against capitalism, 
relaunching new struggles whenever the earlier one is betrayed” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 
100).
(2) A Revolutionary Abstract Machine Is the “Degree Zero” of  its Body Politic
 The condition of  a revolutionary body politic, or what Deleuze and Guattari call its 
abstract machine, also marks the most minimal degree of  existence within the body politic. 
In the sense that an emerging revolutionary condition or event is singular, it is not 
representable within the normal state of  affairs. Because of  this relative invisibility Deleuze 
and Guattari say that such an abstract machine marks a “degree zero” or is the “most 
deterritorialized element” in the political arrangement (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 157). But 
this condition does not indicate a mere potential for transformation as such that cannot be 
realized in any particular transformation or whose realizations are only betrayals or ironies. 
This “zero degree” bears a particular name such that a political field can begin to gain 
consistency around it, creating a “vortex,” or site of  “circulating reference” (Latour 1999), 
like Lenin, the Paris Commune, etc. 
 Political consistency, according to Deleuze and Guattari, thus requires not only a self-
referential condition for its beginning but it also requires this beginning point bear some sort 
of  marker to indicate its non-appearance from the perspective of  the dominant political 
arrangement of  laws and markets. But the abstract machine is also invisible from within its 
own political arrangement. No one knows entirely what it is or what it is capable of  doing. 
This is why Deleuze and Guattari call it an “abstract” machine. A revolutionary condition is 
similarly “abstract” in the sense that it does not appear as a concrete “thing.” May 1968 was 
not a thing. From the perspective of  the state, May 1968 did not mark the necessity of  a new 
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non-statist, non-capitalist politics. It was a problem to be resolved into the state. Even from 
the perspective of  those who were committed to the event, May, 1968 was not a thing that 
ever appeared in full light. It was a real and contested moment whose name brought together 
a host of  previously marginalized political desires. It is in this sense that Deleuze and 
Guattari say that the abstract machine is that, “which at every instant causes the given to be 
given, in this or that state, at this or that moment. But . . . itself  is not given” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987, 265). Not, however, as in “a dream, something that is not realized or that is 
only realized by betraying itself,” but rather as a “Real-Abstract . . . that is neither 
undifferentiated nor transcendent (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 142). 
 A revolutionary condition is thus an abstract machine in the sense that it is both 
now-here and no-where (a play on Samuel Butler’s utopian neologism Erewhon). It is “a 
revolutionary machine,” Deleuze and Guattari say, “all the more abstract for being 
real” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 512). Politically, the abstract machine is the very limit 
“Chiffre,” “cipher” that marks the border line or threshold between the dominant state of  
affairs and the existence of  a new world (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 390). A revolutionary 
condition is thus a Zero, “but,” Deleuze and Guattari say, “there is nothing negative about 
that Zero” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 153). It is “positive” insofar as it indicates the reality 
of  the conditions for a new world. 
(3) A Revolutionary Abstract Machine Supports a Conjunction of  Concrete Elements
 So far I have argued that the conditions of  sustaining a revolutionary political body, 
following Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of  the consistent abstract machine, are (1) that its 
emergence be contingent and heterogenous to all forms of  political representation; (2) that it 
legitimate its emergence with reference only to itself; and (3) that it indicate a degree of  real 
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non-appearance within the concrete situation.8 But the abstract machine of  a consistent 
revolutionary body also supports a “conjunction, combination, and continuum,” of  all the 
concrete “degrees of  deterritorialization”9 that it conditions.10 An abstract machine does not 
represent the concrete elements or degrees of  deterritorialization that it conditions. It does 
not stand in or speak for them, nor does it indicate their pure becoming. Rather, the abstract 
machine has no existence independent of  the concrete degrees of  positive 
deterritorialization that it combines together. The abstract machine acts as an attractor or 
horizon around which concrete actions and agents circulate, contest, and transform it.11 
Where there is a whole swarm of  heterogenous political grievances, problems, and crises in 
power (kinds of  deterritorialized elements), a revolutionary political body, like an abstract 
machine, acts as a mobile and flexible point or proper name like “Zapatismo” or “Peoples 
Global Action” around which diverse groups and grievances can coalesce and take collective 
action.  
 As such, Deleuze and Guattari say, the abstract machine “causes the other element[s 
it conditions] to cross a threshold enabling a conjunction of  their respective 
deterritorializations, a shared acceleration. This is the abstract machine's absolute, positive 
deterritorialization” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 142). A conjunction of  deterritorialization 
for Deleuze and Guattari simply means an intercalation or “ordering without hierarchy” of  
heterogeneous elements within a consistent political arrangement (Deleuze and Guattari 
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8 The condition for a revolutionary political body is not only self-referential as witnessed in claims of  political 
autonomy like “we are autonomous because we are autonomous” but it is also minimally marked in its real-
abstract non-appearance (cipher or degree zero) as we witness in political claims like “we are nowhere, but we 
are everywhere.”
9 See the next section of  this chapter on “the degrees of  deterritorialization” within the consistency of  the 
concrete machinic assemblage. 
10 See chapter III.
11 As Deleuze and Guattari say, the abstract machine “crosscuts the chaotic variability and gives it consistency 
(reality). . . . It refers back to chaos rendered consistent” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 208).
1994, 90).12 It is what allows radically heterogenous political elements to all be equally 
constitutive of  an event even if  that event is changed by this variable constitution. Similarly, 
what revolutionary practices have “in common” is only their relative differentiation from the 
condition they continue to transform. The conjunction of  a revolutionary condition, like an 
abstract machine, is thus what “transforms the respective indexes into absolute 
values” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 71), and gives multiple concrete elements a specific field 
of  immanent practice without external reference to territory, state, or capital. A 
revolutionary body politic does not represent anything, it acts as a mutable and contested 
marker around which various deterritorialized elements combine and take on consistency. 
(4) A Revolutionary Abstract Machine has a Proper Name and Date
 Finally, the condition for a revolutionary body politic has a proper name and date 
that acts as a shared and contested common ground for diverse struggles. We can see this in 
Deleuze and Guattari’s description of  this kind of  abstract machine.
 The abstract machine is always singular, designated by the proper name of  a group 
 or individual, while the assemblage of  enunciation is always collective, in the 
 individual as in the group. The Lenin abstract machine, and the Bolshevik collective 
 assemblage. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 100)
And further,
Abstract, singular, and creative, here and now, real yet nonconcrete, actual yet 
noneffectuated—that is why abstract machines are dated and named (the Einstein 
abstract machine, the Webern abstract machine, but also the Galileo, the Bach, or the 
Beethoven, etc.). (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 511) 
 The abstract machine, according to Deleuze and Guattari is an “asignifying proper 
name” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 28) that works within a logic of  collective action to 
“designate something that is of  the order of  the event, of  becoming or of  the 
haecceity” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 264), like the name of  a military operation or the 
name of  a hurricane. Proper names do not “represent” or stand-in for something else, they 
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12 This was explored in depth in chapter III.
are instead the markers of  a real yet nonconcrete, actual yet noneffectuated, event whose 
being is nothing more than all of  the affects, elements, and agencies that constitute it. 
“Effects,” Deleuze and Guattari say “that are not a mere dependence on causes, but the 
occupation of  a domain, and the operation of  a system of  signs” (1983, 86). 
 This is why Deleuze and Guattari write A Thousand Plateaus as a series of  abstract 
machines, planes, or plateaus instead of  chapters; each chapter/plateau is given a name, a 
date, and an image or placard at the beginning to mark its distribution of  “asignification.” 
The subsequent pages of  the plateau are then the concrete assemblages that effectuate this 
proper name. But all this only raises the question of  how such a real nonconcrete 
revolutionary machine is concretely effectuated. 
The Revolutionary Concrete Machinic Assemblage
 In the previous section I showed how it is possible to conceive of  a political 
condition for a revolutionary body politic that is based neither on representation or anti-
representation, but upon what Deleuze and Guattari call consistency and what I am calling 
participatory politics. If  we are to truly renew the concept of  revolution today the 
conditions of  a revolutionary body politic can no longer be the static and relatively 
immutable ones of  territorial borders, contracts and rights of  the sovereign state, or even the 
unpredictable fluctuations of  the world market. Nor should we simply reject all political 
conditions outright. Rather, what I am proposing instead is that we conceive of  an 
alternative social order or revolutionary body politic based on a maximum degree of  
feedback and mutual transformation between the conditions, elements, and agencies that 
constitute it.      
 Thus in order to understand how a revolutionary body politic works we need to 
understand not only how its conditions work but we need to understand how the concrete 
elements that articulate and realize this condition work. This is the task of  the present 
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section. By “elements” I mean all the the actions, weapons, tools, interventions, slogans, 
demands, and occupations that come together to create a revolutionary sequence. A 
revolutionary body politic has no existence independent of  these concrete deployments. 
 Given the previously argued dangers confronting representational and anti-
representational body politics, I propose instead in this section an alternative concept of  
political elements that is non-hierarchal, but is still ordered and mutually transformative of  
the body politic. This kind of  determinate but flexible political effectuation in a body politic 
is what Deleuze and Guattari call, a revolutionary concrete assemblage. A revolutionary 
concrete assemblage, Deleuze and Guattari say, is characterized by three distinct features, 
each of  which I argue can help us understand the elements of  a revolutionary body politic.
(1) A Revolutionary Concrete Assemblage Effectuates an Abstract Machine
 A revolutionary body politic has a real but abstract condition that does not appear as a 
concrete thing within the dominant matrix of  political power or even within the 
revolutionary body itself. Thus, what still needs to be explained is how a revolutionary body 
politic is effectuated in a variety of  different concrete expressions (practices, slogans, actions, 
institutions, etc.). These are what, I am arguing, Deleuze and Guattari call concrete or 
collective assemblages. But these concrete effectuations are not ordered in a hierarchy with 
either an identity (territory, state, or market) at the top or with a radical difference at the 
bottom. Rather, following Deleuze and Guattari, the concrete elements that effectuate a 
revolutionary condition are deployed in various degrees of  intensity that react back on their 
own conditions for effectuation. Thus, the body politic is always undergoing a continual 
transformation: a participatory feedback loop. But we should not let this feedback loop 
obscure the difference between the abstract and concrete machinic assemblage. “The machinic 
assemblage,” Deleuze and Guattari say “is something entirely different from the abstract 
machine.” But there is still a “coadaptation” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 71) or reciprocal 
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presupposition of  the two (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 77) that allows for “an acentered, 
[and] nonhierarchical,” participatory transformation (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 21). 
In every respect, machinic assemblages effectuate the abstract machine insofar as it is 
developed on the plane of  consistency or enveloped in a stratum. The most 
important problem of  all: given a certain machinic assemblage, what is its relation of 
effectuation with the abstract machine? How does it effectuate it, with what 
adequation? Classify assemblages. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 71)
 It is never possible to decide once and for all, or in advance, given a certain machinic 
assemblage, who is and who is not an ally or enemy of  the revolution or what relation they 
have to the abstract machine. This is because a revolutionary political body is continually 
undergoing a transformation in its abstract condition and its concrete elements. Thus, 
Deleuze and Guattari’s insistence that determining their relationship is the most important 
problem of  all. It is a question that must be continually answered, transformed, and 
reanswered. What are the aims of  the revolution in the short term, mid term, long term, 
how should we effectuate it in a certain situation, what supports the revolution, what is 
hindering it, and what is irrelevant to it? 
 Unlike “arbitrary or inconsistent [elements],” Deleuze and Guattari say, “[that] do 
not hold up for an instant,” “concrete assemblages [are] like the configurations of  a 
machine,” that give it its degrees of  consistency (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 3). “The plane 
[of  immanence]” then “is the abstract machine of  which these assemblages are the working 
parts” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 36). To expand this concept to revolutionary praxis, the 
concrete elements of  a revolutionary political body like its slogans, demonstrations, 
demands, actions, and occupations are transformed by their condition no less than they 
transform that condition.13 Thus, they cannot be understood as “normative” or “goal-
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13 This is the meaning of  the body without organs. Its not that the body of  the abstract machine has no 
concrete organs at all. Its just that these concrete organs do not come pre-organized. There is no static political 
image that organizes the organs of  the political body in advance. The revolutionary body without organs is 
constantly re-orgnanizing its organs in a process of  continual and participatory transformation. 
driven” effectuations that merely follow out prescriptive conditions (laws, demands for 
profit, etc.). But neither should such mutual transformations be mistaken for a kind of  
pragmatic “revisionism” where a hypothesis is “tested,” found to work or not work, and 
then rationally (or otherwise) revised accordingly, thus grounding a narrative of  political 
“progress”.14 
 Rather, the politics of  consistency is revolutionary in the sense that instead of  
applying solutions to pre-given problems (how to make sure everyone is represented fairly in 
a presupposed state, for example), or simply affirming that “other problems are possible,” 
particular problems themselves are transformed directly by those who effectuate them and 
who are affected by them. “When people demand to formulate their problems themselves,” 
Deleuze and Guattari say “and to determine at least the particular conditions under which 
they can receive a more general solution,” there is a politics of  consistency: a direct 
participation without representation or mediation (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 471). This kind 
of  participation and self-management thus offers a political alternative absolutely 
incompatible with territorial hierarchies based ethnic lineage, state hierarchies (both liberal 
and socialist) based sovereign right, and capitalist hierarchies based on wealth and private 
property. 
(2) A Revolutionary Concrete Assemblage Creates an Endoconsistency
 A revolutionary body politic marks a break with representational power and creates 
an evental condition that combines a new set of  concrete practices. These practices then 
turn back on and transform their condition in a social order of  participatory feedback. But 
according to Deleuze and Guattari, these machinic assemblages or, what I am arguing are the 
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14 “Belief, sheer, direct, unmitigated personal belief, reappears as the working hypothesis; action which at once 
develops and tests belief  reappears as experimentation, deduction, demonstration; while the machinery of  
universals, axioms, a priori truths, etc., is the systematization of  the of  the way in which men have always 
worked out, in anticipation of  overt action, the implications of  their beliefs with a view to revising them in the 
interests of  obviating the unfavorable, and of  securing the welcome consequences” (Dewey 1906, 124).
concrete practices of  a revolutionary body, also create an internal consistency of  their own 
within this revolutionary body. How do we determine which concrete practices are more or 
less part of  the same struggle, sequence, alliance, etc.? And in what sense do they function in 
a political “ordering without hierarchy,” or an “equality without homogenization,” as 
Deleuze and Guattari say?  
 The concrete machinic assemblage, according to Deleuze and Guattari, has an 
internal or endoconsistency that “renders components inseparable within itself.” “There is,” 
they say, “an area ab that belongs to both a and b, where a and b ‘become’ indiscernible. 
These zones, thresholds, or becomings, this inseparability defines the internal consistency” 
of  the arrangement (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 20). In terms of  a revolutionary political 
body, this simply means that its concrete practices are dependent and inseparable in varying 
relations and to greater or lesser degrees. Thus, no concrete practice acts independently 
without effecting certain others. Since, as was previously argued, there is no transcendent or 
external guarantee in historical necessity, God, reason, the state, etc. for the legitimacy of  
such a revolutionary body, and the abstract machine has no existence outside its concrete 
effectuations, then these concrete effectuations are bound to the body politic only by their 
immanent relationship: their internal consistency. “As fragmentary totalities,” Deleuze and 
Guattari say, concrete machines “are not even the pieces of  a puzzle, for their irregular 
contours do not correspond to each other. They do, however, “form a wall, but it is a dry-
stone wall, and everything holds together only along diverging lines” (Deleuze and Guattari 
1994, 16–17). Accordingly, Deleuze and Guattari say, the concrete machine “has no 
reference; it is self-referential; it posits itself  and its object at the same time as it is 
created” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 22). 
 It is one thing to evade the hierarchy of  representational political bodies by creating 
an inseparability, becoming, or generic equality of  elements within a political event, but such 
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an affirmation, while important, is not sufficient for elucidating the ordered relationship 
between such elements. Similarly, within a revolutionary political body not all of  its concrete 
practices will be equally important. Political revolution may be “a question of  consistency: the 
‘holding together’ of  heterogeneous elements,” but it is also a question of  creating a variable 
social order (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 323). 
 Thus, Deleuze and Guattari say of  the concrete assemblage that it is “a synthesis of  
disparate elements, defined only by a degree of  consistency that makes it possible to 
distinguish the disparate elements constituting that aggregate (discernibility)” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987, 344). These discernible degrees, or “individuals” can then “enter into 
composition with other degrees, other intensities, to form another individual” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987, 253). All of  which are arranged “according to this or that degree of  
deterritorialization” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 100) whose “orderings without hierarchy” 
can be consistently discerned within the arrangement (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 90). The 
more positively deterritorialized or differentiated a concrete element is the less strongly it 
appears or consists in the political arrangement and the closer to the zero degree or abstract 
machine it becomes. The “less” deterritorialized it is the more strongly it appears and 
consists in the dominant political arrangement and the closer it comes to creating a political 
unity.15 Similarly, a revolutionary body politic creates a non-hierarchal order in the sense that 
it is not a causal order, or an order of  power over any one or thing, but in the sense that 
some practices in the social body are more important or are at greater risk of  co-optation by 
power. A revolutionary body aims to increase its degrees of  deterritorialization against 
power while also connecting, sustaining, and defending the greater degrees that have already 
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15 The difference between deterritorialization as “the degrees of  shared acceleration of  heterogeneous 
components on a plane of  consistency,” territorialization as “the degrees of  coding and primitive unity on the 
plane of  organization” and reterritorialization as “the degrees of  overcoding and axioms on the plane of  
organization” was developed in chapter III. “With the nomad…it is deterritorialization that constitutes the 
relation to the earth, to such a degree that the nomad reterritorializes on deterritorialization itself. It is the earth 
that deterritorializes itself, in a way that provides the nomad with a territory” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 381).
been liberated.  
 These degrees of  deterritorialized consistency, according to Deleuze and Guattari, 
are then bounded by two limits: a pessimal threshold, or degree zero, after which consistency 
is broken down or dissipated into inconsistency, and a maximal limit, after which it is 
exploded or totalized under something else like a form of  representation. In between 
inconsistency and representation there is thus the consistency of  degrees of  positive 
deterritorialization. Just as a tick’s power, Deleuze and Guattari say, is “bounded by two 
limits: the optimal limit of  the feast after which it dies, and the pessimal limit of  the fast as it 
waits,” there is a minimal threshold of  revolution where popular support, enthusiasm, or 
commitment wane to such a degree that its consistency is lost, and there is a maximal limit 
after which it becomes reterritorialized into the party or state apparatus (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987, 257). The aim of  a revolutionary consistency is accordingly to occupy and 
populate the middle with new elements, institutions, and agencies. There is thus a non-
hierarchical equality of  elements (qua effectuations of  the event), and a non-homogenous 
diversity of  elements (qua degree to which they consist in an arrangement). Elements are not 
ranked by how they affirm a presupposed identity or difference in-itself, but are locally and 
non-hierarchically ordered to the degree they create a strong or weak consistency of  a 
specific event.    
(3) A Revolutionary Concrete Assemblage Creates an Exoconsistency
 A revolutionary political body not only creates an internal consistency of  its concrete 
practices but it also creates an external consistency that connects it to other elements outside 
itself. Deleuze and Guattari call this the exoconsistency of  the concrete assemblage. 
Its internal neighborhood or consistency is secured by the connection of  its 
components in zones of  indiscernibility; its external neighborhood or exoconsistency 
is secured by the bridges thrown from one [machine] to another when the components 
of  one of  them are saturated. . . [but,] we can no longer add or withdraw a component 
without changing the nature of  the [assemblage]. (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 90)
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Similarly, a revolutionary body politic of  concrete practices not only includes those who 
participate in its internal transformation, but also aims to include others not already part of  
the struggle. That is, revolution is both inclusive and expansive. It has the capacity for 
internal transformation and external growth beyond its local construction. 
The Revolutionary Political Persona
 So far I have argued that we use Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of  consistency, 
composed of  an abstract machine and concrete assemblage, to understand the participatory 
process that forms the basis of  a revolutionary political body distinct from both 
representational and anti-representational bodies politic. The condition of  a revolutionary 
body politic is an abstract machine in the sense that it is singular, inclusive, and absolute in 
its consequences. The concrete elements of  a revolutionary body politic compose a machinic 
assemblage in the sense that they effectuate and transform their conditions, create a non-
hierarchical but ordered internal consistency, and expand this to include others. But we have 
not yet seen how Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of  personae can be expanded from its 
limited use in What is Philosophy? and become relevant for revolutionary praxis. This is the 
task of  the present section. 
 The concept of  a revolutionary subject poses two problems. On the one hand the 
subject can be understood as a unified and identical basis from which to exercise a freedom 
of expression or a freedom from domination. The problem was that such a subject itself cannot 
change what it is, only act for or against something via the pre-given self  of  contemplation 
modeled after various forms of  political representation (territory, state, capital). On the other 
hand the subject can be understood as a capacity for the transformation of  subjectivity as 
such. But this notion allows for subjectivity only by dispersing its agency into a pure 
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potentiality. In what follows I would like to propose instead a third theory of  revolutionary 
subjectivity drawn from Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of  conceptual personae.16
 Against Peter Hallward’s claim that Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of  subjectivity is  
“derivative” or “dissolved into the imperative of  creativity as such” (2006, 163), I argue 
instead that by expanding their concept of  the persona we can articulate a theory of  
revolutionary subjectivity defined by the “intervention of  a local operator” who connects the 
conditions of  a revolutionary body to its concrete consequences (Deleuze and Guattari 
1994, 75). Personae are not subjects of  experience, rational reflection, discourse, 
representation, or difference/creativity in-itself. They do not transcend political bodies in 
any way. Rather they are subjects of  and within a political body. They function as the internal 
process of  connection between its abstract conditions and concrete effectuations. A persona, 
Deleuze and Guattari say, is characterized by three distinct features, each of  which I argue 
can help us understand revolutionary subjectivity. 
(1) A Revolutionary Persona Makes an Immanent Intervention in the Body Politic 
 A revolutionary body politic is a continually transformed condition and set of  
concrete practices but it is the revolutionary subject that connects the two together. The 
connection between a revolutionary condition and its consequences, however, is a conflictual 
process because, as Deleuze and Guattari say of  persona,
 There are types of  persona according to the possibilities of  even their hostile 
 encounters on the same plane  and in a group. But it is often difficult to determine if  
 it is the same group, the same type, or the same family. (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 
 77)
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16 “It definitely makes sense to look at the various ways individuals and groups constitute themselves as subjects 
through processes of  subjectification: what counts in such processes is the extent to which, as they take shape, 
they elude both established forms of  knowledge and the dominant forms of  power. Even if  they in turn 
engender new forms of  power or become assimilated into new forms of  knowledge. For a while, though, they 
have a real rebellious spontaneity. This is nothing to do with going back to ‘the subject,’ that is, to something 
invested with duties, power, and knowledge. One might equally well speak of  new kinds of  event, rather than 
processes of  subjectification: events that can’t be explained by the situations that give rise to them, or into 
which they lead” (Deleuze 1995, 176).
Even within the same body politic there are different types of  persona or subjects who 
contest the order and consequences of  its territories, deterritorializations, and 
reterritorializations in the social field. These form, Deleuze and Guattari say,
inextricable knots in which the three movements are mixed up so that, in order to 
disentangle them, we have to diagnose real types or personae. The merchant buys in 
a territory, deterritorializes products into commodities, and is reterritorialized on 
commercial circuits. In capitalism, capital or property is deterritorialized, ceases to be 
landed, and is reterritorialized on the means of  production; whereas labor becomes 
"abstract" labor, reterritorialized in wages: this is why Marx not only speaks of  
capital and labor but feels the need to draw up some true psychosocial types, both 
antipathetic and sympathetic: the capitalist, the proletarian.” (Deleuze and Guattari 
1994, 68)
 According to Deleuze and Guattari, the personae that Marx draws up are not self-
knowing subjects, independent from the processes of  deterritorialization and 
reterritorialization, who decide what is beneficial or harmful as such outside of  larger social 
bodies. Nor are they entirely absorbed into the pure processes of  transformation. Rather the 
“proletarian” and the “capitalist” are specific personae or “‘terminals’ of  a whole group of  
social assemblages” that locate, distinguish, and connect various political practices to and 
through the social body (Guattari 2008, 371). That is, their subjectivity is not essentially 
conscious, rational, emotional, embodied, experiential, or grounded in any other 
transcendental monolith. Rather, persona exist immanent to their social body. 
 Expanding on Deleuze and Guattari’s example of  Marxism we can see the use of  
this notion for understanding  a distinctly revolutionary kind of  subjectivity. The political 
persona of  the “proletarian” is Marx’s subject of  revolutionary praxis. Passing back and 
forth between the specific (maximally deterritorialized) abstract machine of  “Labor” and 
locating the (deterritorialized degrees) of  concrete “worker-assemblages” composed of  
various slogans, direct actions, factory reclamations, and self-management efforts, is the 
persona of  the “proletarian.” Without reflection, contemplation, or communication, a 
revolutionary subjectivity intervenes within a process of  political representation and 
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connects degrees of  deterritorialized labor to each other (self-management) while warding off  
the reterritorializations of  private property and capital. Thus the role of  political persona, 
according to Deleuze and Guattari, is to “make perceptible, in the most insignificant or most 
important circumstances, the formation of  territories, the vectors of  deterritorialization, and 
the process of  reterritorialization” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 68). A political persona is 
thus revolutionary insofar as it determines where a political body forms territories, 
deterritorializes those territories, connects those deterritorialized elements to each other, and 
avoids reterritorialization by various forms of  political representation. 
 Like a runner, or intercessor, Deleuze and Guattari say, the “persona is needed to 
relate concepts on the plane, just as the plane itself  needs to be laid out (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1994, 64, 81). But these two operations do not merge in the persona, which itself  
appears as a distinct operator” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 76). Thus, far from being 
dissolved into an affirmation of  pure transformation (or negative deterritorialization), as 
Peter Hallward has suggested of  Deleuze’s earlier theory of  agency, Deleuze and Guattari’s 
theory of  political personae is based on two specific interventions: (1) the laying out of  an 
abstract machine and (2) the connection of  it to the concrete machines that populate it.          
 Herein lies the difficulty: one cannot have a revolutionary subjectivity without a 
revolution, but one cannot have a revolution without subjects that bring it about. Deleuze 
and Guattari’s solution to this problem, however, is to suggest that both interventions occur 
simultaneously in the mutual presupposition of  the other; problem and solution are co-given 
they say (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 78, 82). “Sometimes,” Deleuze and Guattari say, “the 
persona seems to precede the plane, sometimes to come after it—that is, it appears twice; it 
intervenes twice” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 75). On the one hand the political persona 
extracts the determinations of  the abstract machine, “as if  it seizes a handful of  dice from 
chance so as to throw them on the table,” and on the other hand establishes a 
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correspondence between each throw of  the dice and the components that occupy this or 
that region of  the table (the concrete assemblages) (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 75). Since, 
for Deleuze and Guattari “there are only immanent criteria” in revolutions, the political 
personae of  these movements are also immanent to these criteria in their expression of  
them (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 74). 
 The persona’s dedication to these mutually determining criteria thus forms the 
structure of  political “commitment” or “belief.” “Persona concern those who believe in the 
world,” Deleuze and Guattari say, not in the existence of  the world as a thing but in its 
particular possibilities and intensities, so as once again to give birth to new modes of  
existence (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 74). In “Control and Becoming,” an interview with 
Deleuze, Antonio Negri asks Deleuze what he thinks the political consequences of  his 
conception of  the subject will be for a new militant pragmatism. Deleuze responds by saying 
that, “What we most lack is a belief  in the world, we’ve quite lost the world, its been taken 
from us. If  you believe in the world you precipitate events, however inconspicuous, that 
elude control, you engender new space-times however small their surface or volume” (1995, 
176). Political personae are exactly this immanent belief  in a new world that is both “now-
here,” in the concrete machines used to effectuate the abstract machine, and “no-where,” in 
the abstract machine that is continually being transformed. Personae, as revolutionary 
subjects, are thus committed to the creation of  new modes of  existence, no matter how 
small, that will connect up with others to construct a new revolutionary political body.
(2) A Revolutionary Persona has Different Features 
 Revolutionary political personae do not have psychological or personological traits 
based on the subjective identity of  consciousness nor are they merely fractured or dissolved 
“egos.” Rather, according to Deleuze and Guattari, they have distinct pathic, relational, 
dynamic, juridical, and existential features. Revolutionary personae thus create specifically 
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different kinds of  consistencies and relations among concrete and abstract machines. 
Deleuze and Guattari discuss, in What is Philosophy?, several different features of  some of  
these personae in the history of  philosophy that I would like to expand and explicitly 
politicize in this section (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 71). But before developing each of  
these features in turn, however, it is important to note the limitations of  this typology as well 
as clarify the lack of  any pretension to an exhaustive universal list of  political personae. As 
Deleuze and Guattari say, “no list of  the features of  conceptual personae can be exhaustive, 
since they are constantly arising and vary with planes of  immanence. On a given plane, 
different kinds of  features are mixed together to make up a persona” (Deleuze and Guattari 
1994, 70). Personae are not unified static beings without conflict, nor do they fit any 
exhaustive list made of  their types. Accordingly, it is not “always easy to decide which, at a 
given moment in a given society, are the good types” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 68). 
Despite the difficulty, the task of  articulating them remains an important practice, more a 
creation or participation than a representation. 
 First, political personae have pathic features: 
The Idiot, the one who wants to think for himself  and is a persona who can change 
and take on another meaning. But also the Madman, a cataleptic thinker or 
“mummy” who discovers in thought an inability to think; or a great maniac, someone 
frenzied, who is in search of  that which precedes thought, an Already-there, but at 
the very heart of  thought itself. (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 70)
These pathic personae have certain passions, dispositions, or sufferings in a political domain 
that affect the kinds of  connections they make in it. These can be helpful for understanding 
the pathic features of  revolutionary political personae: the revolutionary pessimist who 
demands only the impossible in order to maintain moral superiority; the defeatist who, like a 
“mummy” discovers in the revolution the hopelessness of  all collective action; or even the 
frenzied activist driven by guilt to constantly be “taking action.” 
 Second, political personae have relational features:
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“The Friend,” but a friend who has a relationship with his friend only through the 
thing loved, which brings rivalry. The "Claimant" and the "Rival" quarrel over the 
thing or the concept. (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 71)
Personae can be defined in terms of  their relationships with other personae. Consider the 
political persona of  the “Compa,” in Zapatismo. The compa has a relationship with another 
compa only insofar as both are struggling for similar conditions, principles, or specific actions. 
This brings conflict over the “aims of  the revolution” or how best to achieve them. The 
“Revolutionary” and the “Reactionary” then quarrel over the ends or means of  the struggle.   
 Third, personae have dynamic features insofar as they undergo transformation or 
movement:
If  moving forward, climbing, and descending are dynamisms of  conceptual 
personae, then leaping like Kierkegaard, dancing like Nietzsche, and diving like 
Melville are others for philosophical athletes irreducible to one another. (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1994, 71)
In terms of  political personae we might consider direct action, sabotage, and mass 
demonstration (among others) as kinds of  group-subject dynamisms. Retreating, 
compromising, occupying, hiding, attacking, defending, and organizing can all be considered 
dynamisms of  political personae. The subterfuge of  Subcomandante Marcos, the negotiations of 
the San Andres Accords, the teaching at the Zapatista Autonomous Schools, are all dynamic 
features of  the compas.
 Fourth, political personae have juridical features insofar as collective actions “lay claim 
to what belongs to them by right and, from the time of  the pre-Socratics, have confronted 
Justice” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 72). But Deleuze and Guattari do not have in mind a 
transcendent conception of  judgment by Law or Values or even the virtue of  conscience. 
Rather the juridical features of  political personae are mergers of  judge and innocent where 
judgment takes place within the purely immanent criteria of  evental existence (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1994, 72). Immanent justice may mean beyond Good and Evil, but it does not 
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mean beyond good and bad. Consider the Caracoles and people’s courts of  Zapatista territory. 
Rather than being informally judged by the juridical-army (EZLN), the village people of  
these territories have begun rotational participation in people’s courts in order to respond to 
legal issues of  drug and human trafficking, non-regional use of  forest materials, and various 
community disputes they lay claim to by their own right: by autonomy. Community members 
(both men and women) take turns learning how to use these juridical features immanent to 
the values and laws they have established independently from the Mexican government or 
corporate interests over the resources of  their land.   
 Finally, political personae have existential features: the small aspects of  daily life 
compose the significance of  political struggle. Deleuze and Guattari provide an example 
from the history of  philosophy: “is not Kant’s stocking-suspender a vital anecdote 
appropriate to the system of  Reason?” they suggest. And Spinoza’s liking for battles between 
spiders due to the relations of  the modes in the Ethics (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 72–73)? 
Might we also consider the importance of  Lenin’s taste in music, Marcos’ use of  poetry and 
art, or Marx’s health problems, or the compas taste for pozol (a fermented maize porridge), etc? 
How do these features contribute to the functioning of  the personae and the effectuation of 
the event?
 While there are certainly many more features to political personae, it remains an 
important part of  a theory of  revolutionary subjectivity to be able to articulate how and to 
what degree the different kinds of  personae work and relate to each other within a particular 
domain, rather than simply affirming their capacity to become other. 
No rule, and above all no discussion, will say in advance whether this is the good 
plane, the good persona, or the good concept; for each of  them determines if  the 
other two have succeeded or not, but each must be constructed on its own account
—one created, one invented, and the other laid out. Problems and solutions are 
constructed about which we can say, "Failure ... Success ... ," but only as we go along 
and on the basis of  their coadaptations. (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 82)
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(3) A Revolutionary Persona Operates in the Third Person  
 A revolutionary body politic has various types of  subjectivity that contest and 
participate in the direct transformation of  its conditions and consequences. But these 
personae do not act or speak from the perspective of  an autonomous self  in the first person, 
they operate as agents immanent to a revolutionary body politic in the third person (He, She, 
They) and the indefinite (One, Everyone, Anyone, etc.). While the first person generally 
indicates a self-conscious subject of  enunciation who makes decisions on a political 
arrangement independent from it, and the second person designates the projection of  the 
first, the third person persona indicates an indefinite group-subject always in co-adaptation 
with the body politic. In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari say,
We believe… that the third person indefinite, HE, THEY, implies no 
indetermination from this point of  view; it ties the statement to a collective 
agencement, as its necessary condition, rather than to a subject of  the enunciation. 
Blanchot is correct in saying that ONE and HE—one is dying, he is unhappy—in no 
way take the place of  the subject, but instead do away with any subject in favor of  an 
agencement of  the haecceity type that carries or brings out the event insofar as it is 
unformed and incapable of  being effectuated by persons (“something happens to 
them that they can only get a grip on again by letting go of  their ability to say I”). 
The HE does not represent a subject but rather makes a diagram of  an agencement. 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 265)
 Thus, opposed to the “indetermination” of  a pure potential for transformation, or 
the representational first person of  enunciation (based on contemplation, reflection, and 
communication), the third person effectuates or makes a diagram of  the event, immanent 
only to the collective assemblage. Personae are “indefinite” in the sense that they are not 
persons independent from the event who, look on, judge, and make decisions about how it 
should proceed, but they are “determinate” in the sense that they are indicated by a third 
person that is tied to a collective agencement. The persona is thus never a person or 
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consciousness but rather an inseparable “they,” or “everyone” effecting a becoming, folding, 
or co-adaptation of  the abstract and concrete machines. 
 “I won’t say I anymore,” Deleuze and Guattari say in Anti-Oedipus, “I’ll never utter 
the word again; it’s just too damn stupid. Every time I hear it, I’ll use the third person 
instead” (1983, 23). The irony of  this quote aside, the important point is not so much that 
the first person pronoun, “I” is never uttered again, but that the speech acts of  personae 
always be considered as most primarily “speech act[s] in the third person where it is always 
the conceptual persona who says, ‘I’” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 64). It is not the case that 
the first and second person pronouns, “I” or “You,” have no meaning; rather, the point is 
that they are derived or conditioned on a more primary third persona of  the event. “I” and 
“You” function as different features of political events that engage in negotiation and conflict 
immanent to the collective assemblage at hand, not as features of  an independent 
consciousness, ego, radical alterity, or transcendence outside the assemblage. 
 Rather than representing or speaking about a political event, the persona or avatar is 
always the immanent agent of  an operation and locally determinate in relation to the abstract 
and concrete machines it helps create and connect (1983, 16). For Deleuze and Guattari, the 
revolutionary political “subject” is not simply “de-centered;” it is a co-adaptive component 
of  a particular collective enunciation or political consistency. Having expanded and explicitly 
politicized Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of  the persona, we can see how it accounts for a 
new kind of  revolutionary political subject different from both representational and anti-
representational types. Along with the renewal of  the theory and practice of  revolution 
found in Deleuze and Guattari is the renewal of  the concept of  a revolutionary subject. This 
subject is not structured by an identity based on static and pre-given political conditions 
(territory, state, and capital), or merely dispersed, but is rather a third person part of  a 
consistent and participatory political body. 
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Zapatismo and the Creation of  a Participatory Body Politic
 In the last section I argued that opposed to the two dangers of  representation and 
anti-representation, there exists an alternative social order currently under construction. This 
new body politic is defined by its participatory mutability: the degree to which its conditions 
are transformed by the participation of  the elements and subjects affected by it. I further 
argued that in order to understand the structure and function of  this participatory and 
revolutionary body politic we need to understand the unique relationship it articulates 
between three different dimensions: (1) the conditions under which it emerges and determines 
who counts as part of  its body politic, (2) the distribution of  concrete elements that express 
and constitute its body, and (3) the kinds of  subjects who act on and transform its body. 
Representational, anti-representational, and participatory political bodies each express a 
different type of  relationship between these three dimensions. In order to develop a theory 
of  a specifically revolutionary and participatory political body, I drew on Deleuze and 
Guattari’s concept of  consistency, found in A Thousand Plateaus and What is Philosophy? and 
expanded its application to the issue of  revolutionary politics. But this has only been a 
theoretical development. 
 In this next section I argue that the Zapatistas have created a revolutionary and 
participatory body politic in practice. The two sides of  theory and practice thus constitute 
the theoretical practice I am calling revolutionary participation. Zapatismo presents an 
interesting case in political theory and practice because it cannot not be understood by the 
political philosophies of  liberalism or Marxism. Zapatismo abandons both the notions of  
sovereign power based on political and juridical representation but also the the basic tenants 
of  Marxist science, vanguardism, state capture, class struggle, and the determination of  the 
economy “in the last instance.” Marcos and the early EZLN upon arriving in Chiapas found 
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that their Marxist, Leninist, and Maoist preconceptions were “totally inadequate for 
communicating with the local population,” and eventually concluded that their original plans 
for struggle were, “undemocratic and authoritarian” (Ross 2006, 14). But the Zapatista’s are 
not a “postmodern” revolution in the sense that they merely reject these forms of  
representation in favor of  a spontaneous or speculative leftism. Instead, they have 
constructed a new kind of  body politic altogether based on participation. They call this 
process mandar obedeciendo, leading by obeying.17 But what is leading by obeying and how does 
it function as a practice of  political participation? 
 Perhaps, the new political morality is constructed in a new space which will not be 
 the taking or retention of  power, but the counterweight and opposition which 
 contains and obliges the power to ‘rule by obeying’. . . ‘[R]ule by obedience’ is 
 not within the concepts of  "political science" and it is devalued by the morality of  
 "efficiency" which defines the political activity which we suffer. (Marcos 2004, 217)
 
 The new body politic the Zapatistas invent is thus one whose conditions for social 
order and inclusion are defined by their obedience to those included by them, not by the 
taking of  representative power or the rejection of  all political organization. Leading by 
obeying thus expresses a political vertigo or participatory feedback loop between the leaders 
who obey the led, and the led who must lead the leaders and obey. Mandar obedeciendo breaks 
the traditional political distinction between means and ends; it “makes the road by walking.” 
The process of  leading by obeying can be understood as the mutual transformation of  three 
different dimensions: a revolutionary condition, its concrete practices, and a form of  
revolutionary subjectivity.  
The Revolutionary Condition: “Zapatismo, 1994”
 As a body politic, Zapatismo invents a new condition for social order and inclusion. 
Like the phenomena of  the revolution of  1789, the Paris Commune, and the revolution of  
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17 The Clandestine Revolutionary Indigenous Committee in each region monitors the operations of  the
Good Government Juntas in order to prevent acts of  corruption, intolerance, injustice and deviation from the 
Zapatista principle of  “Ruling by Obeying.”
1917, Zapatismo is a singular event in the sense that it is irreducible to historically necessary 
causal chains. In 1994, in Mexico, Zapatismo held no resemblance to any recognizable, legal, 
or legitimate political thing within the present “state of  affairs,” i.e., no political 
representation (party), no market representation, linguistic representation (their languages are 
not spoken or recognized by political representatives), or representation by the local 
indigenous leaders (Caciques). There was no causal necessity that Zapatismo should have 
existed, no way it could have been deduced from the domains of  “rights,” “commodities,” or 
“class struggle” from which it emerged. Yet the Zapatistas “burst upon a world that denied 
their existence,” as Zapatista scholar John Holloway says (Holloway 1998, 1). From the 
representational point of  view of  Mexican politics, the marginalized and un-represented 
Zapatistas of  Chiapas have no “legitimate” existence and yet they coexist immanently and 
heterogeneously within the political arrangement anyway. The singular event of  Zapatismo is 
thus not conditioned on requests for representation like “rights,” the overthrow of  the state, 
a new market economy, or a new ethnic nationalism, but instead takes on its own self-
reference or autonomy from within the situation. 
 But the condition of  the Zapatista’s body politic is also universal in the sense that it 
is both inclusive and infinite in its consequences. “To be Zapatista” does not mean that you 
must be represented by the EZLN or that you must be indigenous, or even from Mexico. 
But Zapatismo cannot mean anything one wants. Zapatismo means participating in a very 
specific struggle against neoliberalism and for direct self-management where ever one is and 
to whatever degree one is capable of. Without a prior or immutable condition for exclusion 
the Zapatistas have made it clear that anyone can become a Zapatista to the degree that they 
share their struggle.18 Many around the world have subsequently taken up this universal 
event where they are (Europe, Asia, North America, etc.). So rather than simply affirming 
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18 “We are all Zapatistas!” Became a global slogan for solidarity actions with the Zapatistas.
their difference and un-representability, the Zapatistas have created a singular-absolute event/
intervention and given it a specific consistency of  its own, heterogenous to the regimes of  
political representation. This singular-universality is practically constituted through the 
creation of  Encuentros (international gatherings)19 that aim to include others that will change 
the nature of  Zapatismo as a social body each time they meet (Chatterton 2007).  
 But Zapatismo does not represent anyone. Rather, as a condition for a revolutionary 
body politic, Zapatismo mobilizes a proper name or marker that acts as an attractor or 
horizon for all those elements in Chiapas that did not legally “exist,” who were politically 
“invisible,” who were marginalized, disappeared or killed by the government (the underpaid, 
landless, non-Spanish-speaking, indigenous campesinos).20 In 1994 the proper name 
“Zapatismo” was brought into popular existence, not to represent these people, but to mark 
the visibility of  their invisibility within Mexican politics. The proper name “Zapatismo” 
provides a sign of  something through which people can speak. Thus when Marcos speaks to 
the Mexican government he does not represent the Zapatistas, he is instead named, 
“Delegate Zero” of  the "Other Campaign."21 Where a normal delegate represents or stands-
in for its people, “Delegate Zero” instead expresses a positive marker of  what does not 
appear as legitimate political being in Mexico. This zero is a positive indication of  what is 
being spoken through without referent or representation. It indicates the condition of  an 
“Other politics.”
 This conditional marker “Zapatismo,” does not represent Emilio Zapata, Marcos, or 
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19 The Intercontinental Encuentros (Encounters) for Humanity and Against Neoliberalism emerged from the 
Zapatista movement's engagement with individuals and social movements around the world following the 
Zapatista uprising.
20 “We were silenced. We were faceless. We were nameless. We had no future. We did not exist” (Marcos 2001b, 
101). 
21 Subcomandante Marcos (currently a.k.a. Delegate Zero in relation to the "Other Campaign"). Unlike other 
Zapatista comandantes, Subcomandante Marcos is not an indigenous Mayan.
the sum total of  denumerable Zapatistas, but is like a pure infinitive “to become Zapatista” 
in a concrete field of  collective actions that circulate and transform the body politic marked 
by this name. Zapatismo thus has no existence outside of  the concrete practices that 
effectuate and mutually transform it. As a condition for collective action it must be 
elaborated step-by-step and is always changing. The slogan, “Todos Somos Zapatistas!” (We are 
all Zapatistas!) demonstrates the universality of  this process. This slogan creates an 
incorporeal transformation, that is, a real change in the world that is not necessarily or 
immediately physical or corporeal. As a speech-act tied to the conditions of  a revolutionary 
body politic it brings together all of  the solidarity actions, demonstrations, and celebrations 
of  “inexistent” and marginalized people around the world. Each time someone or something 
new is included in this “we” the meaning of  Zapatismo changes, like the differential 
repetition of  a festival.22 This is a feature of  the participatory body politic I am arguing takes 
place both in Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy and in the Zapatistas political practice. This 
is why the Zapatistas have so many celebrations and Intercontinental Encuentros: not to 
provide new laws or programs, but to “redeploy” and transform the nature of  Zapatismo 
itself  each year. “They do not add a second and a third time to the first, they carry the first 
time to the ‘nth’ power,” as Deleuze says (Deleuze 1994, 1). 
 Zapatismo also creates and combines various concrete practices of  different 
degrees of  importance, proximity, and intensity. For example, environmentalists, feminists, 
and labor activists may all equally be considered Zapatistas if  they take up and follow out its 
consequences. They all do so to different degrees of  significance and intensity that are all 
ordered but not by a hierarchy of  power and control.   
The Revolutionary Concrete Practices: the Zapatista Autonomous Municipalities
 The body politic created by the Zapatistas not only establishes a singular-universal 
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22 “Behind our black mask  . . . we are you” (Khasnabish 2008, 127).
condition by which to combine and include various concrete practices within its social order 
but it also creates a variety of  concrete practices that effectuate and react back on their 
conditions. These concrete practices “obey” in the sense that they are politically conditioned 
by the singular-universal event of  Zapatismo but also “lead” in the sense that they are able to 
transform this condition through direct participation. 
 For example, the Zapatistas have created 38 Autonomous Municipalities covering more 
than a third of  the state of  Chiapas in order to concretely realize the real but “invisible and 
abstract” conditions of  their body politic (Ross 1995). The Zapatista Autonomous Municipalities 
are the Zapatistas’ implementation of  the 1996 San Andrés Accords, which the government 
abandoned in December 1996, after refusing to carry them out. The Accords guarantee the 
right of  indigenous peoples to form and govern their own municipalities. In forming the 
municipalities, residents reject the representation of  official authorities and elect their own 
rotating and recallable administrators. They name their “local health promoters [and] 
indigenous parliaments, and elaborate their own laws based on social, economic, political and 
gender equality among the inhabitants of  diverse ethnic communities” (Mora 1998). The 
municipalities make their own decisions based on the participatory, direct consensus of  its 
constituents and through the rotational governance of  the Juntas (councils or cabinets that 
adjudicate disputes, distribute funds, and register workers cooperatives), and the Clandestine 
Revolutionary Indigenous Committee (CCRI). But this participation is not only political 
participation. The Zapatistas also effectuate their political body in the concrete practices of  
workers cooperatives based on collective ownership, worker control, and self-management. 
There are no bosses, landowners, or capitalists, but instead a participatory economics based 
on shared prosperity. These concrete effectuations of  their condition are not perfect by any 
stretch of  the imagination but the aim of  their creation of  these concrete expressions is, as 
Guattari would say, 
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to set up structures and devices that establish a totally different kind of  contact. A 
kind of  self-management or self-organization of  a set of  problems which does not 
start from a central point that arranges elements, inserts them into a control grid, or 
establishes an agenda, but that, on the contrary, allows the various singular processes 
to attempt a rhizomatic unfolding. This is very important, even if  it doesn’t work. 
(2008, 178)
The Zapatista’s concrete effectuation of  their body politic is their struggle for a maximum of 
participation and “self-management conceived outside the criteria of  a formal democracy 
that has proven to be sterile” (Guattari 2008, 391). 
 The Zapatistas have created a whole host of  various concrete articulations of  their 
event: abolishing alcohol, having a rotational form of  participatory self-government in the 
Juntas, harvesting coffee and honey, weaving and working in cooperatives, receiving aid from 
international NGO’s, participating in the horizontal cooperative economy that fair trades 
with them around the world, using the slogan “we are all Zapatistas!” As Marcos says, “The 
kids, the chickens, the stones, everything here is Zapatista.”23 Zapatismo, according to 
Marcos, is not a political ideology, it has no normative prescriptions, or necessary 
consequences given in advance of  its expression. It is neither party nor vanguard. Rather, it 
creates a new type and concrete distribution of  existence: kids, chickens, and stones all 
become the concrete body of  Zapatismo.  
 But this does not mean that all these concrete elements are exactly the same. The 
campesinos who grow, produce, eat, sell, teach, learn, and govern as “Zapatista” as they can, 
should not, of  course, be confused with those in Europe, America or elsewhere who are in 
solidarity with them, write academic articles about them, give them aid, etc. Each element of  
Zapatismo functions in a different way and with a different degree of  risk and privilege at 
stake, even though each helps constitute the other. These elements, however, do not exist in 
170
23 “For a long time, this place has existed where men are Zapatistas, the women are Zapatistas, the kids are 
Zapatistas, the chickens are Zapatistas, the stones are Zapatistas, everything is Zapatista. And in order to wipe 
out the Zapatista Army of  National Liberation, they will have to wipe this piece of  territory off  the face of  the 
earth, not just destroy it but erase it completely, because there is always the danger of  the dead down below…” 
— Subcomandante Marcos letter to Proceso, 1994. 
a hierarchy of  power and knowledge. They are ordered based on their intensity and 
importance but not on their hierarchy. No one person or program stands at the top to order 
such a hierarchy.  
 Even within Zapatista territory there are degrees of  intensity in relation to 
Zapatismo. The “First of  January Boot Cooperative” in the caracol Oventic has to import 
their boot soles from Asia, but the Yachil Coffee coop is entirely “Zapatista” owned and 
managed. Importing boot soles from Asia might be a slightly lesser degree in relation to the 
goals of  local production, self-management, and economic justice, the latter might be a 
greater. Such degrees of  deployment in Zapatismo are in constant mutation, growing greater 
when a Canadian anarchist boot co-op opens up to sell the Zapatista’s boot soles, for 
example, or becoming weaker when cooperative cafés that sell Zapatista coffee go out of  
business because a Starbucks moves in. There are thus a variety of  elements and degrees in 
which Zapatismo is effectuated and whose degrees of  consistency do not constitute a 
hierarchy of  power, but rather an order of  relation to and within the event. 
 But the participatory body politic created by the Zapatistas not only creates an 
internal consistency of  the concrete practices that constitute it to various degrees, as we have 
seen, it also connects these concrete practices up to those outside of  this internal 
consistency. The Zapatistas have concretely expanded their struggle beyond their locality and 
to the world at large. Had the Zapatistas created an exclusively indigenous, ethnic, or 
nationalistic revolt it would have risked becoming a limited and locally saturated struggle 
within the borders of  Chiapas or Mexico alone. It became clear after 1994, however, that the 
Zapatistas could rebel but they could not compete with the Mexican military without 
national and international popular support from those outside their territory. Thus, the 
Zapatistas asked the world to see Zapatismo as everyone’s struggle. They said, “Detras de 
nosotros estamos ustedes,” “behind us we are you,” and “Todos somos Marcos,” “we are all Marcos.”  
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 Without media attention and human rights watches that kept paramilitary forces at 
bay, without the monetary support, cooperative networks, first aid, and supplies of  the global 
community, Zapatismo risked an internal saturation in several regards. It risked running out 
of  supplies and being forced into desperate acts of  violence against the Mexican army; it 
risked becoming a reformist movement out of  desperation for any kind of  political 
amelioration; it risked becoming a sectarian, nationalist, or indigenous movement without 
any global vision, and it even risked falling back on military vanguard and patriarchal 
hierarchies within their communities. 
 The concrete practices that have created this external and expansive connection 
include the way that Zapatistas take on refugees from all over Chiapas, hold 
“Intercontinental Encuentros” around the world, assist the struggles of  many left social 
movements around Mexico, provide medical and legal aid to non-Zapatistas and even to 
anti-Zapatistas within their own communities. Despite the fact that the Zapatistas may not 
be in complete agreement with all the groups or individuals they share certain campaigns or 
resources with, the Zapatistas can at least form bridges where their interests are common. 
Beyond ideology, geography, identity, and certainly beyond an affirmation of  difference in-
itself, the Zapatistas have created a vast global network of  external consistency piece by 
piece. 
The Revolutionary Political Subject: the Compañera
 Leading by obeying not only means creating a revolutionary political body and 
effectuating a set of  concrete practices that sustain it and follow out its consequences, it also 
means inventing a new form of  subjectivity that connects the two with each other in a 
mutual transformation. For this purpose the Zapatistas have invented the revolutionary 
subject of  the compa (short for partner or comrade). The Zapatista compa has a strange 
double existence. For the event of  Zapatismo to be brought about there must be compas to 
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do so, but for there to be Zapatista compas, Zapatismo must already exist. The emergence of  
each presupposes the other; thus both emerged at the same time: Jan 1st, 1994.24 
 The purpose of  the compas, as the revolutionary subjects of  Zapatismo, is to 
articulate and determine the various processes of  Zapatismo: where are its dangers, where 
are its opportunities, where are its points of  antagonism and conflict, etc. For example the 
compas, as the subjects who connect the evental condition “Zapatismo” to its concrete 
consequences, have to decide how many trees may be taken from the jungle to avoid 
deforestation, what the penalty for taking too many is (planting two more and caring for 
them), or whether or not a consequence of  Zapatismo is intervening against 40 state 
troopers arresting environmental activists for protesting the destruction of  a forest of  200-
year-old trees from being turned into a shopping mall in Morelos.25 Piece by piece the compas 
show Zapatismo’s concrete consequences by effectuating some actions, some slogans, some 
demonstrations, and not others. But these effected elements, as processes of  leading by 
obeying, in turn transform Zapatismo. It has no existence outside of  its effectuations. This 
transformation of  the condition “Zapatismo” then transforms the compas who must then 
redeploy new concrete effectuations based on this change. Zapatismo thus leads itself  by 
obeying itself  in a kind of  feedback loop with no vanguard at the helm. It is in this sense a 
process of  participation where event, consequence, and subject all enter a mutual 
transformation. 
 The Zapatista compa also breaks with a tradition of  revolutionary subjectivity based 
on individualism and self-discipline. Instead, the compa acts in the third person and creates a 
new kind of  discipline: the collective discipline of  the event. This does not mean of  course 
that compas never say “I,” or “You,” it simply means that these features are derivative or 
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24 See chapter III.
25 Apparently it does.
secondary to the more primary third person that acts as the agent of  a connection between 
an event and its consequences. Conflicts and agreements still take place between specific 
“I’s” and “You’s” but only as conflicts and agreements of  the event they participate in: not 
outside it, or upon it, but within and through it. Like the use of  Delegate Zero to replace the 
political condition of  representation and exclusion or the use of  the self-managed 
Autonomous Municipalities to replace the concrete practices of  private and public property, 
the Zapatistas create compas to replace the representational subject of  liberal and capitalist 
individualism. The compas accomplish this practically through the use of  black ski masks. 
 The compas use black masks and bandanas to create a collective and “indefinite” 
group-subject. “In order for them to see us, we covered our faces; so that they would call us 
by name, we gave up our names; we bet the present to have a future; and to live... we 
died” (2004b, 115). While Marcos has given several different reasons for the use of  these 
masks over the years, from making sure no one tries to become the leader,26 to portraying 
Mexico’s covering up of  its real Mexico,27 the collective practice of  masking has produced a 
very specific kind of  revolutionary subjectivity immanent not to a consciousness who 
represents an “I” to itself, but to the event: to Zapatismo itself. The practice of  collective 
masking in Zapatsimo is hostile to vanguardism insofar as it creates a visual equality between 
subjects without leaders. It de-individualizes first person subjects in favor of  third person 
collective subjects of  the event. We might imagine how confusing it would be to try and 
follow a single person when everyone was wearing the same black ski mask. “Are you the 
one leading us? No, I thought you were leading us?” Everyone takes turns leading by obeying 
((Marcos 2006). The point is to create a locally generic subjectivity of  Zapatismo and express 
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26 “The main reason is that we have to be careful that nobody tries to be the main leader. The masks are meant 
to prevent this from happening.” A quote from Marcos (Maxwell and Harvey. 1999, 6).
27 “I will take off  my ski mask when Mexican society takes off  its own mask, the one it uses to cover up the 
real Mexico…” Quote from an interview with Marcos in (Katzenberger 1995, 70). 
it collectively, that is, to lead but to lead by obeying those you are leading. “Because,” as 
Subcomandante Marcos says, “here in the EZLN the mistakes are conjugated in the first 
person singular and the achievements in the third person plural” (Ramírez 2008, 307). Rather 
than affirm a pure alterity or potential for “transformation as such” found in “the 
face” (Levinas 1979) of  a “Thou” (Buber 1958) against a representational “I/You” 
opposition, the Zapatistas propose instead an indefinite but determinate third person of  the 
event. By covering their faces as a political action the Zapatistas are able to create a unique 
political anonymity (open to anyone, and yet unambiguously against neoliberalism) that 
rejects both liberal and critical models of  subjectivity, in favor of  a subject of  the event 
itself. This practice has been taken up by others around the world to achieve a similar 
collective form of  agency (Thompson 2010). 
 In this section I have argued that the Zapatistas have created a revolutionary and 
participatory body politic based on leading by obeying. In particular they have done this by 
creating the conditions of  a singular-universal event with the proper name and date, 
“Zapatismo, 1994;” by sustaining and effectuating its concrete consequences in their 
Autonomous Municipalities, and by creating a new form of  revolutionary subjectivity that 
acts in the third person: the masked compa. These three dimensions of  their revolutionary 
body politic not only parallel Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy of  consistency, but 
also express the theoretical practice of  participation that I have developed throughout this 
chapter.   
Conclusion
 In the previous chapter we were left with the problem of  how revolutionary 
interventions could be sustained through the creation of  an alternative body politic without 
becoming either representational or anti-representational. This chapter has argued that there 
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is a third way to understand the concept of  a body politic today: as a participatory set of  
conditions, elements, and agencies engaged in a maximal degree of  mutual and direct 
transformation. This can be seen in both the political philosophy of  Deleuze and Guattari 
and the praxis of  the Zapatistas. 
 Against the exclusionary conditions of  political representation defined by a set of  
pre-given normative criteria for political participation, or the ambivalent conditions of  
potentiality defined by the general capacity for change-as-such, I have argued for a concept 
of  political conditions along the lines of  what Deleuze and Guattari have called abstract 
machines. Since the abstract machine is a singular marker of  an event (and not a thing) that 
both conditions and is transformed by the political elements it conditions, it has no pre-
given exclusionary criteria, only participatory ones contingent on what/who participates. 
Since the abstract machine marks a locally waged struggle against specific forms of  power, it 
is also an unambivalent commitment to more than just change-as-such: it is the creation of  
specific new elements and agencies. 
 Against the hierarchical ordering of  elements found in the politics of  representation, 
defined by their distance from, or reproduction of, pre-given norms or identities, as well as 
the hierarchical ordering of  elements in the politics of  potentiality, defined by their distance 
from the process of  pure becoming or a difference-in-itself, I have argued for a concept of  
political elements based on Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of  the concrete machinic 
assemblage. Since concrete machines effectuate their condition in a relation of  reciprocal 
transformation (and not by a reproduction of  pre-given criteria) they are participatory and 
non-hierarchical insofar as every element can change the conditions of  the whole. 
Additionally, since they express “degrees of  consistency” (between pure difference and pure 
identity) they can also be meaningfully ordered in relation to an abstract machine opposed to 
affirming a general degree of  a “capacity to become other”. 
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 Similarly, against the paralysis of  the subject, created by limiting its transformation to 
what it may rationally desire to be free from or be free to, found in the politics of  identity, as 
well as the paralysis created by dispersing subjectivity into a pure form of  becoming or 
transformation as such, I have argued for a concept of  political subjectivity based on 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of  “personae.” Since political personae are defined by the 
simultaneity of  their immanent intervention as well their connection between the abstract 
and concrete machines, they are able to change not only their desires within the political 
domain of  a given event, but also their very nature insofar as their actions transform the 
initial conditions of  their existence. In addition to their localized interventions, personae 
have specific features that distinguish them from a purely dispersed form of  
transformational becoming: they combine and conflict, juridically, existentially, relationally, 
etc. The three concepts of  the abstract machine, the concrete assemblage, and the political 
persona thus provide real conceptual alternatives to the representational and anti-
representational political bodies, just as Zapatismo provides a practical alternative to them in 
the practice of  leading by obeying.  
 But while this chapter has been able to show the structure and function of  how 
revolutionary interventions are sustained in a participatory body politic, it has failed to offer 
much more than a gesture of  how such political bodies can connect up with others. It is one 
thing for a revolutionary event to create an internal consistency between its abstract 
condition, concrete consequences, and subject, or even to connect a few of  its consequences 
outside its local struggle, as we have seen in the case of  Zapatismo, but how do radically 
heterogenous revolutionary political bodies connect to one another, if  they can at all? On 
what new condition? How would we reconcile their potentially mutually exclusive concrete 
commitments? This is a question of  political affinity and universal solidarity and will be 
addressed in the next and final chapter of  this dissertation.     
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CHAPTER V
POLITICAL AFFINITY AND SINGULAR-UNIVERSAL SOLIDARITY
Clearly, a revolutionary machine cannot remain satisfied with local and occasional struggles: 
it has to be at the same time super-centralized and super-desiring. The problem, therefore, 
concerns the nature of  unification, which must function in a transversal way, through 
multiplicity, and not in a vertical way, so apt to crush the multiplicity proper to desire.
(Deleuze 2004, 199)
Introduction
 How is it possible to sustain and carry out the consequences of  a non-
representational revolutionary transformation? In chapter IV I proposed three responses to 
this question. First, I argued that non-representational revolutions do not simply establish 
new conditions for political life based on a “more just” sphere of  political action whose 
foundational principles are still held independently from the constituted sphere where such 
principles are deployed. Nor do such revolutions merely aim to establish counter institutions, 
whose sole purpose is to undermine all forms of  representation and await the possibility that 
something new, and hopefully better, may emerge. 
 Second, I argued that a non-representational revolutionary body politic is built and 
sustained through an expressive and participatory process whose founding conditions are 
constantly undergoing direct and immanent transformation by the various practices and 
people who are effected by them to varying degrees. I further argued that in order to 
understand the structure and function of  participation in this revolutionary body politic we 
need to understand the unique relationship it articulates between three different dimensions 
of  its political body: (1) the conditions under which it emerges and determines who counts as 
part of  its body politic, (2) the distribution of  concrete elements that express and constitute its 
body, and (3) the kinds of  subjects who connect and transform these conditions and elements. 
Representational, anti-representational, and participatory political bodies each express a 
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different type of  relationship between these three dimensions. In order to develop a theory 
of  a specifically revolutionary and participatory political body, I draw on Deleuze and 
Guattari’s similar concept of  consistency, found in A Thousand Plateaus and What is Philosophy? 
but expand its application to the issue of  revolutionary politics. 
 Third, I argued that the Zapatistas have created a similar revolutionary and 
participatory body politic based on what that they call Ruling by Obeying (Mandar 
Obedeciendo). Together, Deleuze, Guattari, and the Zapatistas form a theoretical practice of  
revolutionary political participation.
 But while the theory of  a participatory body politic developed in chapter IV may 
have been able to account for the practical and theoretical reality of  a third type of  political 
body, it failed to understand on what basis such revolutionary bodies would be able to 
connect to one another and assemble a larger global alternative to neoliberalism and political 
representation. If  the conditions of  revolutionary political bodies are singular and non-
representational, on what basis can such heterogenous political conditions share a common 
affinity or belonging? To what degree can this inclusive model of  political participation, 
argued for in chapter IV, be practically extended into a world-wide revolutionary movement? 
Does one condition or body politic simply swallow another in larger and larger spheres of  
participation or do they exist in parallel?  
 Defined as the connection between two or more heterogeneous political conditions, 
what I am calling revolutionary political affinity confronts two dangers. On the one hand, it 
risks being synthesized into a single global condition under which heterogeneous conditions 
can communicate, but only as particular elements under a larger representational condition 
(the affinity of  citizenship within territorial nation-states, the unequal/vertical affinity 
between allied and axis nations, etc.). On the other hand, the affinity between revolutionary 
political bodies risks becoming dispersed into a multiplicity of  unconnected singularities 
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whose only belonging is the universal non-belonging of  their radical difference. However, 
the political solidarity found in the contemporary return to revolution I argue, is not simply a 
matter of  integrating marginalized demands back into the dominant nation-state apparatus 
by simply tweaking the criteria for citizenship to include those who are currently excluded. 
Nor is it a matter of  recognizing the universal singularity of  all beings to become other than 
they are. Rather, this revolutionary solidarity occurs when the participatory political bodies, 
defined in chapter IV, adopt each other’s struggles as their own. This solidarity is not a 
matter of  recognition, charity, or even radical difference, but rather a federated and 
transversal connection between multiple singular-universal political bodies. 
 This chapter thus poses three responses to the problem of  creating solidarity 
between multiple non-representational political bodies. First, I argue against the concepts of  
citizenship and difference as desirable models of  political belonging insofar as the former is 
structurally exclusionary and the later is unable to theorize any concrete relations between 
multiple coexistent conditions. Second, I argue that, opposed to these two dangers of  
citizenship and difference, the solidarity that defines the contemporary return to revolution 
is defined instead by the federated connection between multiple singular-universal conditions 
without totality. In order to develop this third concept of  political solidarity I draw on 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of  nomadism and expand its implications to revolutionary 
praxis. Third, I argue that this recent return to revolution is expressed in the Zapatista’s 
political practice of  global networking and the assembly of  International Gatherings Against 
Neoliberalism (Encuentros Intercontinentales). Together, the theory of  nomadism and the 
practice of  mutual global solidarity in Zapatismo define the theoretical practice of  what I am 
calling singular-universal solidarity. 
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Universal Political Affinity
Citizenship and the Territorial Nation-State    
 The concept of  political affinity in the twentieth century has been dominated by the 
figure of  the citizen. Though far from articulating a homogenous figure of  political affinity, 
the concept of  citizenship has been a rich and pivotal site for increasingly divergent 
contestations over political agency, inclusion, and exclusion. Today, however, a century of  
contestation has escalated into full-on destabilization, as citizenship has come under siege by 
three increasingly irreconcilable phenomena.
 (1) The increasing frequency of  political and economic intervention by trans- and 
non-national organizations into states by providing many of  the affinities, protections, 
services, and goods typically provided by state citizenship. Such organizations include 
transnational entities like the European Union or the Bolivarian Alliance in South America; 
international entities like the United Nations; global entities like Non-Governmental 
Organizations and the growing network of  doctors, teachers, journalists, farmers, lawyers, 
and groups “without borders;” economic entities like private Corporations and the World Trade 
Organization; and activist entities like the Alter-Globalization Movement and the World (and 
Regional) Social Forums. 
 (2) The growing global movement of  economically, politically, and environmentally 
forced migrants (disproportionately from the global south) who are often denied full 
political status (citizenship) and access to services in their new country. The last decade alone 
has marked the highest number of  migrations world-wide in recorded history. But what is 
unsettling about this phenomena is that each year a higher and higher percentage of  
migrants around the world are becoming irregular or non-status. If  citizenship and legal 
status are the conditions under which nation-states understand the political agency and rights 
of  a people, what does it mean for over 100 million people to be living without status 
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around the world? (United Nations 2008; IOM 2008).1 Increasing numbers of  precarious, 
criminalized, and exploited persons pose a serious challenge to the desirability of  citizenship-
based political affinity.       
 (3) The massive internal destabilization of  citizenship brought on by the nation-state 
itself: the denationalizations during World War I and World War II; the creation of  
interment, work, refugee, and extermination camps throughout the twentieth century; the 
torture and abuse of  prisoners at Abiu Graib; the suspension of  Habeas corpus at Guatanamo 
and in the Patriot Act, and so on. These demonstrate the increasingly permanent state of  
juridico-political exception and executive control into which citizenship has fallen. If  states 
cannot be trusted to guarantee the sole concept of  political affinity that only they have given 
themselves the power to protect, then the legitimacy of  such a concept remains permanently 
in question.
 Citizenship, as a form of  political affinity or belonging, aims to resolve the 
relationship between multiple political conditions (territorial, economic, cultural, and so on) 
by capturing them all under a single condition, what Hannah Arendt calls, “the old trinity of  
state-people-territory” that formed the basis of  European civilization (Arendt 1951: 282). 
Insofar as multiple political conditions and their agents accept the enforcement of  specific 
criteria for belonging (birth, rights, etc.), the state can mediate and identify legitimate forms 
of  political agency (voting, property, family, etc.) and illegitimate forms of  political agency 
(revolution, theft, perversion, etc). But it does so only insofar as multiple conditions are 
sacrificed to become elements of  a single state condition: citizenship.   
 The problem with the theoretical entrenchment of  the territorial nation-state matrix, 
however, is not that we have yet to find the right balance between them, but rather that all 
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1 “The IOM estimates that irregular immigrants account for one-third to one-half  of  new entrants into 
developed countries, marking an increase of  20 per cent over the past ten years” (IOM 2008). 
three terms of  this trinity are themselves fundamentally exclusionary political concepts. In 
fact the very philosophical labor of  trying to theorize a radically inclusive politics within such 
a matrix should rightly be considered an “oxymoron” (Levinson and Tamir 1995). A theory 
of  political affinity delimited by a territorial space necessarily excludes those outside its 
borders and restricts the free movement of  peoples to a logic of  political inclusion and 
exclusion along arbitrary geo-political lines (Balibar 2006, 2). The territory is the a priori 
condition for migration and its control. Thus, a theory of  political affinity based on the 
particularity of  national identity, no matter how “differentiated” it is, likewise marginalizes 
extra-territorial, extra-national affinities and solidarities that cannot be restricted to the 
nation. 
 A theory of  political affinity legitimated by the sovereign state also excludes its own 
power of  legitimation from its juridical legislation. Logically, that is, the state cannot include 
its own condition (the exceptional and executive violence of  its foundation) within its own 
laws. This is why almost all modern state constitutions (democratic, socialist, or totalitarian) 
have paradoxical laws that allow for the suspension of  the constitution itself  in times of  
emergency or national security (Agamben 2005, 11–19). Finally, restricting political analysis 
to the confines of  the territorial nation-state conceals the unquestioned presupposition of  
liberal multiculturalism: its complicity with multinational capitalism (!i"ek 1997). The 
argument that modern nation-states should be neutral sites or “empty universalities” of  
multicultural representation often simply means that minorities are tolerated as consumer 
markets or sources of  equally exploited wage labor (as an economic exclusion) in a state-
protected capitalist economy (!i"ek 1997, 44). Despite its pretensions to universality and 
inclusion the territorial nation-state is essentially exclusionary, whether it is liberal or socialist. 
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Biopolitics and Universal Singularity
 The inherently exclusionary dilemma of  the territorial nation-state that underpins the 
concept of  citizenship-based political affinity is, however, not a new problem, and 
uncovering its paradox or aporia has not done it any harm. Even so, the contemporary 
phenomena of  extra-national affinity, migration, and political states of  emergency have 
certainly exacerbated it. Rather than weakening exclusionary models of  power, the logical 
structure of  exceptionalism has only taken on an increasingly multiple, decentralized, and 
permanent formulation under modern capitalism—all the more powerful for its suppleness 
and contradiction. The power of  political exclusion today “not only takes place at the 
territorial borders of  the nation-state” but has become diffused into much more flexible 
border structures that have made life itself (not merely the citizen) the site of  multiple 
intersecting forms of  power (Balibar 2002, 75–86). Today invoking juridico-political 
suspensions of  laws and rights toward the ends of  increased security against an unidentified 
enemy (terror), and allowing multinational corporations to pass freely across national 
territorial borders while the poor and undesirable are “refused,” states and corporations have 
mobilized an advanced structural invisibility.2  
 Borders are thus a modern political expression of  this mobilized exception. A border 
excludes and includes less like a barricade or wall than like a passage-way or sieve for capital to 
pass through a very particular distribution of  borders (for profit, control, security, etc.) while 
fortifying others against migrants or terrorists. In the present political climate of  terror and 
securitization, it has become increasingly apparent that borders no longer exist solely in the 
geographical space between two sovereign territories, but as local police enforcement, fire 
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2 While there may be a structural exclusion and multiplicity necessary to law itself, there are certainly degrees of 
mobilizing this combination. Modern nation-states, as Hannah Arendt feared, have succumbed to the 
temptation to increasingly deploy this exceptionalism. “The clearer the proof  of  their inability to treat stateless 
people as legal persons and the greater the extension of  arbitrary rule by police decree, the more difficult it is 
for states to resist the temptation to deprive all citizens of  legal status and rule them with an omnipotent 
police” (Arendt, 1951, 290).
fighters, hospitals, schools, private companies, airports, banks, and individuals begin to 
independently monitor and strategically report non-status and “suspicious” persons, “the 
border” today is becoming something much more “self-regulating” and “self-transmuting”: 
what Deleuze calls les sociétés de contrôle, “control societies” (Deleuze 1995: 179). Borders have 
become multiple modulating constraints not just to block external movement but to regulate 
and stabilize internal populations to a certain degree or probability within a largely 
unpredictable milieu or environment (Balibar 2006, 5). 
 But if  the exclusionary liberalism of  the territorial nation-state has been increasingly 
transformed into the more multiple and heterogeneous exceptionalism of  biopolitics and 
control, what, if  any, opportunities does this open up for a new non-exclusionary theory of  
political affinity? Giorgio Agamben argues that the decline of  nation-state-based citizenship 
has revealed the figure of  the refugee as the starting point for a new theory of  political 
affinity. It is worth quoting him here at length,  
Given the by now unstoppable decline of  the Nation-State and the general corrosion 
of  traditional political-juridical categories, the refugee is perhaps the only thinkable 
figure for the people of  our time and the only category in which one may see today
—at least until the process of  dissolution of  the Nation-State and its sovereignty has 
achieved full completion—the forms and limits of  a coming political community. It 
is even possible that, if  we want to be equal to the absolutely new tasks ahead, we 
will have to abandon decidedly, without reserve, the fundamental concepts through 
which we have so far represented the subjects of  the political (Man, the Citizen and 
its rights, but also the sovereign people, the worker, and so forth) and build our 
political philosophy anew starting from the one and only figure of  the refugee. 
(Agamben 1996, 158–59)
 While the “unstoppable decline of  the Nation-State” is far from certain at this point, 
Agamben’s insight here is to highlight the site of  such a potential unhinging: the refugee. 
Insofar as the figure of  the refugee “unhinges the old trinity of  State-nation-territory” and 
expresses the disjunction between the human and the citizen, between nativity and the 
nation, Agamben argues, “it brings the originary fiction of  sovereignty to crisis” and allows 
“the citizen [to] be able to recognize the refugee that he or she is” (Agamben 1996, 164).
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 If  biopolitics has truly created a permanent state of  exception and modulated 
control, everyone has become, at least potentially, a form of  bare life, stripped of  all 
particularity. Citizens are no longer the central subjects of  political management. It is now 
environments and populations that are increasingly becoming the focus of  a governmental 
rationality of  modulated and flexible control. This form of  life or singularity, discernible in the 
figure of  the refugee or the non-status migrant and virtually present in everyone, is internally 
excluded from the dominant politics of  citizenship and the nation-state. Thus, Agamben 
argues that such singularization opens up the opportunity for a new radically inclusive form 
of  political affinity based on “the paradoxical condition of  reciprocal extraterritoriality (or, 
better yet, aterritoriality) that . . . could be generalized as a model of  new international 
relations” (Agamben 1996, 164). Eugene Holland has expressed similar hopes for the 
concept of  the nomad (“the deterritorialized par excellence”) found in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
philosophy (2006, 203).   
 While grounding political affinity in the universal singularity of  reciprocal 
aterritoriality or deterritorialization may avoid the problem of  representation and exclusion 
inherent in the relation between the universal and the particular found in the nation-state, it 
remains, however, insufficient for understanding how such singularities organize and connect 
up with one another or become, in themselves, concretely universal. Singularity, in this 
theory, seems to remain radically finite, or rather indefinite. While we may agree that 
universal singularity or absolute deterritorialization is the condition for “those who have no 
‘qualification’” to form new networks of  non-totalizing relations, it does, for all this, fail to 
theorize how such singularities form immanent relations of  greater or lesser consistency 
(Rancière 2004, 305). For example, if  we agreed that citizenship were inherently exclusionary 
and that we were all mutually aterritorial refugees, what new practices of  political affinity 
would be desirable to facilitate more or less connection between such singularities? What are 
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the different types of  relation between singularities, and what are their dangers? What would 
such a new model of  international relations actually look like? The theory of  universal 
singularity or deterritorialization fails to provide a theory of  political relation and thus to 
understand political affinity as more than just a finite and ambivalent opening of  “new 
horizons of  possibility previously undreamt of  by international state law” (Derrida 2001, 7). 
Solidarity and the Singular-Universal
 In the wake of  these problems I argue in this section that the contemporary return 
to revolution, of  which Deleuze, Guattari, and the Zapatistas are a part, is defined instead by 
a singular-universal solidarity. By this I mean the degree to which two or more 
heterogeneous political bodies are united through one or more specific concrete practices. 
This solidarity, however, is never a complete unity; it is only a degree of  identity based on the 
specific number of  mutually shared practices. The question of  solidarity can thus be 
formulated in the following way according to Deleuze: “How can one uphold the rights of  a 
micro-analysis (diffusion, heterogeneity, fragmentation) and still allow for some kind of  
principle of  unification that will not turn out to be like the State or the Party, a totalization 
or a representation” (2006, 132–33)? 
 The answer to this question requires all of  the previous chapters of  this dissertation. 
In chapter II, I defined and distinguished between the different dangers of  representation 
facing this kind of  unity; in chapter III, I defined four types or degrees of  change that 
escape these representational unities; and in chapter IV, I argued that these degrees of  
change could be connected together in a participatory body politic defined by its singular-
universal conditions, concrete effectuations, and immanent subjectivities or persona. But we 
have yet to see how singular-universal conditions themselves can be connected together to 
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form larger, world-wide revolutionary networks. We have not yet understood the theory and 
practice of  solidarity: the creation of  “a world where many worlds fit,” as Marcos says.  
 We have so far distinguished between two kinds of  universality: (1) the universality of  
representation (found in the territorial nation-state), and (2) the universality of  singularity 
(found in the potentiality of  the deterritorialized refugee or nomad). But the concept of  
belonging or solidarity I develop in this chapter should also be distanced from four common 
theories of  solidarity: (1) Solidarity is not a matter of  charity. Charity presumes an unequal 
distribution of  power and wealth, such that those who have them may temporally alleviate 
the suffering of  those who do not without radically changing the conditions under which 
such inequality existed in the first place. (2) Solidarity is not altruism. Altruism is based on an 
identification with the needs, interests, and character of  a particular group or person. As 
such, altruism also fails to understand or change the conditions under which a particular 
group or person has suffered injustice. (3) Solidarity is also not a universal principle of  duty. 
Such a principle would undermine the singularity and contingency of  multiple conditions 
and subordinate them to a single abstract condition (duty) without the possibility of  
participatory transformation of  that condition (as discussed in chapter IV). (4) Finally, 
solidarity is not a matter of  allies fighting toward the same teleological objective (class 
struggle, socialism, etc.). As we saw in chapter IV, this is in part because contemporary 
revolutionary conditions undergo participatory transformations of  their objectives as they 
proceed. Additionally, each singular-universal condition has its own objectives that would be 
undermined by submission to a single objective. 
 Negative definitions out of  the way, the remainder of  this chapter offers a positive 
account of  solidarity in two stages: the first section develops a theory of  how multiple 
singular-universal conditions can be connected together, without presupposing the 
representational unities discussed in chapter II, by drawing on Deleuze and Guattari’s 
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concept of  nomadism found in A Thousand Plateaus. The second section then argues that the 
Zapatistas express this new type of  political solidarity by mobilizing global connections 
between multiple singular-universal political conditions through their Encuentros 
Intercontinentales.    
Singular, Universal, Inclusive
 Before addressing the question of  how multiple singular-universal conditions are 
able to connect to each other, I want to remind the reader what a singular-universal 
revolutionary political condition is, as it was defined in chapter IV. The contemporary 
revolutionary political body, I argued, is able to unify an assemblage of  heterogeneous 
practices of  resistance without subordinating them to a form of  political representation 
(state, party, or vanguard) insofar as it makes use of  a participatory politics theorized by 
Deleuze and Guattari as the reciprocal determination (consistency) of  an abstract machine, a 
concrete assemblage, and machinic personae. In particular, the abstract machine acts as a 
mutable revolutionary political condition and exemplifies the local yet absolute dimensions 
of  the revolutionary body politic.
 A revolutionary condition, or abstract machine in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, is 
singular insofar as it presupposes no prior identity, causality, or place in the dominant matrix 
of  political representation (territorial-state-capitalism), but it is absolute insofar as nothing is 
essentially excluded from participation in its infinite consequences: it is a maximum degree 
of  inclusion with a minimal degree of  identification. It is local insofar as it has a specific 
proper name, site, or date (Zapatista 1994, The Paris Commune, May 68’, etc.), but is 
absolute insofar as this proper name is open to universal participation and reinterpretation. 
The absolute of  the abstract machine, then, should not be confused with the absolutes or 
universals of  identity that remain the same (and pre-given) while adding on an increasing 
number of  axioms or elements of  representation (as in representational democracies, nation-
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states, and market economies). Rather, when Deleuze and Guattari speak of  a “becoming-
everybody/everything (devenir tout le monde)” of  revolution, this means that everybody and 
everything may participate in an effectuation and transformation that “respond[s] to the 
demands of  the event” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 470; Deleuze 2006, 234). In sum a 
singular-universal event accomplishes three basic operations: (1) it clarifies the distance or 
irreconcilability of  a singularity within the dominant matrix of  political representation; (2) it 
calls for a revolutionary decision on a specific “undecidable” and unrepresented singularity 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 473); (3) and it then follows out the “non-denumerably infinite” 
consequences of  this event by constructing new concrete assemblages and machinic 
personae that effectuate it (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 470).
 But in what sense, then, is such a condition necessarily inclusive? In What is 
Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari describe this immanent condition3 as a plane whose only 
regions are the elements that develop it through local operations, point by point, and within 
a generic relation of  becoming with one another. The plane of  immanence, according to 
Deleuze and Guattari, thus has an “infinite” or “absolute” movement, or “a nonlimited 
locality” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 382), “defined by a coming and going, because it does 
not advance toward a destination without already turning back on itself, the needle also being 
the pole” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 38) like a “vortex” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 509). 
Thus, if  a revolutionary condition is defined only by those who construct it through 
participation in it, then it cannot be essentially exclusive (it has no essential criteria for 
participation, only mutable ones).4 The type of  revolutionary political body exemplified in 
the contemporary return to revolution is thus singular, universal, and inclusive. But this 
recapitulation has only heightened the problem we are trying to resolve in this chapter: if  
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3 I.e. plane of  immanence; abstract machine.
4 Although this is not to say that debate and conflicts never arise regarding the status and content of  an event.
revolutionary events each have their own singular and specific conditions, elements, and 
agencies for action, how can they possibly be said to be in solidarity with other heterogenous 
conditions, elements, and agencies without creating a new unity (territory, state, or market)? 
Deleuze, Guattari, and Nomadic Solidarity
 In the preceding chapters I have argued for three interpretive theses about Deleuze 
and Guattari’s political philosophy: (1) that we should use their concept of  Historical Topology 
as a theory of  revolutionary political diagnosis, (2) that we should use their concept of  
Deterritorialization as a theory to bring about prefigurative political transformations, and (3) 
that we should expand their concept of  Consistency to be used as a theory of  political 
participation. In this chapter I propose my final interpretive thesis, namely, that their concept 
of  Nomadism should be used as a theory of  political solidarity. Defined in its most basic 
terms, Nomadism, for Deleuze and Guattari, is a “mode of  unlimited distribution without 
division.” Nomadism is fundamentally a theory of  political relation. It describes how 
singular-universal events like revolutionary political bodies relate to each other and can be 
distributed in a mutually inclusive way without totalization or representation. 
 But why do Deleuze and Guattari call this nomadic? What is it precisely about 
nomadism that allows us to theorize the inclusive and mobile connection between 
heterogeneous political conditions? Deleuze and Guattari define the origins of  the word 
nomad following the work of  French historian Emmanuel Laroche in Histoire de la racine 
"Nem" en grec ancien (1949). There Laroche argues that the Greek origins of  the root “$%&” 
signified a “mode of  distribution” (moyen de distribution), not an allocation of  parceled out or 
delimited land (partage). “The idea [that nomos meant] law is a product of  fifth and sixth-
century Greek thought,” that breaks from the “original Homeric root $%&' meaning, ‘I 
distribute’ or ‘I arrange’” (1949, 255, my translation). Even “the [retroactively] proposed 
translations ‘cut-up earth, plot of  land, piece’ are not suitable in all cases to the Homeric 
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poems and assume an ancient $%&' ‘I divide’ that we should reject. The pasture in archaic 
times is generally an unlimited space (espace illimité); this can be a forest, meadow, rivers, a 
mountain side” (1949, 116, my translation).     
 “The nomos,” Deleuze and Guattari say, thus “designated first of  all an occupied 
space, but one without precise limits (for example, the expanse around a town)” (Deleuze 
1994, 309n6). Rather than parceling out a closed space delimited by roads, borders, and walls, 
assigning to each person a share of  property (partage), and regulating the communication 
between shares through a juridical apparatus, the original meaning of  nomadism, according 
to Laroche and Deleuze and Guattari, does the opposite. Nomadism “distributes people in 
an open space that is indefinite (indéfini) and noncommunicating” without division, borders, 
or polis (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 380). It is marked instead by “traits” that are effaced and 
displaced within a trajectory: points of  relay, water, food, shelter, etc. But just because 
nomadic distributions have no division or border does not mean that nomad space is not 
distributed or consistent. Rather, it is precisely because of  the fact that the nomos defines a 
concretely occupied but non-limited, indefinite space that it offers us a way to think of  
heterogeneous political conditions as mutual and connectable without opposition. If  there 
are no distinct divisions or delimited “pieces” (des morceaux), then there can be no mutual 
exclusion.  
 If  each group solidarity has its own “specific infinity” or distribution illimité (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1994, 21), and there are an unlimited number of  such unlimited distributions, 
then there is by necessity no deducible continuum between such “non-denumerable infinite 
sets.” The relationship between infinite events is thus “undecidable: the germ and locus par 
excellence of  revolutionary decisions,” as Deleuze and Guattari say (Deleuze and Guattari 
1987, 473). It is precisely this undecidability between infinite events that makes solidarity 
possible. If  there were a deducible continuum between all events, then we would simply 
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reproduce the first figure of  representational (and exclusionary) universality—making 
solidarity both unnecessary and impossible. On the other hand, if  any kind of  unified 
continuum were absolutely impossible then solidarity would only be paradoxical and 
ineffective. Solidarity must lie somewhere between these two positions.
 But how is solidarity actually constructed between co-existent and unlimited 
distributions? While it must be admitted that Deleuze and Guattari rarely mention the word 
solidarity, I want to highlight a particularly illuminating passage and a footnote from the 
“Treatise on Nomadology” chapter of  A Thousand Plateaus where they do (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987, 366). Here, they directly connect the concept of  solidarity to its nomadic 
origins and its role in the creation of  a “collective body” (le corps collectif) opposed to the 
State, Family, or Party body.  
 The nomadic origins of  the concept of  solidarity, according to Deleuze and Guattari, 
are found in Ibn Khaldun’s concept of  asabiyah.5 In his book, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction 
to History, Khaldun defines the Bedouin nomads not primarily by their ethnic, geographical, 
State, or familial genealogy, but by their mode of  life and group solidarity that brings various 
heterogeneous persons and families together. What is interesting is that, for Khaldun, 
solidarity is not defined by any pre-given, genealogical, or even static criteria for inclusion/
exclusion, but rather by contingent relationships “between persons who . . . share a feeling of 
solidarity without any outside prodding” (1958, Section 8). “By taking their special place 
within the group [solidarity], they participate to some extent in the common descent to 
which that particular group [solidarity] belongs” (1958, section 13). Not only is the only 
condition for group solidarity, according to Khaldun, “a commitment” to a particular group 
solidarity, but this mutual solidarity then creates a new common line of  descent (similarly 
open to solidarity with other groups). Thus Khaldun can claim that "genealogy is something 
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5 The Arabic word for socialism is derived from asabiyah.
that is of  no use to know and that it does no harm not to know . . . [because] when common 
descent is no longer clear and has become a matter of  scientific knowledge, it can no longer 
move the imagination and is denied the affection caused by [solidarity]. It has become 
useless” (1958, section 8). Even State political power is useless without solidarity behind it 
(1958, section 12). The most primary form of  social belonging is thus, according to 
Khaldun, neither sedentary (State) nor genealogical (Family), but rather contingent and 
mobile (Nomadic).   
 What Deleuze and Guattari find so compelling in the nomadic origins of  Khaldun’s 
theory of  solidarity is that each nomadic Bedouin family acts not as a hierarchical or 
unidirectional condition of  genealogical descent, an arranged matrimonial alliance between 
families, or even a State-bureaucratic descent, but rather as a contingent “band vector or 
point of  relay expressing the power (puissance) or strength (vertu) of  the solidarity” that holds 
them together (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 366). Families are thus assembled primarily 
through relations of  mutual, horizontal solidarity and have nothing to do “with the 
monopoly of  an organic power (pouvoir) nor with local representation, but [with] the 
potential (puissance) of  a vortical body in a nomad space” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 366). 
It would thus be a mistake to understand nomadic solidarity as simply a matter of  pure 
deterritorialization or unlimited space: a line of  flight from or internal transformation of  
State power. Rather, I am arguing, following Khaldun, that Deleuze and Guattari’s concept 
of  nomadism is a matter of  belonging and unity among heterogeneous relays. 
“Revolutionary movement,” Deleuze and Guattari say, is “the connection of  flows, the 
composition of  non-denumerable aggregates, the becoming-minoritarian of  everybody/
everything. . . . This is not a dispersion or a fragmentation” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 
473). Accordingly, Khaldun defines nomadic (badiya) solidarity (asabiyah) according to two 
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axes of  belonging: the group/family (the condition of  a common descent) and relations of  
solidarity (the concrete practices of  mutual support and relay between groups).  
 So just as a revolutionary condition immanently holds together the becoming of  its 
heterogeneous conditioned concrete elements, so is it immanently related to other 
conditions like a Bedouin solidarity: without the outside prodding of  territory, family, or 
state. And since this evental condition is always a singular-universal or local-absolute, made 
only through local operations, there can be no event of  all events. Such an event would be 
transcendent and outside of  or excluded from events as such, as discussed in chapter III. But 
if  there is an infinity of  infinite events6 whose relations are undecidable, but whose 
conditions are decidable as universally open and egalitarian, then it is at least possible that, 
even though such events are non-denumerable and heterogeneous (illimité, for Laroche), 
there could be, according to Deleuze and Guattari, “larger or smaller [infinities] according to 
the . . . components, thresholds, and bridges” they connect (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 21). 
If  every event is open to universal participation and transformation, then events, by 
definition, are not mutually exclusive. They can, however, be added, combined, or mutually 
reinforced to certain degrees, while never becoming entirely identical. That said, since the 
relation between political conditions is still a fundamentally “undecidable” one, the actual 
labor of  following out the local consequences of  the relations of  solidarity requires more 
than just a revolutionary “decision” that two or more revolutionary political bodies are “in 
solidarity.” 
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6 This is different than saying “an infinity of  events.” In chapter IV I argued that each participatory political 
body was both singular insofar as it was a locally waged struggle but infinite or absolute in the sense that its 
consequences could be carried out anywhere by anyone and infinitely so. This is the definition of  an infinite 
event. An infinity of  infinite events is different and poses a real problem similar to one posed in set theory: 
“the continuum hypothesis.” If  there are multiple infinities, that is, an infinity of  infinities without totality what 
how can we know which are larger or smaller and what their relations are? This is also the problem of  solidarity 
between non-representational body politics. 
Transversal Relays
 Thus, if  solidarity is possible how does it work? By solidarity I mean, the immanent, 
point-by-point connection between at least two heterogeneous evental sequences (an 
immanent condition, its concrete elements, and its forms of  agency). By “connection,” I 
mean the degree to which a concrete element or singularity is affirmed as a consequence or 
singularity of  both evental conditions. Since merely “deciding on the undecidable,” as I 
argued in chapter IV, is insufficient for sustaining the participatory consequences and agents 
of  such a decision, so is merely “deciding on the undecidable” relation between two 
heterogeneous political conditions. Accordingly, it is necessary, for evental solidarity, to 
connect at least one consequence or element from one event to at least one consequence or 
element of  another. The more concrete elements of  an event that are connected to the 
elements of  another event, the greater the degree of  infinity in each event as well as the 
degree of  solidarity between them. In What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari call this the 
“external neighborhood or exoconsistency” of  the event. Its trans-universal or “transversal” 
relations are “secured by the bridges thrown from one [machine] to another” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1994, 90). This is the piece-by-piece labor of  solidarity.
 But since each revolutionary condition is singular, a “connection” or “transversality” 
between connections cannot mean total identification. Rather, this kind of  revolution is 
“constructed piece by piece, and the places, conditions, and techniques are irreducible to one 
another” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 157). Thus two heterogenous conditions become more 
or less connected/identified through an unlimited series of  concrete political practices that act as 
non-communicating relays. This is because “for the nomad,” according to Deleuze and 
Guattari, “locality is not delimited; the absolute, then, does not appear at a particular place 
but becomes a non-limited locality; the coupling of  the place and the absolute is achieved 
not in a centered, oriented globalization or universalization but in an infinite succession of  
196
local operations” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 383). But this infinite succession is not an 
indefinite delay of  solidarity; it is the positive concrete articulation of  increasingly greater 
degrees without a totality of  absolute unification. Just as two different nomadic Bedouin 
families share more or less solidarity over some specific practices and thus “participate to 
some extent in the common descent” (my italics) of  each others’ families, so it is possible to 
say that two or more heterogeneous political conditions participate to a greater or lesser 
extent in each others’ conditions to the degree that they share a number of  the same 
concrete consequences or relays. With this definition we are closer to the earlier political 
meaning of  the word nomos as a mode of  non-limited distribution than we are with the 
derivative fifth or sixth-century Greek definition of  nomos as law (loi), judgement (juger), or 
government (gouverner) (Laroche, 1949, 256). With this definition it is also possible for one to 
occupy multiple heterogeneous conditions at once to the degree that a given distribution of  
bridges of  shared commitment crosses transversally multiple political conditions. This is 
what Deleuze and Guattari call 
 a constructivism, [or] ‘diagrammatism,’ operating by the determination of  the 
 conditions of  the problem and by transversal links between problems: it opposes 
 both the automation of  the capitalist axioms and bureaucratic programming. From 
 this standpoint, when we talk about ‘undecidable propositions,’ we are not referring 
 to the uncertainty of  the results, which is necessarily a part of  every system. We are 
 referring, on the contrary, to the coexistence and inseparability of  that which the 
 system conjugates, and that which never ceases to escape it following lines of  flight 
 that are themselves connectable. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 473)
 We have now been able to finally answer the question, “how can one uphold the 
rights of  a micro-analysis (diffusion, heterogeneity, fragmentation) and still allow for some 
kind of  principle of  unification that will not turn out to be like the State or the Party, a 
totalization or a representation” (Deleuze 2006, 132–33)? The answer requires a 
revolutionary body politic to have at least four specific characteristics: singularity, 
universality, inclusivity, and a participatory structure (defined in chapter IV and rephrased 
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above). It must be local and determinate with a proper name, absolute and infinite in its 
consequences, and open to modification by anyone without pre-defined criteria. Given these 
four characteristics, I have shown how Deleuze and Guattari define a “collective political 
body” by its nomadic solidarity following Laroche and Khaldun. Laroche defines nomos by its 
earlier Homeric roots as the open distribution or arrangement of  a collective body in an 
unlimited and inclusive space. The forest, pasture, mountain steppe, and their inhabitants all 
express this undivided but clearly heterogeneous kind of  distributive unity. Khaldun, then, 
defines the connections between heterogeneous Bedouin families neither by Family, State, or 
Territory, but by two different axes: Common descent and relations of  relayed group 
solidarity. While groups of  common descent never merge entirely, they merge to a greater or 
lesser degree depending on the concrete relations of  group solidarity at a given time. Finally, 
we reached the definition of  nomadic solidarity as the piece-by-piece infinite connection 
(bridging) of  shared concrete actions by two or more heterogeneous political conditions 
(never merging but becoming more or less transversally identical).
Zapatismo and Los Encuentros Intercontinentales: “A World in which Many Worlds Fit”       
 The concept of  nomadism as a theory of  political solidarity does not apply only to 
the historical phenomena of  nomadic peoples. As a “mode of  distribution” it can be used 
elsewhere and for other purposes. Thus, in this next section, I argue that the Zapatistas do 
precisely this with their own concept of  mutual global solidarity. This kind of  solidarity is 
irreducible, not only to the practices of  citizenship and difference, but to other existing 
models of  political solidarity as well. I begin by distinguishing between four types of  
solidarity—internationalism, third-world solidarity, rights solidarity, and material solidarity—
and address Thomas Olesen’s (2005) argument that they all share a one-way model of  
unequal solidarity. I then argue that, rather than break with these models altogether, the 
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Zapatistas rely on and offer all these types of  solidarity to some degree but ultimately rely 
most on a practice of  global solidarity defined not by unequal relations between first and 
third world, nor by north and south, but by mutual relations between singular universals. 
Beyond this, I argue that their practice of  creating Encuentros Intercontinentales 
(Intercontinental Gatherings) and Puentes de solidaridad (Bridges of  Solidarity) do more than 
just define a “mutual” relation of  global solidarity; they define a singular-universal theory of  
inclusive solidarity held together by coordinated concrete actions. 
Neither Citizenship nor Difference
 The singular-universal solidarity of  the Zapatistas, however, does not emerge from 
nowhere. It emerges, along with modern citizenship and other theories of  solidarity, from 
the development of  the modernist concept of  universalism: the idea of  a global 
consciousness, a shared humanity, and an aspiration to see the world as a single place. 
Regardless of  how successful modern democracies have been at achieving this universality, 
the Zapatistas express a new development in its theory and practice. In contrast to the 
modern theory of  citizenship based on the territorial nation-state that was criticized earlier 
in this chapter for its exclusionary character, for the Zapatistas there is no essential criteria for 
political inclusion/exclusion, like what territory one was born in, what nation one is a part 
of, or what state grants one rights, etc.). “Dignity is that nation without nationality,” they say 
“that rainbow that is also a bridge . . . that rebel irreverence that mocks borders, customs, 
and wars” (Marcos 2004b, 642).  
 Additionally, in contrast to the theory of  political affinity as difference proposed by 
Simon Tormey (2006, 146), the Zapatistas, I argue, do not insist on the political solidarity of  
universal singularity or difference alone, but on a type of  organized global solidarity found in 
the unique structure of  the Encuentros that must be constructed through a particular network 
of  concrete bridges against neoliberalism. Merely affirming global autonomy and difference 
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means nothing without the discipline of  building revolutionary political bodies and bridges 
based on participatory conditions and concrete actions. “Shared difference” tells us nothing 
about the type of  organization required to assemble singularities without falling into the trap 
of  representation. “A world in which many worlds fit” as the Zapatistas say, thus cannot be 
realized by merely affirming that “there are a multiplicity of  worlds” (universal singularity) 
but must be constructed in such a way that many worlds fit together (through concrete 
bridges and encounters) without creating a representational hierarchy like a territory, nation, 
state, or market. That way is not universal difference for the Zapatistas; that way is 
participatory democracy and global solidarity through networked horizontalism. 
Four Types of  Solidarity
 Finally, the singular universal solidarity used by the Zapatistas is different from four 
other kinds of  solidarity: internationalism, third-world solidarity, rights solidarity, and 
material solidarity. Left-wing internationalism, especially active in the early twentieth century, 
proposed socialist cosmopolitanism as an alternative to global capitalism. It was defined by 
two features: First, it assumed a certain homogeneity of  industrial working conditions and 
thus a high degree of  global class consciousness that was ready for revolution, as can be seen 
in the slogan “workers of  the world unite.” Second, it was vertically structured around 
national parties and states with socialist governments, and not by the voluntary organization 
of  individuals and civil society. Since the end of  the cold war, however, this type of  
international solidarity has virtually disappeared (Waterman 1998, 236). Third World 
solidarity, on the other hand, grew out of  the student movement and anti-war movements of 
the 1960s (especially in Europe and the USA) and was particularly important in supporting 
the national liberation movements of  the 1970s. It was also defined by two features: First, it 
was concerned with economic and structural inequalities between rich and poor; and, 
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second, although it divided the world into first, second, and third (or North and South), it 
still reflected a growing global consciousness. 
 Rights solidarity is concerned mainly with human rights abuses and other forms of  
repression by states or extra-legal forces. “Rights solidarity work generally aims at putting 
pressure on human rights abusers. This may be done directly by lobbying the governments 
of  the countries in which the violations take place, but often pressure is exerted through 
other governments or intergovernmental organizations expected to have a certain influence 
on the state in which the violations occur” (Olesen 2005, 256). Rights solidarity is based on a 
strong conception of  universal human rights but is often less politicized because it focuses 
on the violations of  individual persons instead of  more structural causes. Material solidarity 
is directed mainly towards victims of  natural disasters (droughts, earthquakes, etc.) or 
human-caused disasters (wars, refugees, etc.) and to different forms of  underdevelopment. 
“Material solidarity reflects a global consciousness in that it constructs a world in which the 
fate of  distant people can no longer be ignored. Like rights solidarity, material solidarity is 
often carried out by organizations that take a neutral position in specific conflicts” (Olesen 
2005, 256). 
 All four of  these types of  solidarity, according to Olsen, display elements of  
inequality. These forms are all based on a predominantly one-way relationship between those 
who offer solidarity and those who benefit from it. The ones who offer solidarity are 
generally richer and have more resources to offer those who do not have them. Solidarity 
based on charity and altruism may have beneficial consequences but insofar as they are not 
aimed at changing the structural conditions under which they currently exist, then they risk 
perpetuating the inequality that allows them to exist. While Third World solidarity and 
international solidarity may be more politicized in the sense that they demand structural 
changes to the current global inequalities, they also rely on some of  the binary historical 
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perspectives that characterized the Cold War, where the providers of  solidarity are mostly 
from Europe and the USA and those elsewhere receive aid on the condition they affirm the 
strategies of  the provider. 
 Global solidarity, in contrast, is defined by a high degree of  mutual aid between 
activists that blurs the distinction between the provider and receiver of  solidarity and has a 
larger emphasis on non-material solidarity (inspiration, education, affection, etc.). All 
solidarity activists are understood to be affected, to varying degrees, by the same neoliberal 
system. Global solidarity thus emphasizes similarities between socially distant people while 
simultaneously respecting local differences. In this way global solidarity aims to move 
between the singular and the universal without subordinating one to the other. This is the 
kind of  solidarity practiced by the Zapatistas. 
The Encuentros
 But it would be inaccurate to argue that the Zapatistas have always given or received 
solidarity in a purely mutual way. The Zapatistas still receive material aid from Europe and 
the United States to a significant degree, and human rights groups continue to be a presence 
in Chiapas. While the global inequality of  wealth and power does pose a challenge to the aim 
of  mutual global solidarity, this does not mean that global solidarity should not be the larger 
aim and practice of  revolutionary movements.7 The Zapatistas and their supporters thus aim 
to create the first global solidarity network based on this model of  mutual aid. The network 
they invented to do this was called the Encuentro Intercontintal. 
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7 Although those who currently practice rights and material solidarity would also agree that the current system 
of  inequality is a barrier to global solidarity, the difference is that material aid solidarity does not change the 
conditions for the production of  the material donated. The Zapatistas on the other hand aim to transform the 
conditions for material production and distribution not just in theory but also in practice. Their political 
philosophy is explicitly anti-capitalist and their practical creation of  workers cooperatives and use of  
democratic fair trade practices concretely express their rejection of  private property, profit, and charity. Despite 
their relative poverty they have done their best to provide aid to others like Cuba and Palestine.
 On July 27th, 1996, three thousand activists from more than forty countries 
converged in Zapatista territory in Chiapas, Mexico, for the First Intercontinental Encuentro for 
Humanity and Against Neoliberalism. The aim of  the first Encuentro was to gather the 
“minorities of  the world: the indigenous, youth, women, homosexuals, lesbians, people of  
color, immigrants, workers, peasants, etc” (Marcos 2004b, 642), and create a space where 
they could share their struggles and create bridges of  mutual global solidarity. Here, the 
Committees in Solidarity with the Zapatista Rebellion were created and charged with the further 
organization of  more Encuentros on the five continents—Europe, Asia, America, Africa, and 
Oceania—in the coming years. And the closing remarks of  this first Encuentro (2nd Declaration 
of  La Realidad) defined two central aims of  this new network: First, to make a collective 
network of  all singular struggles and resistances. 
 This intercontinental network of  resistance, recognizing differences and 
 acknowledging similarities, will search to find itself  with other resistances around the 
 world. This intercontinental network of  resistance will be the medium in which 
 distinct resistances may support one another. This intercontinental network of  
 resistance is not an organizing structure; it doesn't have a central head or decision 
 maker; it has no central command or hierarchies. We are the network, all of  us who 
 resist. (Marcos 2004b, 645)
Second, to create an intercontinental network of  alternative communication among all 
struggles and resistances that 
 will search to weave the channels (tejer los canales) so that words may travel all the 
 roads (camine todos los caminos) that resist . . . [and] will be the medium by which 
 distinct resistances communicate with one another. (Marcos 2004b, 645)
 In 1997 the Second Encuentro was held in southern Spain, drawing over three thousand 
activists from over fifty countries. It was here that the plans for the creation of  an offshoot 
group called Peoples Global Action (PGA) originated in order to “move beyond debate and 
exchange and propose action campaigns against neoliberalism, worldwide” (De Marcellus 
2001). Beginning in 1998, PGA organized a series of  direct actions and interventions on 
various global elite summits (G7, WTO, etc.) that are now identified as the Anti-
203
Globalization Movement. Over the years the multiplication of  similar forums on global 
resistance (World Social Forum [2001–present], Regional Social Forums, etc.) have all 
emphasized the core proposals made at the First Encuentro (Horizontal [non-hierarchical] 
organization and global alternative communications without centralization) (Khasnabish 
2008, 238). 
 The fact that Zapatismo has profoundly influenced the last fifteen years of  the 
largest actions and gatherings in the world against neoliberalism is by now well-known and 
recounted in several important books on the history of  the anti-globalization movement 
Notes from Nowhere 2003; Khasnabish 2008; Curran 2006; Engler 2007). But it is precisely 
because its historical influence is so well-known that its conceptual determination remains so 
obscure. Thus, beyond empirical descriptions of  this history, I propose to isolate and extract 
two practical concepts that emerge from the Zapatista experiment that allow us both to 
understand the larger theory of  political affinity in the present revolutionary sequence as well 
as to develop and further its practices elsewhere. These two practices are the Encuentro 
(Encounter) and the Puente (Bridge). 
 The Encuentro is not just a historical phenomena or empirical gathering of  various 
marginalized peoples against neoliberalism that takes place around the world; it is a political 
strategy of  heterogeneous common decent and transversality. It was created as an alternative 
to the exclusionary affinity of  citizenship based on the false universality of  nations and 
borders, and to the pure affirmation of  universal singularity based on shared difference 
alone. It also invented a new kind of  revolutionary solidarity historical different from others 
based on unequal power relations. An Encuentro, according to the 2nd Declaration, is a non-
hierarchical and non-centralized space where different groups share their conflicts and 
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agreements without the a priori conditions of  territorial, state, or economic belonging.8 It is a 
space where multiple singular-universal conditions (see section II) co-exist as irreducible 
struggles in their own right and autonomy. The Encuentro itself  is thus not a decision-making 
body, it is not like the revolutionary body politic discussed in chapter IV (based on 
participatory and rotational democracy, etc.). According to the 2nd Declaration, the Encuentro is 
a medium (el medio) in which distinct resistances are in the middle of  something undivided, 
together. 
 But without any decision-making or criteria for inclusion/exclusion, what is the 
meaning of  the Encuentro? What are they in the middle of  together? According to the 2nd 
Declaration, the Encuentro is not an entirely neutral medium, but neither is it a new political 
condition to which all attending political conditions must now give themselves over. The 
Encuentro “is not a new organization, theorization of  Utopia, global program for world 
revolution, scheme, or enumeration of  international orders . . . that assures all of  us a 
position, a task, and a title” (2004b, 645), as the Zapatistas say. Rather, the Encuentro is “for 
Humanity and Against Neoliberalism.” 
 We should take care to distinguish the name of  the Encuentro, as the transversal 
operation holding together many singular universal political conditions, from both political 
ideology (representational or programmatic content) and from a new revolutionary body 
politic of  all revolutionary body politics (composed of  a new and larger condition, set of  
elements, and agencies). Rather the name, “For Humanity and Against Neoliberalism,” is a 
generic name or mutable referent for the descent common to two or more heterogeneous 
political conditions like a particular group solidarity between Bedouin families. By 
formulating Humanity and Neoliberalism in the most generic way possible, the Encuentro is 
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8 The non-exclusionary and egalitarian presupposition of  the Encuentro immediately distinguishes it from racist, 
or discriminatory organizations with perhaps similar structures but who discriminate a priori based on territorial 
race, nation, gender, sex, etc.
able to achieve a maximum of  inclusion and mutual support with a minimum of  
representation and reference.
 Just as Deleuze and Guattari argue, following Laroche, that the Greek root nem, from 
which the word nomadism is derived, originally implied a mode of  distribution or agencement 
in an unlimited or non-divided space, so the Zapatistas have created the practice of  the 
Encuentro that equally distributes heterogeneous political events (women, indigenous, 
teachers, environmental activists, people of  all races, etc.) without dividing them 
hierarchically or based on the exclusionary criteria invented by the State, the Party, or the 
Vanguard. Perhaps another way of  describing the unlimited nomadic space of  the 
mountains, planes, or forest that are without border or division is “a world in which many 
worlds fit”: a locality that has become unlimited alongside others. Similarly, in Kahldun’s 
theory of  solidarity, Bedouin nomad “families” express a common descent undivided by 
Genealogy or the State and distributed in a shared medium (l’esprit de corps) where several 
heterogeneous groups share the group solidarity of  a “collective body” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987, 366). In sum, the Encuentro is the name for the generic transversal relationship 
between multiple singular universal political conditions without division, hierarchy, or 
decision-making capacity. It is an open and non-divided nomadic space, but one that is 
clearly and unambiguousy “Against Neoliberalism and for Humanity.” 
 However, just as it was impossible to understand the concept of  solidarity in 
Deleuze and Guattari without the concept of  “exoconsistency” (that bridged the concrete 
machines between different abstract machines), so it is impossible to understand the concept 
of  solidarity in Zapatismo without also understanding the concept of  the Puentes or Bridges 
that connect the concrete actions and consequences of  different political events.       
 Accordingly, the 2nd Declaration proposes a second dimension of  solidarity to the first 
non-hierarchical, non-decision making, collective space of  the Encuentro: “a network of  
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woven channels [or bridges] so that words [and actions] may travel all the roads that resist.” 
Firstly, the concept of  the network (red) discussed in the 2nd Declaration should be 
distinguished topologically as an “all channel network” (where everyone can connect 
horizontally with everyone else in a non-linear series: like a rhizome) in contrast to “a chain 
network” (where top-to-bottom communication is mediated hierarchically: like a tree) as well 
as a “star or hub network” (where actors are tied to a single central, but non-hierarchical, 
actor and must go through that node to communicate with others: like a tuber) (Ronfeldt 
1998, 7). Secondly, while the Encuentro proposes a inclusive network or mutual encounter 
between “particular struggles and resistances” (singular-universal conditions), this does not 
guarantee that such an encounter will produce any concrete connections or coordinated 
actions between them. Thus, the second dimension of  the Encuentro proposed by the 
Zapatistas is the creation of  an alternative media network for the coordination (weaving) of  
concrete words and actions around the world. As Ronfeldt et al. highlight:
More than ever before, conflicts are about "knowledge" — about who knows (or can 
be kept from knowing) what, when, where, and why. Conflicts will revolve less 
around the use of  raw power than of  "soft power," as applied through "information 
operations" and "perception management" that is, media-oriented measures that aim 
to attract rather than coerce and that affect how secure a society, a military, or other 
actor feels about its knowledge of  itself  and its adversaries. Psychosocial disruption 
may become more important than physical destruction. . . Mexico’s Zapatista 
movement exemplifies [this] new approach to social conflict that we call social netwar.
(Ronfeldt 1998, 7)
 Accordingly, Marcos says, this media network is “not about communication, but of  
building something” (Marcos 2001a). Media not only produce knowledge but also produce 
effects that transform reality. Thus, it may be “the word which is the bridge to cross to the 
other” (Marcos 1998, 8), but in “extend[ing] the bridges that joined those who were the 
same, [it makes] them different” (Marcos 2004b, 437). The concept of  the bridge, deployed 
often in Zapatista writings, is accordingly not a common link between two different things 
that brings them into a unity; it is a differentiator between two common things that keeps 
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them apart and holds them together as differentiated. It is in this sense that the Zapatistas say 
that their “goal [has been] to be a bridge on which the many rebellions in the world can walk 
back and forth” (Marcos and the EZLN. 2008): a bridge that has connected and 
differentiated the mutual transformation of  everyone by everyone else, communiqué by 
communiqué and direct action by direct action. The “coming and going” of  world rebellions 
across this bridge is what gives Zapatista solidarity its nomadic, ambulant, and mutualistic 
features. But at the global level solidarity cannot be realized as a generic encounter against 
neoliberalism; it has to take on specific coordinated words, slogans, and actions, i.e., one or 
more bridges that connect two or more singular struggles together. The more concrete 
bridges or connections made through this alternative media network the stronger and larger 
the network. Because the network is nothing more than the connections or bridges that 
effectuate it, there is no Party, State, or Bureaucracy at the head; it is acephalic. Accordingly, 
it lays the largest possible conditions for a federated world-wide decision-making process.9 
 Just as different lines of  descent for Khaldun’s Bedoudin nomads are modified and 
more or less merged through concrete “points of  relay” or group solidarity (without 
essential determination by Family or State), so the Zapatistas have inspired a global solidarity 
of  Encuentros that modify and more or less merge heterogeneous struggles against 
neoliberalism through a concrete media and action network (without hierarchy, 
centralization, Territory, State, or Party). And just as Deleuze and Guattari say that a plane of 
consistency has an endoconsistency that holds its concrete machines together internally and 
an exoconsistency that connects it to other “nomadic traits” or “points of  relay” on other 
planes of  consistency outside itself, so the Zapatistas define their political plane of  
consistency by its participatory internal institutions (the JBG) as well as by its external 
bridges to other concrete struggles elsewhere: Puentes de Solidaridad. Thus revolutionary 
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9 The problem of  a world-wide decision making process will be expanded upon in chapter VI.
events “are defined only by their mutual solidarity” and not independently of  it (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987, 45). Opposed to static and one-way models of  solidarity based on State and 
Party bodies, the Zapatistas propose a mutual collective-body defined by nomadic solidarity: 
walking, encountering, and bridging.10
Conclusion
From the global gatherings to the summit protests, the 
polymorphous spirit of  Zapatismo was in the air.
(Maccani 2006, 109)
! At the end of  the previous chapter we were confronted with the problem of  how 
revolutionary transformations, having become consistently established in participatory body 
politics, could connect with other such institutions to form a global alternative to state-
capitalism. If  there is no longer a central axis of  struggle, but a multiplicity of  struggles each 
with its own conditions, elements, and agencies, how can they be unified or organized into a 
global struggle without deploying the traditional forms of  State, Party, and Representation? 
This chapter’s response to this problem was threefold. 
 Firstly, I argued that the present model of  liberal citizenship based on territorial 
nation-states is unable to provide a theory of  universal emancipation/solidarity because of  
(1) the increasing proliferation of  non- and extra-national organizations that now replace 
many of  the benefits offered by citizenship; (2) the increasing amount of  criminalized 
migrants that are denied citizenship; and (3) the increasing frequency (since WWI) in which 
nation-states have suspended the constitutional rights of  citizens in modern democracies. 
Additionally, territorial nation-states are necessarily exclusionary insofar as they are limited 
by a particular geography, identity, and sovereign law. Conversely, I argued that the theory of  
universal singularity (that what everyone has universally in common is difference/singularity 
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10 “Preguntando caminamos,“ “Asking, we walk.”  
in-itself) is only able to provide an aporetic definition of  political affinity without a theory of 
how such singularities would be able to assemble into specific political distributions. 
 Secondly, I argued that Deleuze and Guattari (following Laroche and Khaldun) 
provide a conceptual alternative to these models in their theory of  nomadic solidarity based 
on (1) non-divided distribution and (2) the federated relay between points. Given the four 
characteristics of  a revolutionary body politic as defined in chapter IV (local and determinate 
with a proper name, absolute and infinite in its consequences, and open to modification by 
anyone without pre-defined criteria), Deleuze and Guattari define a “collective political 
body” of  solidarity as the piece-by-piece infinite connection (bridging) of  one or more 
shared concrete actions between two or more heterogeneous political conditions, never 
merging but becoming more or less transversally identical.
 Finally, I argued that the Zapatista Encuentros (in combination with the JBGs) offer an 
alternative to both citizenship and difference-based affinities as well as unequal forms of  
solidarity. I argued that just as Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of  nomadic solidarity was 
based on non-divided distribution and federated relay, so the Zapatistas’ practice of  mutual 
global solidarity (Encuentro) is based on inclusive horizontalism and networked bridges of  
coordinated action. While the first provides the conditions for a generic network of  mutually 
supported resistance against Neoliberalism (“One no, many yeses”) the second weaves 
together (federates) these multiple relays and channels into concrete action-decisions. The 
Zapatista conceptual practice of  the Encuentro aims to create a nation without nationality, a 
people without territory: “a world in which many worlds fit.”       
 But while this chapter has been able to conceptualize the revolutionary political 
solidarity that characterizes the present revolutionary sequence by drawing on the work of  
Deleuze, Guattari, and the Zapatistas, it also confronts a final tension between the two 
dimensions internal to the functioning of  mutual global solidarity: the need for an open 
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(non-decision-making) horizontalism and the need for a coordinated network of  decision-
oriented action. While it may be possible for heterogenous participatory political bodies to 
govern themselves, to share their methods and struggles at global Encuentros, and even to 
coordinate global actions through alternative media, this does not entirely resolve the 
problem of  how decisions are to be made, implemented, and modified at the global level 
without creating a global State, Party, or Representation. How is it that the largest organized 
gathering of  anti-neoliberal forces in the world, like the World Social Forum, can begin to 
make and enforce a meaningful transition away from global capitalism? Although the 
question of  global transition and decision-making is not answered in this chapter (or in 
practice by the Zapatistas or the World Social Forum), the theory of  solidarity developed 
here does lay a fecund groundwork for answering it. In the next and concluding chapter I 
end with a reconstruction and reflection upon the relative accomplishments of  each chapter, 
the success of  the argument of  the dissertation as a whole, and outline areas for further 
investigation.
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION
Introduction
 We are witnessing today, the return of  a new theory and practice of  revolution. In its 
early stages of  development and far from homogenous in character, we are witnessing not 
only the growing belief  that “another world is possible” beyond capitalism, but that it “must 
be made” in such a way that the mistakes of  previous revolutionary efforts are not repeated: 
the capture of  the state, the representation of  the party, or the privileged knowledge of  the 
vanguard. Philosophically, I have argued we can see this new shift in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
concepts of  historical topology, constructive deterritorialization, political consistency, and 
nomadic solidarity. Politically, I have argued we can see this alternative at work in the 
Zapatista’s use of  a multi-centered diagnostic of  suffering; in their creation of  the Juntas de 
Buen Gobierno; in their leading by obeying, and their practice of  mutual global solidarity. 
 But Deleuze, Guattari, and the Zapatistas are neither models for how revolutions 
should proceed nor representations of  how they are actually proceeding. Rather, what I have 
argued in this dissertation is that Deleuze, Guattari, and the Zapatistas have created several 
concepts and practices that are both indicative of, and useful for, the further creation of  a 
new theory and practice of  revolution that is no longer be subordinated to the processes of  
political representation or their mere critique by a speculative Leftism based on difference 
and potentiality. I have followed a conditional imperative. If  one wants to struggle, here are 
some tactics to do so. Accordingly, I have proposed and defended the use of  four theoretical 
practices extracted and reassembled from the work of  Deleuze, Guattari, and the Zapatistas: 
(1) a diagnostic theory of  history, (2) a prefigurative theory of  political transformation, (3) a 
participatory theory of  revolutionary institutions, and (4) a theory of  political affinity based 
on mutual global solidarity. Insofar as these theoretical practices have clarified and further 
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developed the actual, and not merely possible, existence of  a non-representational 
revolutionary process, this dissertation has succeeded in its aims. 
Method and Interpretation
 These four theoretical practices were created through a methodology of  extraction 
and re-assembly. Organized around the revolutionary problematics of  history, 
transformation, the body politic, and affinity, each of  the four central chapters of  this 
dissertation developed selected concepts and practices from Deleuze, Guattari, and the 
Zapatistas and composed them into a new practical-theoretical assemblage that responded to 
the problematic at hand. In chapter II, I took Deleuze and Guattari’s historical topology 
based on the immanent processes of  coding, overcoding, and axiomatization and the 
Zapatistas intersectional diagnostic deployed during La Otra Campagna and argued that we 
can extract and reassemble from these what I call a multi-centered political diagnostic useful 
for determining the dangers and potentials for historical and revolutionary action. In chapter 
III, I showed how a prefigurative theory of  political transformation, taking place in the 
future anterior, could be extracted from Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of  
deterritorialization and the Zapatista’s Juntas de Buen Gobierno. In chapter IV, I showed how a 
participatory theory of  revolutionary institutions could be extracted from Deleuze and 
Guattari’s concept of  consistency and the Zapatista’s practice of  direct democracy used in 
the Juntas. Finally, in chapter V I showed how a political theory of  belonging based on 
mutual global solidarity could be extracted from Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of  
nomadism and the Zapatista’s creation of  Intercontinental Encuentros. The aim of  this 
extraction and reassembly was not to show how theory is derived from practice or practice 
from theory, but to put the two into a mutually illuminating relationship that 
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highlights their heterogeneity and puts them both to use in responding to the problems of  
revolutionary praxis. Where one may have been a bit clumsy, hit a wall, or left one with 
questions, the other breaks though and pushes forward. In this dissertation I have tried to 
use theory and praxis as system of  relays around the four tactical problems of  revolutionary 
praxis. 
 The creation of  these theoretical practices was also accomplished through an 
interpretive intervention in the context of  the scholarly literature on Deleuze and Guattari 
and the Zapatistas. In both cases I have made a similar intervention: to reject interpreting 
their work as either trying to merely tweak or fortify processes of  political representation 
(state, party, etc.) or as merely expressing the potentiality of  another a post-representational 
politics. Rather, I have read Deleuze, Guattari, and the Zapatistas as political constructivists, 
that is, I have read them as making real contributions to the creation of  a new collective 
political body. In the case of  Deleuze and Guattari, I locate this constructivst turn in A 
Thousand Plateaus and What is Philosophy? and argue that we can extract from these works a 
positive and contemporary vision of  revolutionary theory. In particular, the concept of  
political consistency I take from What is Philosophy? in chapter IV relies on an extension of  
the definition they give to philosophy (as a constructivism) to the field of  politics. This is an 
extension left undeveloped in What is Philosophy? and only mentioned once in A Thousand 
Plateaus. Thematically and conceptually I have shown that such an extension is not textually 
unsupported and can in fact be mutually illuminating. The real motivation for this 
intervention, however, is that without this constructive focus Deleuze and Guattari’s 
philosophy risks a variety of  dangers articulated well by their critics: political ambivalence, 
virtual hierarchy, subjective paralysis, etc.
 I chose to read the Zapatistas in a similar way that focused on their later (2003–
present) writings and activities in order to highlight a similarly constructive turn. In 1994, the 
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Zapatistas declared war against the Mexican government. This failed. In 1996–98, the 
Zapatistas then attempted to gain formal recognition of  their indigenous autonomy from the 
Mexican government. This also failed. In 2003 the Zapatistas took a step back to listen 
carefully to the Mexican people, to critique and improve Zapatista political processes (the 
place of  women and the EZLN “military”), and to began a long term project of  sustaining 
the autonomous Zapatista territories and their relations with other organizations around the 
world. This was their constructive turn. Beyond the “failure” or “success” of  the Zapatista 
Uprising to capture the state or win rights from it, it is important to analyze what new 
revolutionary tactics developed after the traditional ones had failed: the rejection of  the 
vanguard, the prefigurative creation of  the autonomous communes, the global network of  
mutual aid, etc. It is from these practices that I extract the four conceptual indicators of  a 
new revolutionary sequence. 
Difficulties and Implications 
 One of  the difficulties of  this methodology of  extraction and reassembly was to 
articulate the heterogeneity between Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts and the Zapatista’s 
practices without granting a privilege or explanatory power of  one over the other. Instead of 
extracting a set of  concepts and showing their implications for the history of  political 
philosophy or extracting a set of  practices and showing their implications for the history of  
social movements, I have extracted four theoretical practices and shown their implication for 
four important problematics in revolutionary praxis. My hope is that these assemblages will 
form further relays in the future development of  these problematics. Accordingly, the 
theoretical practices I developed in each of  the chapters acts more like a circulating reference 
point or strange attractor for heterogenous concepts and practices than it does like a 
representation of  theory exemplified by practice. Each chapter has tried to maintain a real 
215
difference between theory and practice without synthesizing the two. And it is precisely this 
difference that leaves open further mutations in the theoretical practices I have put forward. 
If  the reader picks up on this relay style of  assembly, it is entirely intentional. 
 The task of  this dissertation was to elaborate responses to four questions 
confronting the current, albeit young, revolutionary sequence: (1) What tools does it offer us 
to understand the current historical conjuncture of  power such that political change is 
desirable? (2) How can this current conjuncture of  power be transformed? (3) What kinds of 
new social bodies will be put in the place of  or along side the old ones? (4) Who can belong 
to or participate in this transformative social body? What I have shown by drawing on 
Deleuze, Guattari, and the Zapatistas is that we can locate a novel and consistent set of  
answers to these questions in the present sequence. The conclusion I have aimed to draw 
from this effort is that we should reject the prevailing notion that “there is no alternative to 
global capitalism and representational politics,” and that “another world is merely possible.” 
My conclusion is that another world is already underway (theoretically and practically) within 
and alongside the old. The task now is to develop and defend it. 
 The larger implication of  this conclusion is that contemporary political philosophy 
interested in understanding the current conjuncture should offer us more than the mere 
conceptual conclusion that another politics is possible. Additionally, it should offer us a 
philosophical interrogation of  actually existing theoretical practices currently underway: what 
dangers they face, what kinds of  changes they have made, what kinds of  alternatives they 
propose, and what the larger connections they have created. The aim of  these efforts, what 
Foucault called “a history of  the present,” is to critically develop the theories and practices 
that are already in action here and now and force philosophy to become adequate with 
contemporary political struggle. This dissertation has shown that such an interrogation is not 
only possible but productive in resolving some of  the basic questions often posed to post-
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structuralist political philosophers and contemporary revolutionaries. If  not capitalism, then 
what else is there? This question deserves more than the affirmation that “another world is 
possible.” We must be able to say that “another world is actually underway” beneath and 
along side the old. 
 The future of  such a research agenda will require not only an effort on the part of  
philosophers to create concepts that mobilize the insights of  political struggle but also an 
effort by militants themselves to deploy the insights of  political philosophy. If  the success of 
this dissertation and research program is based on its usefulness for those engaged in 
struggle on both fronts, then the above effort is absolutely necessary. 
 In the course of  this dissertation it may have appeared that there was an order or 
sequence to the concepts presented: first the diagnostic of  power, then the intervention and 
transformation of  this power, afterward its establishment in a body politic, and finally its 
global or universal connection. But this is only the logical order presented in this 
dissertation, not the existential coexistence in which these activities occur. Diagnosis, 
prefiguration, participation, and solidarity often occur at the same time and to different 
degrees in a revolutionary praxis. Even if  they are not directly active in a political situation 
they must be actively warded off  or avoided as such. 
 But due to the focus of  this dissertation on the problematics of  revolution the 
reader may be wondering if  there is any room for state politics at all in new theory and 
practice of  revolution. Has this dissertation rejected wholesale the strengths and place of  
state politics within revolutionary struggles themselves? Absolutely not. Although I deal with 
this problem most directly in chapter II, as the second kind of  political transformation, what 
Deleuze and Guattari call, “relative positive deterritorialization,” it is true that many 
questions remain. Should revolutionary politics always and in all cases reject relative, partial, 
or reformist transformations internal to the processes of  representation (territory, state, and 
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capital)? Might even the smallest reforms, protests, and desires play the role of  catalysts in a 
larger process? Deterritorializations are not necessarily good or bad; the question of  
revolution, however, is to what degree these crises, lines of  light, etc., begin to take on an 
alternative and prefigurative consistency beyond the state. Territory, state, and capitalist 
processes can and do unleash potentials that should not be dismissed, but they also need to 
take on a new consistency. Hugo Chavez is currently trying to create a revolution in 
Venezuela by deterritorializing the state from the top down, while simultaneously creating a 
consistency of  its fragments from the bottom up. In Argentina unemployed workers have 
appropriated abandoned factories and created worker self-management. These are not 
revolutions, but they are important processes of  deterritorialization that may contribute to 
one. As was also argued in chapter II, there is no essentially privileged site of  power or single 
place to begin a revolution. Thus what is required is a diversity of  tactics on a diversity of  
fronts as the same time.  
Directions for Future Research
 Among the four theoretical practices proposed in this dissertation, two are 
particularly fecund and require further development. The first is the practical concept of  a 
participatory body politic proposed in chapter IV. A participatory body politic is composed 
of  three basic components: (1) the conditions under which it emerges and determines who 
counts as part of  its body politic, (2) the distribution of  concrete elements that express and 
constitute its body, and (3) the kinds of  subjects who connect and transform these conditions 
and elements. What kind of  social body are Deleuze, Guattari, and the Zapatistas proposing 
to put in place of  representational political processes? They propose the creation of  a new 
revolutionary body politic based on the mutual transformation of  these three components. 
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 What needs to be developed further in this theoretical practice are the different 
dimensions under which this kind of  reciprocal determination takes place. There are, for 
example, participatory relations, gender relations, economic relations, ecological relations, 
etc. that need further elaboration appropriate to each domain. Chapter IV, however, was only 
able to develop this practical concept in relation to the creation of  specifically political body. 
Further research into the concept of  participation as an alternative to political representation 
and mere potentiality would thus require an analysis into the conditions, elements, and 
agencies specific to these domains. For instance, the existence of  a third person form of  
political agency, according to Deleuze, Guattari, and the Zapatistas is not merely a human 
feature. This raises the question of  what role ecological entities play in a directly democratic 
revolutionary institution? For instance, how can ecological entities be included in political 
decision-making? 
 The second major theoretical practice that requires further development in this 
dissertation is the concept of  solidarity. Chapter IV argued that a post-representational 
revolutionary body politic is not only possible but theoretically and practically already 
underway. Chapter V argued that revolutionary body politics can share each others struggles 
as their own and coordinate anti-capitalist actions on the global scale. However, this does not 
entirely answer the question of  how decisions are to be made, implemented, and modified at 
the global level among heterogeneous groups without creating a global State, Party, or 
process of  representation. How is it that the largest organized gathering of  anti-neoliberal 
forces in the world, like the World Social Forum, can begin to make and enforce a 
meaningful transition away from global capitalism? Chapter V has laid the philosophical and 
political foundations for something like this to emerge, but it has not entirely been able to 
anticipate the next step. Further research into the contemporary problematics of  a post-
representational and anti-capitalist global alternative needs to clarify and interrogate this 
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problematic as it is currently happening at the World Social Forum. What are the theories, 
practices, and risks that are being proposed to turn this horizontal network into a federated 
decision making body? 
IV. Concluding Overview
 Guided by the methodology of  relayed assemblage and the interpretive intervention 
of  constructivism, this dissertation has drawn on the work of  Deleuze, Guattari, and the 
Zapatistas in order to extract four theoretical practices helpful for aiding and understanding 
the present, albeit young, revolutionary sequence. In particular, it proposed four specific 
practical-theoretical concepts or “tactical pointers for the conditional imperative of  political 
struggle,” as Foucault would say. Accordingly, the chapters of  this dissertation proposed and 
defended each of  these theoretical practices in turn. Each chapter was composed of  three 
major subsections. The first section critically distinguished the proposed theoretical practice 
from two others: political representation and political potentiality without construction. The 
second section then drew on at least one major concept from Deleuze and Guattari’s 
philosophy to build this theoretical practice. Finally, the third section drew on at least one 
major political practice in Zapatismo to assemble this theoretical practice.    
 Chapter II argued that the return to revolution located in Deleuze, Guattari, and the 
Zapatistas can be characterized by a diagnostic theory of  history motivated by the relative 
rejection of  all previous forms of  historical representation (Patriarchy, Racism, Statism, 
Capitalism, Vanguardism, etc.) and a concern for their immanent diagnosis. Although this 
claim clearly rejects the representational readings of  Deleuze, Guattari, and Zapatismo, it is 
obviously quite similar to the philosophy of  difference described in chapter I. As such, it 
may seem relatively uncontroversial. But, my argument included three crucial and under-
emphasized dimensions of  this rejection. Firstly, that it is a relative rejection, meaning that 
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political representation always plays a more or less active role in political life even if  only in 
the mode of  “being warded off ” by more participatory practices. That is, even in its relative 
absence, it still exerts force as an immanent historical potential of  any political practice. 
Secondly, I argued that political representation is not an homogenous philosophical category, 
since there are several distinctly different types of  representation. These differences are 
found not only in terms of  content, such as race, class, gender, economics, and so on, but 
also in formal structure, such as coding, overcoding, and axiomatization. Thirdly, I argued 
that these types of  relative representation always intersect and coexist with each other to 
different degrees in every political situation. Against the necessary historical emergence of  
these different types of  political representation, but also against their merely contingent and 
coexistent emergence, I argued instead, drawing on Deleuze and Guattari’s Historical 
Topology and what the Zapatistas call their Diagnostic of  Suffering, that their return to 
revolution is characterized by a mobilization of  these types of  representation as an 
immanent political diagnostic of  the situation to be transformed. But how then can one 
escape this matrix of  political power and representation? 
 In chapter III I argued that this return to revolution found in the work of  Deleuze, 
Guattari, and the Zapatistas is also characterized by a prefigurative theory of  political 
transformation: the aim of  constructing a new present within and alongside the old. 
Opposed to achieving revolutionary transformation by an evolutionary process of  transition, 
progress, and reform in representation, or achieving it simply through a spontaneous rupture 
with the present, I argued that prefigurative political transformations take place in the future 
anterior. I was not arguing that this kind of  revolutionary struggle theorized only takes place 
in the future anterior. I argued instead, drawing on Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of  
deterritorialization and the Zapatista’s theory of  the Juntas de Buen Gobierno, that the future 
anterior is only one of  four types of  political transformation (Relative Negative, Relative 
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Positive, Absolute Negative, and Absolute Positive). Prefigurative revolutions are thus those 
types of  transformation that, realizing each type of  political transformation to some degree, 
are able to sustain the maximal creation of  a new present as the expression of  the past and 
future of  their situation and connect it up to other struggles happening elsewhere. This type 
of  political revolution is thus neither tied entirely to the determinations of  its past (with its 
pre-given possibilities) nor to the potentialities of  its future always yet-to-come. Rather, it is 
constructive of  a new present that transforms both the past and the future. But how then 
are these revolutionary transformations sustained beyond their relative autonomy and 
prefiguration?
 In chapter IV I thus argued that we can locate in Deleuze, Guattari, and the 
Zapatistas a participatory theory of  a revolutionary body politic that does not simply 
establish new conditions for political life based on a “more just” sphere of  political action 
whose foundational principles are still held independently from the constituted sphere where 
such principles are deployed. Nor does a participatory body politic merely aim to establish 
anti-institutions, whose sole purpose is to undermine all forms of  representation and await 
the possibility that something new, and hopefully better, may emerge. Rather, a participatory 
and revolutionary body politic is built and sustained through an expressive process whose 
founding conditions are constantly undergoing a high degree of  direct and immanent 
transformation by the various practices and people who are effected, to varying degrees, by 
its deployment. In particular, I argued in this chapter that this participatory “feedback loop” 
can be located in Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of  Consistency, found in A Thousand 
Plateaus and What is Philosophy? and in the Zapatista’s political practice of  Rule by Obeying 
(Mandar Obedeciendo). I argued that, in order to understand the structure and function of  this 
consistency and of  ruling by obeying in revolutionary body politics, we need to understand 
how their conditions, elements, and agencies work differently than in representational and 
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anti-representational political bodies. I argued this by drawing on three concepts in Deleuze 
and Guattari’s philosophy that correspond to the conditions, elements, and agencies of  
consistent revolutionary institutions: the abstract machine, the concrete assemblage, and the 
machinic persona. Just as these three concepts immanently transform one another in a 
relationship of  “order without hierarchy,” according to Deleuze and Guattari, so does ruling 
by obeying provide the egalitarian frame-work for the revolutionary institutions of  the 
Zapatistas (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 90). But as of  yet the problem of  how these kinds of 
revolutionary institutions can connect up with each other remains unaddressed by this 
theory of  participation. 
 Thus, chapter V drew on all the previous chapters in order to argue that we can 
locate in Deleuze, Guattari, and the Zapatistas a theory of  revolutionary political affinity 
based on mutual global solidarity. Revolutionary political affinity, I argued, is not simply a 
matter of  integrating marginalized demands back into the dominant territorial-nation-state 
apparatus based on modifying specific criteria for citizenship or aiding those who need help. 
Nor is it a matter of  recognizing the universal singularity of  all beings to become other than 
they are. Rather, revolutionary political affinity is a matter of  solidarity: when revolutionary 
institutions, namely, those who remain un-represented or excluded from dominant forms of  
political affinity, find in each other, one by one, the universal transmitability and mutual aid 
of  each other’s singular struggles. Singular-universal solidarity is thus not a matter of  
recognition, charity, or even radical difference, but rather a mutually federated difference or 
“contingent holism” of  heterogenous singular-universal events in world-wide struggle. The 
task of  this chapter was thus to avoid both of  these dangers and propose a theory of  
political solidarity instead, drawn from Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of  Nomadism and 
the Zapatistas’ global practice of  Encuentros Intercontinentales. In particular, I argued first 
against the concepts of  citizenship and difference as desirable models of  political belonging 
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insofar as the former is structurally exclusionary and the later is unable to theorize any 
concrete relations between multiple coexistent conditions. Secondly, I argued that, opposed 
to these two dangers, revolutionary solidarity should be defined instead by the federated 
connection between multiple singular-universal conditions without totality. 
 Finally, in this chapter I have concluded with a reconstruction and reflection upon 
the relative accomplishments of  each chapter and the argument of  the dissertation as a 
whole. In particular, I addressed the problem left remaining at the end of  the dissertation: 
how can mutual global solidarity take on a decision-making power such that the world’s 
organized struggles against neoliberalism can form an acting counter-power without private 
property, necessary political exclusion, economic exploitation, or a centralization of  this 
counter-power itself ? While Deleuze, Guattari, and the Zapatistas provide excellent 
resources for constructing a new political philosophy of  revolution, they are only able to lay 
the ground work to deal with this problem that has also yet to be resolved in the present 
revolutionary sequence at the level of  the World Social Forum. This is a significant barrier to 
a real transition away from global capitalism and requires a further philosophical 
investigation into the currently emerging forms of  political and philosophical 
experimentation that contribute to this problem’s resolution.
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